Title
National Power Corp. vs. Provincial Government of Bulacan
Case
G.R. No. 207140
Decision Date
Jan 30, 2023
NPC contested RPT assessments on Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant machineries and land, claiming tax exemptions. SC ruled NPC liable, citing non-exclusive use of machineries, failure to pay under protest, and premature appeal filing.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 193301)

Procedural history in summary

Municipal Assessor of Norzagaray issued two notices of assessment to NPC: a Machineries Assessment for the period January 1, 1996–December 31, 2005 (tax due originally PHP 113,960,000.00) and a Land Assessment for January 1, 1997–December 31, 2006 (initially PHP 18,475,003.20). NPC appealed administratively to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA). LBAA denied NPC’s protest and ordered payment. On appeal, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) affirmed. NPC then appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc, which affirmed the CBAA and denied reconsideration. NPC filed a Petition for Review to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.

Notices of assessment — particulars and revisions

Machineries Assessment listed eleven facilities (e.g., main dam, spillway and taintor gates, diversion and tailrace tunnels, penstock, power intake structures, surge tunnel, draft tube gates/hoists) aggregated to the stated tax liability for the 1996–2005 period. For the Land Assessment the Municipal Assessor later acknowledged an initial error in assessment level and issued an amended statement of account (June 1, 2007) reducing the land tax to PHP 6,485,422.60 for the covered period; this amendment was confirmed in a subsequent letter dated July 12, 2007.

NPC’s claims and procedural defense

NPC advanced two principal contentions before the administrative boards and in judicial proceedings: (1) the machineries and equipment assessed are exempt from real property tax (RPT) under Section 234(c) of the LGC because they are actually, directly and exclusively used in the generation and transmission of electric power (and invoked machinery definitions in Section 199(o)); and (2) the land assessment was erroneous because the proper assessment level for GOCCs is 10% (Section 218(d)). NPC also argued that payment under protest was not required because it was challenging the assessor’s authority to tax exempt property — an argument invoking Ty v. Trampe and related authorities.

LBAA ruling — jurisdictional and factual conclusions

The LBAA held that payment under protest (Section 252) is a condition sine qua non to invoke the appellate remedy before the LBAA and rejected NPC’s reliance on Ty v. Trampe. The LBAA found NPC failed to prove the machineries were actually, directly, and exclusively used for power generation and therefore not exempt. The LBAA ordered NPC to pay the assessed taxes (land and machineries) for the applicable periods.

CBAA ruling — factual findings and conclusion

The CBAA affirmed the LBAA after conducting hearings and an ocular inspection. It concluded the dam and appurtenances are multi-purpose structures used for irrigation, flood control, domestic water supply, and other non-power functions in addition to power generation, thereby negating the exclusivity requirement for exemption. The CBAA deemed the land-assessment issue moot after the municipal assessor’s correction but upheld taxation of the eleven machineries/structures.

CTA En Banc decision and reasoning on procedural bar

The CTA En Banc denied NPC’s petition, holding NPC’s administrative protest was ineffective because it did not first pay the tax under protest as required by Section 252. The CTA treated NPC’s exemption claim as a question of the correctness or reasonableness of the assessment — a factual matter for administrative resolution — and therefore concluded administrative remedies were not exhausted, rendering NPC’s action premature and not ripe for judicial determination.

Issues before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court identified and addressed three issues: (1) whether payment under protest (Section 252) is a condition precedent to question a local assessment before the LBAA; (2) whether the properties in the Machineries Assessment are exempt from RPT under Section 234(c); and (3) whether the properties in the Land Assessment are exempt from RPT.

Supreme Court’s analysis of the payment-under-protest rule and exhaustion doctrine

The Court reaffirmed the governing principle: where the dispute concerns the reasonableness or correctness of an assessment (questions of fact), the taxpayer must comply with the payment-under-protest requirement of Section 252 before appealing to the LBAA; the LBAA’s role is primarily fact-finding (Section 229). Conversely, when the taxpayer challenges the assessor’s authority or the legality of the assessment (a pure question of law), payment under protest is not required and judicial relief may be sought directly (e.g., injunction in the RTC). The Court reviewed and distinguished Ty v. Trampe and Olivarez v. Marquez, explaining those cases involved pure legal questions (assessor’s authority or validity of scheme) rather than factual disputes over exclusive use.

Application of the rule to NPC’s claims and the CTA’s handling

Applying that framework, the Court concluded NPC’s claim for tax exemption was principally a factual claim as to whether the listed properties were actually, directly and exclusively used for power generation — therefore ordinarily subject to Section 252’s payment-under-protest requirement. The Court noted past rulings (e.g., Napocor v. Province of Quezon; Camp John Hay) that treated exemption claims as factual and administrative in nature. Thus NPC should have paid the tax under protest before pursuing LBAA remedies; absence of payment ordinarily renders administrative appeals premature.

Exception to exhaustion and rationale for proceeding to the merits

Despite concluding NPC failed to observe the payment-under-protest prerequisite, the Supreme Court explained the exhaustion requirement is flexible and not strictly jurisdictional. Because the LBAA and CBAA had already entertained and adjudicated the factual merits (including hearings, ocular inspections, and evidence admission), remanding the case to the administrative boards for compliance would be futile and would frustrate practical administration: the boards had in effect decided the facts, a Warrant of Levy had been issued, a TRO had been previously issued by this Court, and the case had been pending for many years. Given these circumstances and the administrative bodies’ full exercise of fact-finding functions, the Court proceeded to decide the substantive exemptions issue on the merits rather than remanding.

Legal standard for exemption under Section 234(c) and definitions of “machinery”

The Court reiterated the statutory test for exemption under Section 234(c): the claimant must show (a) the machineries and equipment are actually, directly, and exclusively used by a local water district or GOCC, and (b) the claimant is engaged in supply/distribution of water or generation/transmission of electric power. The Court emphasized the LGC’s definition of “machinery” (Section 199(o)) and the implementing rule (Article 290(o)): items qualify as “machinery” for exemption purposes if they are actually, directly and exclusively used for the exempting purpose and are by their nature necessary or indispensable to that activity. The Court cautioned that “exclusive” use requires more than a dominant or principal use; it requires de facto exclusion of other non-exempt uses.

Factual findings on the machineries/structures and deference to administrative findings

The Supreme Court gave substantial deference to the LBAA and CBAA factual findings, finding no reversible error in their evaluation of evidence. The boards had determined that the main dam and the listed structures are multi-purpose: they store and regulate water for irrigation, domestic water supply (MWSS), flood control, and other public functions in quantities and uses exceeding or independent of their use for power generation. The boards found the truly exclusive machineries for power generation (turbines, generators, transformers, transmitters) were excluded from assessment. Because the eleven assessed facilities were not shown to be actually, directly and exclusively used for generation/transmission, they did not meet the statutory exemption test.

Treatment of pollution-control/environmental-protection exemption and NPC’s late invocation

The Court rejected NPC’s belated and undeveloped claim that the properties were exem

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