G.R. No. L-21291 - Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Co.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-21291)

Factual Background

Norma was diagnosed in 1973 with cancer of the cervix (adenocarcinoma). She was operated on at the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, after which she received cobalt and radium therapy. While the records did not clearly establish when she returned to work, the evidence showed that by June 1975 she was already unable to work again.

On September 16, 1975, Norma was hospitalized at the United Doctors Medical Center for recto-vaginal fistula, described as post-radiation, or the bleeding and passage of feces through the vagina as a result of the cobalt and radium treatment. She underwent a sigmoid colostomy and was discharged on October 1, 1975 to recuperate at home.

On November 5, 1975, petitioner filed a claim with the GSIS for income, medical and other benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. The GSIS disapproved the claim on the ground that the ailment was not the direct result of the nature of her duties and that the risk of contracting the disease was not increased by her working condition. The GSIS characterized the condition as the inevitable consequence of the treatment for adenocarcinoma of the cervical stump, and it concluded that it was not an occupational disease, hence not compensable.

GSIS Denial and Petitioner’s Arguments

Norma moved for reconsideration. She argued that she had developed adenocarcinoma in 1973, before the effectivity of the New Labor Code, and that she had continued to suffer from the same since then. She also maintained that, as a nurse, her work exposed her to all kinds of diseases, infections, and irritations that directly caused or aggravated her illness, and that even if the condition had been under control, it recurred because of the nature of her work.

The GSIS denied reconsideration. It insisted that her ailment was not peculiar to her occupation because she could have suffered the same illness if she were employed in another field.

Norma appealed to the ECC. Before the ECC decision, Norma died on March 10, 1976 at the UST Hospital. Her death was attributed to (a) adenoca, cervix, due to (b) uremia, due to (c) ureteral occlusion. On March 31, 1976, the ECC affirmed the GSIS denial and dismissed the claim.

ECC Decision and Filing of the Supreme Court Petition

According to the petition, Manuel Najera obtained a copy of the ECC decision only on December 5, 1979, and he filed the petition in the Supreme Court on December 14, 1979. He raised three issues: the reasonableness and constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 626 under due process and equal protection; whether the doctrine of presumption of compensability remained applicable; and whether Norma’s disability and subsequent death were compensable.

The Supreme Court directed respondents to comment and ordered substitution of the deceased petitioner by her legal heirs. On February 2, 1980, Manuel Najera moved for substitution, praying that he and their minor child be substituted. The Supreme Court allowed substitution on February 18, 1980. On April 25, 1980, the petition was given due course and memoranda were required; only respondents submitted memoranda.

The Main Legal Issue: Applicable Law

The Supreme Court identified the determinative question as which law governed Norma’s claim—the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the New Labor Code.

Respondents argued that the claim was governed by the New Labor Code because Norma’s illness, which subsequently led to her death, supervened in 1975. Under that Code, respondents contended, Norma’s illness was not compensable because it was not among the occupational diseases enumerated for compensation. Respondents added that, even under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the claim was barred because Norma allegedly failed to file it on or before March 31, 1975 under Section 4(b), Rule 11, Book VII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.

Application of Presumption of Compensability Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act

The Court treated it as undisputed that Norma was diagnosed in 1973 with adenocarcinoma while she was employed as a ward nurse, and that she underwent cobalt and radium therapy for the condition. It also noted that her second hospitalization in 1975 was for recto-vaginal fistula, described as a complication of cervical cancer and the effects of radiation therapy.

On that basis, the Court concluded that Norma’s illness supervened in 1973. It followed that her cause of action accrued prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code, when the Workmen’s Compensation Act was still in force. The fact that petitioner filed her claim after March 31, 1975 did not defeat the application of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Court relied on Corrales vs. ECC (88 SCRA 547 [1979]) and subsequent rulings, holding that when the injury or illness had its onset prior to January 1, 1975, the claim should be decided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act rather than the New Labor Code.

The Court further ruled that the prescriptive period under the Workmen’s Compensation Act was ten years because the right was founded on statute. It also held that the filing of the claim with the GSIS, instead of with the appropriate regional office of the Department of Labor, did not defeat the claim. It therefore applied the Workmen’s Compensation Act’s provisions on the presumption of compensability (including presumption of work-connection or work aggravation), as well as rules relating to waiver of non-jurisdictional defenses due to non-controversion, and the ten-year prescriptive period.

The Court observed that the fact that Norma had been healthy at the time of her employment and that her illness supervened during employment were not controverted by the employer. The records did not show any proof of controversion. Accordingly, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Norma was not burdened with proving causation; instead, the law supplied a rebuttable presumption of compensability. The burden to overcome that presumption shifted to the employer, which the Court found to have failed to do by substantial evidence.

The Court added that the rule was rigorous: even if the cause of an employee’s death were unknown, the right to compensation could still subsist. The Court reasoned that the Workmen’s Compensation Act was a form of social legislation meant to give relief to the working man, and thus it required a liberal construction to effectuate its purposes.

Medical Opinion Versus Statutory Presumption

Respondents relied on medical opinion stating that predisposition factors such as chronic cervical irritation, childbirth, abortion, sexual intercourse, and early marriage might bear some etiological relationship to cancer of the cervix, but that the exact relationship had not been elucidated. The medical opinion also asserted that irradiation was the treatment of choice and that direct extension of the cancer to parametrial and para-vaginal tissues caused death, while recto-v

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-21291)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Manuel Najera, as husband and legal heir of Norma B. Najera, filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari to set aside the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) decision dated March 31, 1976 in ECC Case No. 0056.
The ECC decision affirmed the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denial of Norma’s compensation claim under Presidential Decree No. 626.
The petition was initially filed by Norma’s husband and counsel while Norma was already deceased.
The Court required substitution upon Norma’s death on March 10, 1976.
Manuel Najera moved for substitution, praying that he and their minor child Ann Catherine Najera be substituted as party petitioners.
The Court allowed substitution in a resolution dated February 18, 1980 and thereafter directed the parties to submit memoranda.
The records show that only the respondents complied with the directive to submit memoranda.

Key Factual Antecedents

Norma B. Najera was employed as a ward nurse at the National Orthopedic Hospital beginning April 1, 1968.
In 1973, she was found suffering from cancer of the cervix (adenocarcinoma) and underwent an operation at the University of Santo Tomas Hospital.
After surgery, she received cobalt and radium treatment.
Although the records did not disclose when she reported back to work, she became unable to work again starting June 1975.
On September 16, 1975, she was hospitalized at the United Doctors Medical Center for recto-vaginal fistula, described as post radiation and connected to bleeding and passage of feces through the vagina as a result of cobalt and radium therapy.
She underwent sigmoid colostomy and was discharged on October 1, 1975 to recuperate at home.
On November 5, 1975, petitioner filed her claim with the GSIS for income, medical, and other benefits under PD 626, as amended.
The GSIS denied the claim because it found the ailment not directly caused by the nature of her duties, not increased by her working condition, and treated the illness as an inevitable consequence of cancer treatment that was not an occupational disease and thus not compensable.
Norma moved for reconsideration, asserting that she developed adenocarcinoma in 1973, before the effectivity of the New Labor Code, and that her nursing work exposed her to diseases and irritations that caused or aggravated her illness.
Norma further argued that although her ailment was under control, it recurred due to the nature of her work.
The GSIS denied reconsideration, reasoning that her ailment was not peculiar to her type of work because she could have suffered from the same in another occupation.
Norma appealed to the ECC, which affirmed the GSIS denial on March 31, 1976 and dismissed the claim.
Norma died on March 10, 1976 at the UST Hospital.
The stated causes of death were (a) Adenoca, cervix, due to (b) uremia, due to (c) ureteral occlusion.
The petitioner alleged that Manuel Najera obtained the copy of the ECC decision only on December 5, 1979, prompting the filing of the present petition on that basis.

Issues Raised in Petition

The petition questioned whether PD 626, as amended, was reasonable and just and not unduly oppressive or discriminatory, and whether it therefore complied with the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection of laws.
The petition asked whether the doctrine of presumption of compensability remained applicable to Norma’s claim.
The petition asked whether Norma’s disability and subsequent death were compensable under the governing compensation framework.
The Court identified the main issue as the determination of which law governed Norma’s claim, namely the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the New Labor Code.

Parties’ Contentions

The respondents contended that Norma’s claim was governed by the New Labor Code because the illness that led to her death allegedly supervened in 1975.
The respondents asserted that under the New Labor Code, Norma’s illness was not compensable.
The respondents alternatively contended that, even if the claim came under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it was barred because Norma failed to file it on or before March 31, 1975 under Section 4(b), Rule 11, Book VII of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code.
The Court treated it as undisputed that Norma was found suffering from adenocarcinoma in 1973 during her employment and received cobalt and radium therapy.
The Court also treated it as undisputed that in 1975 she was hospitalized for recto-vaginal fistula as a post-radiation complication tied to cervical cancer and radiation therapy.

Statutory and Jurisprudential Framework

The dispute required the Court to determine the proper regime under the transition rules of the New Labor Code, particularly the rule that claims accruing prior to the Code’s effectivity and during the specified period had to be filed with the appropriate Department of Labor regional offices not later than March 31, 1975, or they would be forever barred.
The Court relied on jurisprudence holding that where an injury or illness had its onset prior to January 1, 1975, the claim should be decided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, not under the New Labor Code.
The Court cited Corrales vs. ECC, 88 SCRA 547 (1979), for the rule on onset prior to January 1, 1975 and for the holding that filing after March 31, 1975 did not bar application of the Workmen’s Compensation Act where the prescriptive period was ten years because the right was founded on statute.
The Court also cited Corrales for the holding that filing the claim with the GSIS instead of the appropriate regional office of the Dep