Title
Navarosa vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 157957
Decision Date
Sep 18, 2003
Navarosa and Esto contested Libacao mayoralty; RTC declared Esto winner. COMELEC upheld execution pending appeal, dismissing Navarosa’s jurisdictional challenge and supersedeas bond claim. SC affirmed, citing public interest and estoppel.
election protest
jurisdiction
execution pending appeal
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 157957)

Factual Background

Petitioner Navarosa and respondent Esto were candidates for mayor of Libacao, Aklan, for the elections held on 14 May 2001. On 17 May 2001, the COMELEC Municipal Board of Canvassers of Libacao proclaimed Navarosa as the duly elected mayor based on a margin of three (3) votes over Esto. Respondent Esto, alleging irregularities in the canvassing of ballots in several precincts, filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No. 129 in the RTC Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan. Petitioner Navarosa filed a counter-protest, also alleging canvassing irregularities prejudicial to her.

After revision of the contested ballots, the trial court rendered judgment on 4 March 2002 in favor of respondent Esto. It found that Esto obtained 4,595 votes against Navarosa’s 4,553 votes, resulting in a margin of 42 votes in favor of Esto. The trial court consequently annulled the earlier proclamation of Navarosa, declared Esto the elected mayor of Libacao, and ordered Navarosa to pay P14,215.00 as actual and compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus costs.

Proceedings in the Trial Court: Appeal and Execution Pending Appeal

Petitioner Navarosa appealed to the COMELEC, docketed as EAC Case No. A-9-2002. Respondent Esto, during the pendency of the appeal, moved for execution of the judgment pending appeal. Navarosa opposed, but alternatively offered to post a supersedeas bond should execution pending appeal be granted.

On 22 March 2002, the trial court granted Esto’s motion for execution pending appeal, subject to the filing of a P300,000 bond covering the salary and emoluments of the municipal office and/or the payment of damages. At the same time, the trial court granted Navarosa’s alternative request to stay execution pending appeal, upon the filing of a supersedeas bond in double the amount posted by the protestant, or P600,000, conditioned upon her posting by a specified deadline. In its order, the trial court justified immediate execution by relying on the doctrine that such execution may be warranted in election cases due to the need to give substance to the electorate’s mandate and because a significant portion of the mayoral term had already lapsed. It also ruled that Section 3, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure did not require a further showing of “good reasons” before a stay could be effected through the filing and approval of a sufficient supersedeas bond.

Both parties moved for reconsideration of the 22 March 2002 order, but the trial court denied their motions on 5 April 2002.

Petition to the COMELEC and Subsequent Denial by the En Banc

Respondent Esto filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC against the trial court’s order. Petitioner Navarosa, in her memorandum before the COMELEC, raised for the first time the issue that the trial court allegedly failed to acquire jurisdiction over the election protest because Esto allegedly did not pay the required COMELEC filing fee.

In its resolution of 28 November 2002, the COMELEC Second Division affirmed the grant of execution pending appeal and nullified the stay allowed by the trial court through the supersedeas bond. The Second Division reasoned that it was the COMELEC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, that could order the stay or restrain the immediate execution of a trial court’s decision in an election protest; it held that the trial court could not later restrain execution by allowing a supersedeas bond under Section 3, Rule 39.

The Second Division also addressed the jurisdictional argument on the COMELEC filing fee. It found that respondent judge had correctly determined that the filing fee had been duly paid, and that the records reflected a total payment covering the required amount. It held that any purported issue of incomplete payment of the filing fee was without basis on the face of the official receipts and related election fee forms.

Petitioner Navarosa sought reconsideration, but the COMELEC En Banc denied the motion on 15 April 2003. Navarosa thereafter filed the present petition for certiorari with the Court, and the Court later required the parties to maintain status quo on 10 June 2003 pending resolution.

Issues Presented

Petitioner Navarosa assigned three main errors framed as grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. First, she argued that the COMELEC En Banc acted with grave abuse by affirming the Second Division resolution despite alleged failure to resolve the trial court’s supposed lack of jurisdiction over the election protest due to Esto’s alleged non-payment of the mandatory COMELEC filing fee of P300.00.

