Title
Navarro vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 112389-90
Decision Date
Aug 1, 1994
Navarro's appeal dismissed for failing to file brief; motion for new trial denied as alleged payment evidence insufficient to rebut B.P. 22 presumption.
motion for new trial
dismissal of appeal
motion of reconsideration
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 179909)

Factual Background

Navarro was prosecuted for the issuance of checks that were dishonored, leading to her conviction under B.P. 22. On appeal, she sought procedural accommodation. By a motion dated September 15, 1992, she requested an extension of 90 days from September 17, 1992 within which to file her brief. The Court of Appeals granted the request. Navarro, however, failed to file her brief within the extension and likewise failed to file it even beyond the extended period. As a consequence, on February 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals dismissed her appeal pursuant to Sec. 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, grounded on her abandonment or failure to prosecute by non-filing of the brief.

Court of Appeals’ Dismissal and Navarro’s Attempted Remedy

After the dismissal, Navarro proceeded with a different remedial step. On March 1, 1993, she filed a motion for new trial on the ground of “newly-discovered evidence.” The motion was denied on June 9, 1993. In denying it, the Court of Appeals emphasized that its resolution dismissing the appeal had not yet become final when the motion for new trial was filed. Even so, the appellate court held that Navarro failed to demonstrate any compelling reason or justifiable cause for reinstatement of the appeal through the device of a motion for new trial. It further stated that, before the motion for new trial could be considered, Navarro was incumbent to move for reconsideration of the dismissal resolution; no such motion for reconsideration was filed, and the resolution thus became final as of March 5, 1993. Navarro later filed a motion for reconsideration on July 5, 1993, but it was denied on October 20, 1993.

Issues Raised in the Petition for Review

In her petition for review, Navarro presented two principal allegations. First, she claimed that she had not sought reinstatement of her appeal; she allegedly merely asked that a new trial be granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. Second, she challenged the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that she should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order before filing her motion for new trial, asserting that such conclusion allegedly lacked support under the applicable rules and jurisprudence.

Respondent’s Position

The Solicitor General contended that the appeal had already been dismissed, and that Navarro’s course of action after the dismissal could not be entertained. The Solicitor General maintained that Navarro should have moved for reconsideration of the dismissal order to have her appeal reinstated, because the respondent court could not entertain and give due course to other pleadings filed after dismissal of the appeal. The Solicitor General also advanced that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of interest to prosecute because Navarro had filed only a notice of appeal and not an appellant’s brief. The Solicitor General further asserted that the denial of the motion for new trial was correct, though not necessarily solely on the technical ground of failure to file a motion for reconsideration first.

The Court’s Treatment of the Timing and Procedural Posture

The Supreme Court acknowledged that Rule 124, Sec. 14 of the Rules of Court provides that at any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused becomes final, the latter may move for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence material to his defense, with conformity to the requirements of Sec. 4, Rule 121. Applying this, the Court explained that Navarro’s motion for new trial was filed while the dismissal of the appeal had not yet become final in the strict sense relevant to the timing rule. The Court reasoned as follows: the dismissal of the appeal became final after the lapse of 15 days from service upon the accused or counsel, unless the period was suspended by a motion for new trial. Navarro received notice of the dismissal resolution on February 17, 1993, so the dismissal became final on March 5, 1993. Since the motion for new trial was filed on March 1, 1993, it was within the period allowed under Rule 124, Sec. 14. The Court noted that the Court of Appeals itself had admitted that its dismissal resolution “had not yet become final” when Navarro filed her motion for new trial.

Why the Motion for New Trial Was Still Properly Denied

Despite recognizing that the motion for new trial was timely, the Supreme Court sustained its denial on additional and substantive grounds. It observed that Navarro’s conduct indicated that she did not act to pursue meaningful reinstatement of her dismissed appeal. It appeared she filed the motion for new trial only after receiving a copy of the dismissal resolution. The Court noted that she took no steps to manifest to the Court of Appeals that she was filing a motion for new trial because of newly-discovered evidence. It also recorded that she did not move to have her appeal reinstated after dismissal, and it pointed to the lack of explanation for her failure to file her brief within the time extended by the Court of Appeals. The Court added that it was only on March 1, 1993, which was more than 60 days after the expiration of the 90-day extension, that she filed her motion for new trial, suggesting she likely hoped to retrieve her lost appeal through that motion, but such hope was not legally supported.

The Supreme Court then articulated a separate basis for denial: even if the purported newly-discovered evidence were admitted, it would at most have been corroborative, and the Court did not consider it of such substantial character as to overturn the judgment of conviction. The decision emphasized the evidentiary significance of the alleged payment in relation to the timing required by B.P. 22. It stated that the alleged newly-discovered evidence would have made a difference only if it had stated the date of payment, because the defense under B.P. 22 depends on payment made within five banking days from notice of dishonor. As narrated, the alleged payment—relating to an undated receipt—could not preclude conviction, because the critical circumstance was that the receipt was undated.

Substantive Discussion on B.P. 22 and the Complete Defense of Timely Payment

The Court reiterated the elements of the offense under B.P. 22: first, the making, drawing, and issuance of any check for value; second, the knowledge of the maker or drawer at the time of issue that funds or credit with the drawee bank were insufficient for payment in full upon presentment; and third, subsequent dishonor for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason where the drawer, without valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. It further held that payment of the value of the check—whether by the drawer or the drawee bank—within five banking days from notice of dishonor constitutes a complete defense. This defense operates to rebut the prima facie presumption under B.P. 22 that the drawer had knowledge of insufficiency at the time of issuance and presentment.

In Navarro’s case, the Supreme Court determined that she failed to overcome the statutory presumption because she did not substantiate the allegation of payment in a manner that established compliance with the five-banking-day requirement. It found no proof that the payment, assuming it was made at all, was effected within the required period from notice of dishonor. Thus, even on the assumption that Navarro’s claimed payment could constitute new

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