Case Summary (G.R. No. 83558)
Procedural posture and key dates
Respondent judge issued an order dated June 8, 1988 granting a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining NPC from undertaking stevedoring and arrastre services at its Calaca pier and directing NPC either to enter into a contract for such services or to conduct public bidding. NPC sought relief by petition for certiorari to annul that order; the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order on June 15, 1988 and, after plenary consideration, resolved the matter by the challenged decision (rendered thereafter).
Applicable law and authorities
Primary statutory and regulatory sources: Republic Act No. 6395 (NPC Charter), as amended; Presidential Decree No. 1818, Section 1 (prohibiting issuance of injunctions against government infrastructure projects, natural-resource development projects, and certain public utilities, explicitly including stevedoring and arrastre contracts); rules and doctrines governing preliminary injunctions and mandamus. Controlling jurisprudence relied upon in analysis: Montelibano v. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc.; Republic v. Acoje Mining Company, Inc.; Teresa Electric & Power Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission and Filipinas Cement Corporation; Araneta v. Gatmaitan; Buayan Cattle Co., Inc. v. Quintillan; Sy Ha v. Galang; Aprueba v. Ganzon; Avenue Arrastre & Stevedoring Corporation v. Commissioner of Customs; Tangonan v. Pano; and Tabigue v. Duvall. (The 1987 Constitution is the applicable constitutional backdrop in effect at the time of the decision.)
Issues presented for decision
- Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining NPC from conducting stevedoring and arrastre operations at its pier in light of PD No. 1818. 2. Whether NPC was authorized by its corporate charter to undertake stevedoring and arrastre services at its own pier. 3. Whether the issuance of the preliminary injunction and the concomitant directive to enter into a contract or conduct public bidding constituted grave abuse of discretion, given the absence of a protectable right and whether mandamus was an appropriate remedy.
Jurisdictional ruling under Presidential Decree No. 1818
The Court held that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in issuing the preliminary injunction. Section 1 of PD No. 1818 bars any court in the Philippines from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in controversies involving government infrastructure projects or public utilities operated by the government, explicitly citing stevedoring and arrastre contracts among the covered activities. NPC, being a government-created public utility engaged in generation and distribution of electric power, falls within the protective ambit of PD No. 1818; therefore the trial court lacked power to enjoin NPC’s lawful execution or operation of such activities.
NPC’s corporate power to perform stevedoring and arrastre services
The Court rejected the trial court’s conclusion that NPC’s charter (RA No. 6395, as amended) did not empower NPC to undertake stevedoring and arrastre services. Section 3(1) of the Charter authorizes NPC to do acts reasonably necessary, incidental, auxiliary or useful to accomplish its corporate purposes, which include construction, operation and maintenance of power plants and related works to achieve total electrification. Applying the established test—whether a logical and necessary relation exists between the questioned act and the corporate purpose—the Court reasoned that the NPC-owned pier receives coal exclusively used to fuel the Batangas thermal plant and that stevedoring (unloading and handling of coal) is incidental and indispensable to the operation and maintenance of that power plant. The Court relied on precedent recognizing that corporations may exercise powers reasonably necessary to promote corporate ends even if not expressly enumerated in their charters.
Requirements for issuance of a preliminary injunction and application to the facts
The Court reiterated the established prerequisites for a preliminary injunction: a clear showing by the complainant of a right to be protected and that the acts enjoined violate that right. Here, the private respondent’s contract for stevedoring services had already expired before the suit, and its PPA permit for cargo handling at the Calaca pier had likewise expired. There was therefore no existing contractual or statutory right of private respondent to be preserved by injunctive relief. NPC had no legal obligation to renew the contract and had been authorized by the PPA to provide cargo handling services at its pier. As
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 83558)
Case Citation and Panel
- 252 Phil. 747; Third Division; G.R. No. 83558; Decision dated February 27, 1989.
- Reported as NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE ABRAHAM P. VERA, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 90, QUEZON CITY AND SEA LION INTERNATIONAL PORT, TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., RESPONDENTS.
- Resolution authored by Justice Cortes.
- Concurrence by Chief Justice Fernan, and Justices Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, and Bidin.
Parties and Roles
- Petitioner: National Power Corporation (NPC).
- Private Respondent: Sea Lion International Port, Terminal Services, Inc. (complainant below).
- Judicial Respondent: Honorable Abraham P. Vera, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 90, Quezon City.
- Also named in the underlying suit: Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) (as party in the lower complaint).
Factual Background
- NPC owns a pier located at the Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Calaca, Batangas.
- The pier receives coal shipments used exclusively to fuel NPC's Batangas coal-fired thermal power plant for electric power generation.
- Sea Lion International Port, Terminal Services, Inc. (private respondent) previously held a Contract for Stevedoring Services for coal-handling operations at NPC’s plant; that contract had expired prior to the commencement of the suit.
- Private respondent also held a PPA permit for cargo handling services at the NPC Calaca pier, which had likewise expired.
- NPC undertook stevedoring and arrastre services at its pier after the private respondent’s contract and permit had expired.
- Private respondent filed a complaint for prohibition and mandamus with damages against NPC and PPA, alleging bad faith and grave abuse of discretion in NPC’s non-renewal of the contract and in NPC’s takeover of stevedoring services.
- Respondent judge initially issued a restraining order against NPC enjoining it from undertaking stevedoring services at its pier; subsequently the judge issued an order dated June 8, 1988 issuing a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining NPC from further undertaking stevedoring and arrastre services at the pier and directing NPC either to enter into a contract for those services or to conduct a public bidding; private respondent was allowed to continue stevedoring and arrastre services at the pier.
Lower Court Proceedings and Relief Sought in the Petition
- Upon issuance of the restraining order/preliminary injunction, NPC filed an “Urgent Motion” to dissolve the restraining order, asserting (inter alia):
- That respondent judge lacked jurisdiction under Presidential Decree No. 1818 to issue the order.
- That private respondent, whose contract had expired before suit, failed to establish a cause of action for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
- Respondent judge denied NPC’s motion and issued the preliminary injunction (order dated June 8, 1988).
- NPC filed a petition with the Supreme Court seeking annulment of the respondent judge’s order.
- The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order on June 15, 1988; after pleadings were filed (private respondent’s comment and petitioner’s reply), the case was submitted for decision.
Issues Presented to the Court
- Whether the respondent judge had jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction in the circumstances of this case, in view of Presidential Decree No. 1818.
- Whether NPC is empowered by its charter, Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, to undertake stevedoring and arrastre services at its pier.
- Whether private respondent established the requisite right and cause to merit issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction after its contract and PPA permit had expired.
- Whether the respondent judge’s directive ordering NPC to enter into a contract for stevedoring and arrastre services or to conduct a public bidding constituted an improper writ of mandamus or an unwarranted intrusion into corporate discretion.
Governing Statute Quoted (Presidential Decree No. 1818)
- Quoted provision (Section 1): No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.
- The Court treated NPC as a public utility covered by the protective ambit of PD No. 1818.
NPC Charter Provisions Quoted (Republic Act No. 6395, as amended)
- Purpose sections referenced (Secs. 1 and 2): national policy of total electrification; development of hydroelectric and production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources to meet industrial development, dispersal and rural electrification needs.
- Charter empowerment (Sec. 3(1) quoted in part): NPC was empowered to construct, operate and maintain power plants, reservoirs, transmission lines, and other works, and “To exercise such powers and do such things as may be reasonably necessary to carry out the business and purposes for which it was organized, or which, from time to time, may be declared by the Board to be necessary, useful, incidental or auxiliary to accomplish said purpose...”
- The Court