Second, she contended that the COMELEC En Banc acted with grave abuse by affirming the execution pending appeal despite the absence of “good reasons” to order execution of the trial court’s decision pending appeal.

Third, she argued that the COMELEC En Banc acted with grave abuse by affirming the Second Division despite the latter’s ruling that the trial court had no power to stay execution pending appeal by resorting to Section 3, Rule 39, on the theory that Section 3 does not apply to election cases.

The Court’s Ruling on Jurisdiction and the COMELEC Filing Fee

The Court first addressed the contention that the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over the election protest because of incomplete payment of the COMELEC filing fee. It noted that, procedurally, Navarosa should not have raised the issue in this petition because the petition concerned an ancillary matter—the propriety of allowing execution pending appeal. Still, the Court chose to resolve the jurisdiction issue because it allegedly affected the trial court’s authority to issue the ancillary order on execution pending appeal.

Section 9 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provided that no protest, counter-protest, or protest-in-intervention would be given due course without payment of a filing fee of P300.00 for each interest. Petitioner Navarosa argued that although respondent Esto allegedly paid P515.00 for filing and other fees, only P100 was credited to the COMELEC General Fund required as the COMELEC filing fee; she contended that the balance went to other funds such as the Judiciary Development Fund, the Legal Research Fund, and the Victim’s Compensation Fund.

The Court, however, found that the COMELEC Second Division actually did rule on the alleged non-payment issue. It held that, based on the trial court’s election fees form, of the total P515 paid, only P100 was credited to the General Fund; thus, respondent Esto had only paid part of the required P300. The Court then discussed the doctrinal treatment of incomplete payment, noting that earlier rulings had held that an election protest was not dismissible when a protestant relied on the trial court’s assessment and paid only a portion of the filing fee. The Court also referenced later rulings that had tightened the requirement after the doctrine in Loyola v. COMELEC. It nonetheless held that those later stricter rulings did not apply to the present case.

The Court stressed that at no time during the full-blown trial did petitioner Navarosa raise the issue of incomplete payment. Instead, she actively participated in the proceedings by filing her answer, presenting evidence, and later praying for a stay of execution by posting a supersedeas bond. Most importantly, she invoked the trial court’s authority by filing a counter-protest seeking affirmative reliefs. The Court concluded that Navarosa’s belated timing of the jurisdiction argument estopped her from attacking the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction at such a late stage. It underscored the principle that although jurisdictional issues cannot ordinarily be waived, estoppel may nevertheless bar a party from raising such issues when the party’s conduct has rendered the belated challenge unjust.

In light of its finding on estoppel, the Court held that the trial court’s continued exercise of jurisdiction could not be undone after the revision of ballots and the rendering of judgment. The Court stated that the remedy for the supposed deficiency would be for respondent Esto to pay the P200 deficiency in the COMELEC filing fee. The Court reasoned that it would be highly unjust to the electorate to dismiss an election protest and foreclose the determination of the true winner based on a minor deficiency in the filing fee after the trial court had already completed revision of the contested ballots.

The Court’s Ruling on “Good Reasons” for Execution Pending Appeal

Turning to the propriety of execution pending appeal, the Court reiterated the requirements for granting it in election protest cases: (1) a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (2) the existence of “good reasons”; and (3) an order granting execution pending appeal that must state the “good reasons.”

The Court observed that petitioner Navarosa conceded compliance with the first and third requisites. The dispute centered on whether the trial court and the COMELEC correctly found “good reasons” to justify discretionary execution. The Court relied on Ramas v. COMELEC, which summarized the circumstances qualifying as “good reasons,” including the public interest and will of the electorate, the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office, and the length of time the election contest had been pending.

The trial court had relied on two “good reasons”: first, that execution would give substance and meaning to the people’s mandate; second, that more than ten months or nearly one-third of the three-year mayoral term had already lapsed. The Court held that these were consistent with Ramas and found no grave abuse of discretion. It also rejected reliance on Camlian v. COMELEC, explaining that the circumstances described in Camlian—particularly the self-serving and unsubstantiated character of certain claims and allegations of dilatory appeal—were absent in the present case. Thus, Camlian di

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