Case Summary (G.R. No. 102918)
Factual Background
Nessia’s complaint alleged that Mayor Fermin “deliberately ignored” and caused the non-payment of his vouchers covering reimbursement of travel expense allowances. Nessia attributed the alleged inaction to an alleged political hostility: he claimed that the mayor refused to act on his claims because Nessia had defied Fermin’s request made to municipal officials to register and vote in the 1980 local elections in Victorias.
In his answer with counterclaim, Fermin disputed the complaint’s allegations and asserted that Nessia’s claims could not be approved because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations. The Municipality of Victorias concurred with Fermin and added that Nessia was at fault because he allegedly did not provide Fermin a justification for drawing funds beyond appropriations, and he failed to amend his vouchers to conform to the budget limitations. Victorias was later declared in default due to non-appearance at the pre-trial conference.
The parties presented evidence. Based on the record, the trial court found that the vouchers had been received by the mayor’s secretary, and that Fermin had taken no meaningful action on Nessia’s follow-up letters. Nessia presented letters inquiring about the status of the vouchers. The trial court treated the lack of action on these follow-ups as evidence of malicious refusal.
Trial Court Proceedings and Judgment
After the issues were joined and evidence was submitted, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment on 24 April 1987 in favor of Nessia. The court ruled that Mayor Fermin maliciously refused to act on plaintiff’s vouchers. It relied on the circumstance that the vouchers were received by the secretary of Fermin, which the trial court treated as negating the mayor’s claim that he did not receive the vouchers. It further held that even assuming the mayor had not received the vouchers, he remained answerable because, upon receiving Nessia’s follow-up letters, he should have inquired into their whereabouts.
The trial court also took note of an admission by Fermin during trial that he did nothing on the vouchers. On this basis, it awarded damages, though not in the full amount prayed for, granting Nessia, inter alia, reimbursement and damages including moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees, plus costs.
Proceedings in the Court of Appeals
Both Nessia and Fermin appealed to the Court of Appeals. Nessia sought an increase in moral and exemplary damages. Fermin sought exoneration from liability. The Municipality of Victorias did not appeal.
On 19 July 1991, the Court of Appeals dismissed Nessia’s complaint. It reasoned that there was lack of cause of action. In its view, the complaint itself and Nessia’s testimony admitted that Fermin acted on the vouchers, or at least that Nessia’s allegations failed to establish unjust inaction. The Court of Appeals characterized the case as one where Nessia accused Fermin of failing to act on vouchers that were not shown to have been received, and further suggested that even if received, the vouchers could not be approved because they were submitted late and were not supported by appropriation.
The Court of Appeals thus reversed the trial court and dismissed the action.
Issues Raised in the Supreme Court
Nessia elevated the case under Rule 45 and raised four issues, which the decision summarized as follows: first, whether the Court of Appeals could reverse the trial court’s decision which had become final and executory as against the Municipality of Victorias for failure to appeal; second, whether the Court of Appeals could grant affirmative relief to Victorias, which did not appeal; third, whether the Court of Appeals erred in exonerating Fermin from malicious refusal to act; and fourth, whether the Court of Appeals erred in exonerating both Fermin and Victorias from liability, including whether Fermin maliciously refused to act and whether the dismissal of the complaint absolved Victorias despite its failure to appeal.
Before reaching the merits, the Court addressed a procedural challenge raised by the Office of the Solicitor General concerning the alleged absence of a certified true copy of the assailed Court of Appeals decision.
Procedural Objection on Certified True Copy
The Office of the Solicitor General contended that the challenged decision attached to the petition was not a certified true copy as required by Circular 1-88, par. 3, and argued that the petition should have been dismissed. The Court rejected the contention. It held that the assailed decision, referred to as Annex “A,” had in fact been certified by Atty. Leandro D. Rebong, a Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals. Thus, the procedural objection did not warrant dismissal.
Appraisal of Evidence: Receipt of Vouchers and Credibility
On the substantive question of whether there was unjust inaction, the Supreme Court sustained the trial court’s findings. It emphasized the deference owed to trial courts on matters of credibility and evaluation of conflicting testimonies, since the trial judge had the superior vantage point in ascertaining truth and detecting falsehood.
The Court found no error in the trial court’s appreciation of the contradictory testimonies relating to the receipt of the vouchers. It upheld the conclusion that the vouchers were actually received. It noted that the claim that the name inscribed on the lower left portion of the transmittal letter did not match the customary signature of the mayor’s secretary did not convincingly establish non-receipt. The Court also observed that it was not convincingly shown that a signature purportedly belonging to the secretary was not her handwriting.
The Court added that, once proof of receipt had not been confuted, the normal presumption of regularity in official acts supported the view that the secretary received the enclosures and properly handled the transmittal. It reasoned that if the secretary had not received the enclosures, she should have indicated that fact on the letter.
Interpretation of Fermin’s Alleged Response
The Court also addressed Fermin’s alleged response to Nessia: “basta indi lang ako mag-approve sang vouchers mo.” It held that the remark should have been interpreted in Ilonggo as a refusal to approve or disapprove, considering Nessia’s testimony that he had presented his vouchers and that Fermin had not acted on them. The Court relied on the principle articulated in Roque v. Buan that where the Court of Appeals decision suffers from ambiguity and there is a doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the trial court because the trial judge’s firsthand evaluation of testimony is decisive.
Consistency of Allegations with Article 27 Theory
Fermin also argued that Nessia could not claim relief under Article 27 of the Civil Code because his theory of unjust inaction allegedly contradicted allegations in the complaint stating that Fermin denied/refused the vouchers. To support this position, Fermin invoked Sta. Ana v. Maliwat and Cunanan v. Amparo, where the Court had ruled that a pleader is not allowed to contradict his own pleading.
