Case Summary (G.R. No. L-32717)
Factual Background
Petitioner alleged that respondent, by telegram, informed him that his certificate of candidacy had been given due course but directed him not to use recorded political jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loudspeakers. Petitioner asserted that this order infringed his constitutional right to freedom of speech and that no plain, speedy and adequate remedy existed, thus prompting his petition for a writ of prohibition and a prayer for a preliminary injunction.
Procedural History
The petition was filed October 29, 1970. The Court required respondent to file an answer by November 2, 1970, and set the case for oral argument on November 3, 1970. Respondent filed an answer admitting the factual allegations but defended its order as warranted by section 12(E) of Republic Act No. 6132, which proscribed certain electoral propaganda gadgets and concluded its enumeration with the phrase “and the like.” The case was argued November 3, 1970, and the Court issued a minute resolution that same afternoon granting the writ of prohibition prayed for and permanently restraining respondent from enforcing its ban; that resolution was made immediately executory. The present opinion explained the reasons for that resolution.
Issue Presented
Whether respondent Commission had statutory authority under Republic Act No. 6132 to prohibit petitioner’s use of recorded political jingles and whether such prohibition violated petitioner’s constitutional right to freedom of speech.
Parties’ Contentions
Petitioner contended that the Commission’s order abridged his right to free speech, that no provision in the Constitutional Convention Act expressly empowered the Commission to ban taped jingles, and that prohibition could not be justified by implication. Respondent argued that the taped jingle constituted a tangible propaganda material equivalent to the enumerated items in section 12(E) of Republic Act No. 6132, that the phrase “and the like” embraced mechanically recorded or taped voices, and that the Commission therefore could confiscate such recordings and forbid their use.
Ruling of the Court
The Court granted the writ of prohibition and permanently restrained and prohibited respondent from enforcing, implementing or demanding compliance with its order banning the use of political taped jingles. The Court concluded that respondent lacked authority under the Constitutional Convention Act to impose such a ban and that the construction urged by respondent raised serious constitutional doubts because it would infringe freedom of speech. The Court made no pronouncement as to costs. Chief Justice Concepcion and Justices Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Barredo, and Villamor concurred; Justice Teehankee filed a separate concurring opinion; Justices Dizon and Makasiar were on official leave.
Legal Basis and Reasoning
The Court characterized the controversy principally as one of power: whether respondent possessed authority under Republic Act No. 6132 to proscribe recorded jingles. The Court applied the rule of ejusdem generis, observing that the specific enumeration in section 12(E) referred to small tangible gadgets intended as inducements to secure votes — pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes and similar items — and that general words following such enumeration apply only to things of the same kind. The Court held that a recorded or taped voice did not fall within that class.
The Court further invoked the cardinal rule that statutes must be construed, if reasonably possible, to accord with constitutional requirements rather than to render them repugnant. The Court stated that where a statutory construction would create grave doubts about constitutionality, the judiciary must prefer an interpretation that preserves the statute’s validity. Applying this principle, the Court found that construing section 12(E) to encompass taped jingles would impermissibly abridge the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, particularly where such speech served the electoral process and the voters’ right of suffrage.
The Court rejected respondent’s argument that banning recorded jingles while permitting live oral transmission would leave the candidate free to speak, reasoning that forbidding mechanical reproduction but allowing live utterance would amount in substance to prior restraint and an indirect negation of the constitutional guarantee. The Court reiterated the hierarchy of law, emphasizing that the Commission’s powers are limited to administrative questions and that it cannot exercise authority in conflict with or outside the law or the Constitution. The Court relied on precedent recognizing the Commission’s administrative limits and on authority permitting strained statutory constructions to avert constitutional infirmity, citing established decisions and doctrines to justify its approach.
Concurring Opinion
Justice Teehankee concurred with the result and added observations emphasizing the constitutional test of reasonableness under the due process clause. H
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. L-32717)
Parties and Procedural Posture
- Amelito R. Mutuc was a resident of Arayat, Pampanga and a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention.
- Commission on Elections issued a telegram informing Mutuc that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibiting the use of jingles in mobile units equipped with sound systems and loudspeakers.
- Petitioner filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition on October 29, 1970, seeking also a preliminary injunction.
- The Court required an answer, expedited briefing, and heard the case on November 3, 1970, five days after filing and with the election barely a week away.
- The Court issued a minute resolution on November 3, 1970 granting the writ of prohibition and permanently restraining Commission on Elections from enforcing the ban on political taped jingles.
Key Facts
- Petitioner planned to use a recorded or taped jingle disseminated through mobile sound systems as part of his campaign.
- Commission on Elections warned that such taped jingles were prohibited and could be confiscated under a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act.
- Respondent did not deny the factual allegations in petitioner’s petition in its answer filed November 2, 1970.
- The contested order was issued shortly before the election, creating urgency and potential irreparable harm to petitioner’s campaign communications.
Statutory Provision
- The statutory basis invoked by respondent was Republic Act No. 6132 (1970), commonly referred to as the Constitutional Convention Act.
- Section 12 (E) of Republic Act No. 6132 (1970) proscribes the purchase, production, request or distribution of sample ballots and electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like.
- Respondent argued that the recorded jingle was a tangible propaganda material subject to confiscation under Section 12 (E).
Issues Presented
- Whether Commission on Elections had statutory authority under Republic Act No. 6132 (1970) to prohibit the use of taped political jingles by candidates.
- Whether the respondent’s interpretation and enforcement of Section 12 (E) abridged petitioner’s constitutional right to freedom of speech.
- Whether the general words “and the like” in Section 12 (E) extended the prohibition to recorded or taped jingles under the doctrine of ejusdem generis.
Contentions
- Petitioner contended that the prohibition abridged his constitutional right to free speech and that no express statutory authority authorized respondent to ban taped jingles.
- Commission on Elections contended that the recorded jingle was a tangible electoral propaganda gadget within the scope of Section 12 (E) and thus subject to confiscation and prohibition.
- Respondent further contended that “jingles” were analogous to streamers or posters and therefore fell within the enumerated ban co