Title
National Federation of Labor vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Case
G.R. No. 113466
Decision Date
Dec 15, 1997
Workers' illegal strike, barricading, and refusal to comply with return-to-work order justified dismissal; NLRC upheld, damages awarded to employer.
illegal strike
dismissal
compensatory damages
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 113466)

Key Dates and Procedural History

  • January 22–27, 1993: Events surrounding pre-election conference, alleged barring of union officials, absences and re-entry attempts.
  • January 25–26, 1993: First work stoppage and picketing (petitioners contend union-barring; respondents describe disciplinary context).
  • January 27, 1993: Memorandum of agreement between PERMEX and NFL; management required explanations from participating workers.
  • January 29, 1993: NFL filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB-Region IX.
  • February 3–8, 1993: PERMEX filed case to declare the January strike illegal; NFL filed unfair labor practice complaint.
  • February 11–March 29, 1993: Second prolonged picket/strike, with reported barricading, chaining of gates, obstruction of ingress/egress, and alleged coercion and intimidation.
  • March 11, 1993: Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and issued a Return-to-Work Order.
  • March 29, 1993: Strike pickets were finally lifted.
  • August 6, 1993: NLRC (Fifth Division) affirmed Labor Arbiters’ consolidated decision, awarding PERMEX compensatory damages of P300,000 and upholding the illegality of the strikes and the dismissals.
  • December 15, 1997: The Supreme Court rendered the decision under review (applying the 1987 Constitution as governing law).

Applicable Law and Standards

  • Constitutional framework: 1987 Philippine Constitution (applicable because the decision date is after 1990).
  • Labor statutes and rules cited by the Court: Labor Code provisions on strikes and lockouts (articles cited in the decision, including Art. 263 and Art. 264 as discussed), the Implementing Rules, and Republic Act No. 6715 (the New Labor Relations Law).
  • Procedural standards: Rule 65 certiorari standard for this Court (grave abuse of discretion or act without/in excess of jurisdiction), and the deference accorded to factual findings of labor tribunals when supported by substantial evidence.
  • Arbiter discretion under Rule VII, Sec. 3 (labor arbiter’s latitude to determine the need for a formal/trial-type hearing after submission of position papers and proofs).

Factual Findings (as established in the record)

  • PERMEX asserted that certain workers requested time off or were excused and that alleged barring was disciplinary in nature; the NLRC found that the company’s actions were disciplinary, not a lockout, and that the ten workers had committed breaches of company discipline.
  • On January 25, 1993, workers were prevented from re-entering premises; a sizeable group staged pickets, barricading gates and impeding company operations, trapping some workers and preventing others from working.
  • The January 27 memorandum required explanations; most workers declined to submit satisfactory explanations and several were placed under preventive suspension effective February 13, 1993; about 40 workers returned to work after proffering explanations.
  • Subsequent picketing in February–March included chaining and padlocking gates, cutting fences, controlling the wharf entrance, and alleged acts of intimidation and threats against non-strikers and company personnel. PERMEX resorted to ferrying workers by boat at one stage to mitigate the blockade.

Issues Presented to the Court

  1. Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by disregarding affidavits and other evidence submitted by NFL and by failing to conduct actual open hearings.
  2. Whether the dismissal of 141 employees was improperly based on a City Fiscal’s prima facie finding and therefore void.
  3. Whether PERMEX’s internal reports and certifications were competent evidence to prove damages caused by the strikes.

Standard of Review and Evidentiary Deference

The Supreme Court reiterated that a Rule 65 petition succeeds only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC. The Court will not re-weigh evidence or reassess witness credibility where factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are supported by substantial evidence. Administrative findings in the specialty field of labor relations merit deference and finality unless shown to be unsupported by evidence.

Due Process and Formal Hearing Requirement

The Court held that a formal, trial-type hearing is not mandatory in every labor case. Due process is satisfied when parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to present their side. In this case, petitioners had opportunities to submit affidavits, position papers, and supporting proofs. The decision emphasized the arbiter’s discretion—under Section 3, Rule VII—to determine whether a formal hearing is necessary after submissions, and noted the policy interest in speedy disposition of labor disputes and avoidance of technicalities that could prolong proceedings.

Legality of the Strikes — Procedural Requirements and Court’s Ruling

The Court analyzed mandatory procedural requisites for a protected strike under the Labor Code and implementing rules: filing of a notice of strike with the DOLE/NCMB, observance of the applicable cooling-off period (30 days for bargaining deadlock; 15 days for unfair labor practice except where union existence is threatened), conduct of a secret-ballot strike vote with prior notice to the NCMB and reporting of results to the NCMB at least seven days before the intended strike. The Court found that:

  • No notice of strike, as required, was filed prior to the January 25–26 stoppage; no prior notice of strike vote was furnished the NCMB; the seven-day post-vote ban was not observed; the workers immediately barricaded premises on January 25.
  • The February 11 strike commenced only six days after the February 5 Notice of Strike, thus violating the cooling-off/notice requirements.
  • The strikes were accompanied by acts prohibited by Art. 263/264 (as cited): destruction of company property, intimidation/coercion of non-strikers, and obstruction of ingress and egress by barricading, chaining and padlocking.
    On these bases, the Court upheld the NLRC’s finding that the January and February–March work stoppages were illegal.

Dismissal of the 141 Employees — Basis and Validity

The Court rejected the petitioners’ contention that the dismissals were based solely on a City Fiscal’s prima facie finding. Instead, the Court found that the primary ground for dismissal was the employees’ refusal to comply with the Secretary of Labor’s Return-to-Work Order issued after the Secretary assumed jurisdiction on March 11, 1993. The Court emphasized controlling precedents: a strike undertaken despite an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity; participants thereby forfeit rights to reinstatement and are deemed to have lost employment. The record showed that, despite police intervention, the strike continued until March 29, 1993. NFL’s argument that PER

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