Case Summary (G.R. No. 231896)
Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis
The decision is governed by the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Statutory and procedural authorities central to the analysis include: Republic Act No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code), specifically Sections 35, 36, and 38; the Local Government Code of 1991, notably Section 59 and Section 511 regarding effectivity, posting and publication of ordinances with penal sanctions; and the Rules of Court provisions on declaratory relief (Rule 63) and on certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus (Rule 65). The Court also considered the operative-fact doctrine as articulated in prior jurisprudence cited in the record.
Facts and Key Provisions of the Ordinance
Ordinance No. 688 prescribed maximum speeds for vehicles along the specified stretches of national highway: 80 km/h from Crossing Polonuling to Crossing Acmonan; 40 km/h from Crossing Acmonan to Crossing Cebuano. Penal sanctions provided are P1,000 for the first offense, P1,500 for the second, and P2,000 or 30 days imprisonment or both for the third. The ordinance’s effectivity clause stated it would take effect “immediately after fifteen (15) days posting in three (3) conspicuous places.”
Respondent’s Apprehension and Judicial Complaint
On October 6, 2014, respondent Faustino was apprehended for allegedly driving at 70 km/h in the 40 km/h zone (Acmonan–Cebuano segment), paid the P1,000 fine under protest, and on October 8, 2014 filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (Special Civil Action No. 104-14) seeking declaratory relief, annulment of the ordinance, refund of fines, and damages. He alleged the ordinance was unconstitutional and violative of the due process clause, the Local Government Code, the Tax Code, and RA No. 4136, particularly for lack of publication and failure to comply with statutory prerequisites.
Trial Court Ruling and Reasoning
By Decision dated January 20, 2016, the RTC declared Ordinance No. 688 void ab initio and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The RTC ordered petitioner to refund all fines collected under the ordinance. The RTC found that prior enforcement did not preclude judicial challenge because further implementation would produce inevitable violations. Substantively, the RTC found the ordinance contravened RA No. 4136 for failing to: (1) classify the public highways and provide requisite markings/signage with certification to the LTO; and (2) prescribe differentiated speed limits by vehicle class as required by RA No. 4136. The RTC did not expressly declare the ordinance unconstitutional due to purported lack of supporting evidence.
Parties’ Contentions on Appeal
Petitioner argued the ordinance was consistent with RA No. 4136’s maximum allowable speeds, that factual characteristics of the road segments justified the chosen limits, that it substantially complied with Section 38’s classification command (citing LTO deputation of PNP and local enforcers), and that the ordinance effectively reduced accidents. Petitioner also contended the trial court erred in ordering wholesale refunds. Respondent maintained the ordinance violated Section 36 of RA No. 4136 (prohibiting local speed limits different from the Act) and failed to meet the publication requirements of the Local Government Code.
Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
The Court identified four issues: (1) whether declaratory relief was the proper remedy to assail the ordinance at first instance; (2) whether Ordinance No. 688 complied with the publication requirement under the Local Government Code; (3) whether the ordinance violated RA No. 4136; and (4) whether the trial court’s directive to refund all fines collected was proper.
Procedural Determination: Proper Remedy
The Court held that declaratory relief (Rule 63) was no longer the proper remedy once the ordinance had been enforced against respondent. Declaratory relief presupposes absence of an actual breach; here the ordinance had already been enforced. The appropriate remedies to challenge such an enacted and enforced ordinance are certiorari and prohibition (Rule 65) to correct grave abuse of discretion or lack/excess of jurisdiction. Because the parties had pleaded allegations sufficient for certiorari/prohibition, the Court treated the petition as one for certiorari and prohibition despite the initial mislabeling.
Publication Requirement: Failure and Consequence
Applying Section 59 and Section 511 of the Local Government Code, the Court concluded Ordinance No. 688 did not comply with publication requirements for ordinances with penal sanctions. The ordinance’s own effectivity provision required only posting in three places and did not evidence publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Petitioner did not show that no newspaper of general circulation existed in South Cotabato nor sought statutory exemption, and did not refute that the ordinance was never published in any newspaper. The absence of publication meant that affected vehicle owners and drivers were not properly informed, and consequently the ordinance did not become effective or enforceable.
Compliance with RA No. 4136: Statutory Prerequisites Not Met
The Court found Ordinance No. 688 contravened Sections 35, 36, and 38 of RA No. 4136. Section 38 requires local legislative bodies to classify public highways for traffic purposes, mark them with appropriate signs (visible to the public), submit certification of “through streets” names/locations/limits to the LTO Commissioner, and obtain LTO approval for classifications and postings. These prerequisites were not complied with for Ordinance No. 688. The Court reaffirmed precedent (e.g., Primicias) that such Section 38 requirements are mandatory and that municipal ordinances are subordinate to national statutes; failure to observe statutory prerequisites renders the ordinance invalid.
Refund of Fines: Incidental Relief Limited to Respondent
The Court held that refund of the P1,000 paid by res
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 231896)
Prefatory Question
- Central normative question posed by the case: whether a local ordinance enacted to promote public safety should be invalidated because it did not comply with statutory and procedural requirements despite achieving its intended public-safety result in practice.
- The Court frames the issue in practical and legal terms: does the end (reduction in accidents) justify the means (an ordinance enacted and implemented without compliance with mandatory statutory prerequisites)?
Antecedents and Factual Background
- Petitioner: Municipality of Tupi, