Title
Munoz, Jr. vs. Ramirez
Case
G.R. No. 156125
Decision Date
Aug 25, 2010
Dispute over a Mandaluyong property: alleged sale vs. equitable mortgage; SC ruled it as paraphernal property, ordered reconveyance as mortgage.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 156125)

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

  • GSIS housing loan mortgage on TCT No. 1427: April 6, 1989.
  • Alleged contract(s) between parties and related documents: April 29–30, 1992.
  • Deed of Absolute Sale from Erlinda to petitioner: April 30, 1992; title transfer recorded July 14, 1993 (TCT No. 7650).
  • RTC Decision dismissing respondents’ complaint: January 23, 1997.
  • CA Decision setting aside RTC and declaring sale void: June 25, 2002; CA resolution denying reconsideration: November 13, 2002.
  • Petition for review to the Supreme Court filed under Rule 45; Supreme Court decision affirmed CA with modifications: August 25, 2010.

Factual Summary

The lot forming part of the subject property was registered in the name of Erlinda and traced to her parents; it was alleged that she inherited the lot. Eliseo (a GSIS employee) mortgaged the title with GSIS in 1989 to secure a P136,500 housing loan to be paid via salary deductions. The respondents built a house on the lot. The petitioner contends that he purchased the property under a Deed of Absolute Sale (April 30, 1992) for P602,000; the respondents contend instead that the transaction was not a sale but a mortgage arrangement secured by the property, and that certain signatures (on a Special Power of Attorney and an affidavit of waiver by Eliseo) were forgeries. The petitioner admits advancing P200,000 to cancel the GSIS mortgage and claims a sale with a one-year repurchase agreement and leaseback; respondents claim the advance was part of an equitable mortgage arrangement and that they remained in possession and continued paying taxes.

RTC Ruling

The Regional Trial Court found the lot to be Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property by virtue of inheritance and upheld the deed of sale as genuine, rejecting the respondents’ forgery evidence as immaterial since Eliseo’s consent was deemed unnecessary for a sale of Erlinda’s paraphernal property. The RTC dismissed the respondents’ complaint for annulment of the sale.

Court of Appeals Ruling

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC, applying the second paragraph of Civil Code Article 158 and the Court’s earlier decision in Calimlim-Canullas. The CA held that because improvements (the house) were constructed using conjugal funds (salary deductions of Eliseo applied to the GSIS loan), the lot became conjugal property and thus could not be validly sold or mortgaged without the spouse’s consent pursuant to Family Code Article 124. The CA declared the Deed of Absolute Sale void.

Issues Presented

  1. Whether the subject property is paraphernal (exclusive) to Erlinda or conjugal property of the spouses.
  2. Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale was a true sale or, in substance, an equitable mortgage.

Supreme Court Disposition and Overarching Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition for review but affirmed the CA decision for reasons different from the CA’s. The Court declined to act as primary trier of facts but reviewed whether the CA’s factual inferences were manifestly mistaken and corrected the factual and legal conclusions where appropriate.

First Issue — Paraphernal or Conjugal?

  • Presumption and rebuttal: The Family Code presumes property acquired during marriage to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116). The Court found clear evidence that Erlinda acquired the lot by gratuitous title (inheritance from her father), which under Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code makes the property her exclusive paraphernal property and thus rebuts the conjugal presumption.
  • On Article 158 (Civil Code) vs. Family Code: The Supreme Court held that the CA erred in relying on Civil Code Article 158 and Calimlim-Canullas because the Family Code (effective August 3, 1989) superseded Civil Code rules on conjugal partnership and improvements. Article 120 of the Family Code governs improvements made on the separate property of a spouse at the expense of the conjugal partnership and prescribes the test comparing cost of improvement and resulting increase in value to the value of the property at the time of improvement.
  • Application to the facts: The Court computed that Eliseo’s salary deductions (May 1989–April 1992: 36 months × P1,687.66) amounted to P60,755.76 paid toward the GSIS loan; petitioner advanced P176,445.27 which actually settled the GSIS mortgage. Given these figures and the GSIS loan amount (P136,500), the Court found it reasonable that the value of the lot exceeded the portion of the loan paid by conjugal funds (P60,755.76). Therefore, under Family Code Article 120 the lot remained Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property at the time she contracted with the petitioner, and Eliseo’s written consent to the transaction was not required. The Court also deemed the NBI finding of forgery of Eliseo’s signatures immaterial to the determination of ownership.

Second Issue — Sale or Equitable Mortgage?

  • Legal standard: An equitable mortgage exists when a contract styled as an absolute sale, lacking some formal requisites, in substance embodies the parties’ intent to charge real property as security for a debt. Article 1602/1604 of the Civil Code and jurisprudence provide indicia for inferring an equitable mortgage: inadequacy of price, vendor remaining in possession, retention of part of purchase price by purchaser, vendor paying taxes, among other factors. Any one of the Article 1602 circumstances suffices to support the inference, provided the sale was in form but intended as security for a debt.
  • Factors present in this case: The Court identified four compelling circumstances supporting an equitable mortgage:
    1. Respondents remained in possession as lessees under a one-year lease (May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993).
    2. The petitioner retained part of the purchase price: he advanced P200,000 to cancel the GSIS mortgage but refused to remit the P402,000 balance when Eliseo did not submit a signed waiver.
    3. The respondents continued to pay real property taxes (July 8, 1993), a strong indicator of continued ownership or claim to ownership when coupled with continuous possession.
    4. The petitioner treated the transaction as securing a debt: he sent a Statement
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