Title
National Development Co. vs. Rongavilla
Case
G.R. No. L-21963
Decision Date
Aug 30, 1967
A textile worker contracted TB due to strenuous work; her delayed compensation claim was upheld as employer failed to contest it timely.
disability compensation
tuberculosis
delay

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-21963)

Parties and Setting

Roberta Rongavilla worked for NDC in its textile mills from October 23, 1946 until June 11, 1951, when she was separated due to ill health. Her duties were those of a pirm winder. She operated a machine with twenty spindles that wound yarn. When yarn snapped, she connected the broken yarn and restarted the spindle. Because of frequent yarn breakage, she spent much time on her feet. She also sometimes transported yarn using a wheeled cab; when bobbin boys were unavailable, she pushed the cab herself. After winding, she loaded finished thread on a cab and brought it to the warp section. Her working hours were eight hours a day, six days a week, and her shifts rotated among 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., and 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.—meaning she worked during late afternoon until early morning two-thirds of the time.

Factual Background Relating to the Illness

On October 16, 1950, Rongavilla was examined at the Quezon Institute and was found to have pulmonary lesions in the minimal stage, right and left. The NDC physician advised her to rest for three months, which she did, after which she returned to work. On March 19, 1951, she returned to the Quezon Institute reporting chest and back pains with coughing. X-ray findings showed that the lesions in the left lung had progressed to a moderately advanced stage. She then underwent extensive treatment. On June 11, 1951, NDC terminated her services because of her pulmonary illness, which later became the basis of her disability-compensation claim for pulmonary tuberculosis.

The Compensation Claim and Initial WCC Proceedings

Almost nine years after her discharge, on May 31, 1960, Rongavilla, through counsel, filed a claim for disability compensation with Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor, Manila, attributing her disability to pulmonary tuberculosis. After due hearing, the Hearing Officer of the Regional Office rendered a decision on September 21, 1961, awarding disability compensation. On November 11, 1961, NDC petitioned for review to the WCC.

On June 10, 1963, Commissioner N. Baens del Rosario of the WCC rendered a decision upholding compensability. The WCC ruled that the acceleration of the employee’s sickness could serve as a ground for compensation. It ordered NDC to: (a) pay the employee P3,000.00 in one lump sum and without any reduction; (b) pay her counsel P225.00 as attorney’s fees; and (c) pay to the Workmen’s Compensation Fund P36.00 as decision fee and P5.00 as cost of review pursuant to Sec. 55 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended.

NDC filed a motion for reconsideration on July 8, 1963. The WCC en banc denied the motion on September 24, 1963.

Issues Raised by NDC on Review

NDC appealed, presenting two principal assignments of error. First, it contended that the WCC erred in holding that the employee’s tuberculosis disability and its aggravation—which allegedly occurred before the enactment of Republic Act 772—were compensable. Second, NDC argued that the WCC lacked jurisdiction because the claim was not filed in accordance with the time requirements of Section 24 of Act 3428.

NDC’s First Argument: Non-Retroactivity of Republic Act 772

NDC maintained that at the time the employee contracted tuberculosis and when her condition was allegedly aggravated, Section 2 of Act 3428 did not list tuberculosis as compensable, nor did it expressly cover aggravation by the nature of employment. It pointed out that Rongavilla’s termination occurred on June 11, 1951, while the amendment inserting tuberculosis and “aggravated by” language became effective only on June 20, 1952 under Republic Act 772. Thus, NDC asserted that the amendments should not be applied retroactively to a disability event that had occurred before June 20, 1952.

WCC and the Supreme Court’s Resolution of the First Issue

The Court rejected NDC’s position. It emphasized that even before Republic Act 772 took effect, Section 2 of Act 3428 already provided compensation when an employee contracted any illness directly caused by such employment, or when the illness was the result of the nature of such employment. The Court relied on the WCC’s factual findings that Rongavilla’s tuberculosis became manifest because of the nature of her work and as a result of her employment.

In its quoted findings, the WCC reasoned that Rongavilla was first found on October 10, 1950 to have minimal pulmonary tuberculosis and was advised to rest. Although the records did not state the exact date of her return, she returned sometime in January 1951, and within about two months—by March 19, 1951—her lesions progressed rapidly to a moderately advanced stage. The WCC concluded that this rapid acceleration could not be attributed to any cause other than the nature of her work because the record lacked evidence of causal relationship aside from her employment. It further found that the flare-ups usually occurred after her brief return to work. It noted her constant standing and exertion because she could not even take brief rests while the machine operated. It also relied on evidence that she worked on a quota basis with extra pay for exceeding quotas, and on the rotating shifts requiring duty during late afternoon to early morning two-thirds of the time. It also referenced the debilitating effect of night work, particularly on women.

The Court held that the absence, at the time of contraction, of the specific terms “tuberculosis” and the phrase “aggravated by” in Section 2 was not determinative. What controlled was whether the illness was caused by the employment or was the result of the nature of the employment. The Court invoked Blue Bar Coconut Company, et al. vs. Joaquin Boo, 95 Phil. 867, 873-874 (G.R. No. L-6820, September 28, 1952), explaining that the later amendment inserting “tuberculosis” and “either aggravated by” did not change employer liability that already existed under the original Section 2. It reiterated that the amendment served clarification rather than expansion of compensability in a case where the illness was already shown to be the result of work or employment. The Court also cited the reaffirmation in Manila Railroad Company v. Daniel Perez and Workmen’s Compensation Commission (G.R. No. L-21071, June 29, 1965).

NDC’s Second Argument: Lack of Jurisdiction for Failure to File Within Section 24

On the second issue, NDC pointed to the procedural history. Rongavilla filed her compensation claim on May 31, 1960, nearly nine years after she was discharged on June 11, 1951. NDC asserted that she also failed to file a written claim with the employer within two months from the date of discharge, as required by Section 24 of Act 3428. NDC characterized compliance with Section 24 as a condition precedent and a jurisdictional requirement. Accordingly, it argued that the WCC had no authority to entertain the claim.

The Court’s Treatment of Section 24 and Employer Renunciation

The Court held that NDC’s jurisdictional theory had no merit. It reiterated settled doctrine that failure by the employee to comply with the requirements of Section 24—notice to and filing of claim with the employer within the prescribed time—was non-jurisdictional. The Court further stated that delay or failure to give the notice to the employer did not bar the proceedings if it was shown that the employer, its agent, or representative had knowledge of the injury, sickness, or death, or that the employer did not suffer by such delay or failure. Additionally, even if the claim was filed beyond the period, the WCC could still proceed if the employer had not manifested an intention to controvert the right to compensation on or before the fourteenth day of disability or within ten days after knowledge of the accident, sickness, or disability.

The Court examined the record and concluded that NDC had knowledge long before discharge. It noted that the employee was first diagnosed with minimal pulmonary tuberculosis on October 16, 1950 and was advised to rest. After her return, NDC still made her work despite knowledge that she was suffering from pulmonary lesions. Thus, even before her termination on June 11, 1951, NDC had full knowledge. Yet NDC did not comply with its obligations under Section 37 by failing to file the required employer’s report of accident or sickness. It also failed to follow Section 45 by not filing the notice of its intention to controvert. The Court added that NDC did not seek reinstatement of its right to controvert.

For these failures, the Court ruled that NDC was considered under the law to have renounced its right to controvert the claim. It therefore could not contest Rongavilla’s claim by invoking the employee’s non-compliance with Section 24. The Court stressed that it was the employer that must strictly comply with the

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.

About Privacy Terms