The Supreme Court did not accept this framing. It held that the complaint’s allegations—such as that the mayor refused and continued to refuse payment or that the mayor refused to act—should not be construed as an admission only of disapproval. The Court explained that refusal to pay is not inferred solely from disapproval of a claim. It may also arise from inaction. Thus, the allegations were not necessarily inconsistent with Nessia’s theory of unjust inaction.
Budgetary Appropriations: Inaction May Still Generate Liability
Fermin’s defense also invoked the alleged absence of sufficient appropriation, arguing that he could not be compelled to approve vouchers that exceeded budgetary limits.
The Court accepted the general proposition that Fermin could not be compelled by mandamus to approve vouchers when they exceeded budgetary appropriations. However, it ruled that this did not foreclose liability for damages under Article 27. The Court explained that Article 27 penalizes a public servant’s malicious refusal or neglect, without just cause, to perform an official duty, even when the issue involves the administrative processing of pending matters.
To illuminate the character of the wrong, the Court invoked Sec. 3(f) of R.A. 3019, which criminalizes neglecting or refusing, after due demand, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on a matter pending before a public official for the purpose of discriminating against an interested party. The Court reasoned that public officials must act expeditiously: approval or disapproval advances the administrative process. In contrast, official inaction stalls the process and leaves the claimant in uncertainty.
In this connection, the Court referenced Baldivia v. Lota to explain that when disapproval is mandated by the absence of appropriation, mandamus relief may not lie. Yet Baldivia also contained observations that a claimant may seek recovery against the municipality and then pursue mandamus against the municipal council and mayor to compel the enactme
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 102918)
Parties and Procedural Posture
- The petitioner Jose V. Nessia sued the respondents Jesus M. Fermin, then Mayor of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and the Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental for recovery of damages and reimbursement of expenses connected with his official duties as then Deputy Municipal Assessor.
- Victorias was declared in default for non-appearance at the pre-trial conference.
- The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment on 24 April 1987 in favor of Nessia, granting reimbursement and damages.
- Both Nessia and Fermin appealed to the Court of Appeals, with Nessia seeking an increase in moral and exemplary damages, and Fermin seeking exoneration.
- The Municipality of Victorias did not appeal the trial court’s decision.
- On 19 July 1991, the Court of Appeals dismissed Nessia’s complaint for lack of cause of action.
- Nessia filed an appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45, raising four issues.
- Before reaching the merits, the Court resolved a procedural objection by the Office of the Solicitor General concerning whether the assailed appellate decision was a certified true copy under Circular 1-88, par. 3.
Key Factual Allegations
- Nessia alleged that Fermin deliberately ignored and caused the non-payment of vouchers covering Nessia’s claim for reimbursement of travel expense allowances.
- The complaint alleged a motive for such inaction: Nessia supposedly defied Fermin’s request that municipal officials register and vote in Victorias in the 1980 local elections.
- Fermin denied the allegations and countered that the claims could not be approved because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations.
- The Municipality concurred with Fermin and added that Nessia was at fault because he allegedly did not provide justification for drawing funds beyond the appropriation and did not amend his vouchers to conform to the budget.
- The trial court found that Nessia’s vouchers were received by Fermin’s secretary, based on documentary handling and follow-up letters.
- The trial court also found that, even assuming receipt issues were raised, Fermin should have inquired upon receipt of Nessia’s follow-up letters and then acted on the vouchers.
Trial Court Findings
- The trial court found that Fermin maliciously refused to act on Nessia’s vouchers, basing its conclusion on Fermin’s inaction on follow-up letters.
- The trial court ruled that the vouchers were received by Fermin’s secretary, thereby rejecting Fermin’s claim that the vouchers were not received by him.
- The trial court held that even if the vouchers had not reached Fermin, Fermin remained answerable because he should have made inquiries into their whereabouts upon receiving follow-up letters.
- The trial court awarded reimbursement and damages, while granting less than what Nessia prayed for.
Court of Appeals Ruling
- The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action.
- The appellate court treated the evidence and Nessia’s own testimony as not establishing unjust inaction, concluding that Fermin’s alleged conduct did not amount to wrongful failure to act.
- The Court of Appeals characterized the controversy as involving vouchers that were not shown to have been received by Fermin and, even if received, as claims submitted late and allegedly unsupported by an appropriation.
- In dismissing the case, the Court of Appeals effectively exonerated the Municipality from liability as a consequence of the dismissal.
Supreme Court Procedural Issue
- The Office of the Solicitor General argued that the assailed Court of Appeals decision attached to the petition was not a certified true copy, as required by Circular 1-88, par. 3, and thus the petition should have been dismissed.
- The Court held the objection to be erroneous because the decision (Annex “A”) was certified by Atty. Leandro D. Rebong, a Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.
- The Court therefore proceeded to resolve the substantive issues.
Issues Raised on Appeal
- Nessia contended that the Court of Appeals could not reverse the trial court’s decision as against the Municipality of Victorias, considering the Municipality’s failure to appeal.
- Nessia further contended that the Court of Appeals erred in granting affirmative relief to the Municipality which did not appeal.
- Nessia argued that the Court of Appeals erred in exonerating Fermin from liability for malicious refusal to act on Nessia’s claims under Art. 27 of the Civil Code.
- Nessia argued that the Court of Appeals erred in exonerating both Fermin and the Municipality from liabilities, focusing on whether Fermin maliciously refused to act and whether the dismissal should have affected the Municipality despite its lack of appeal.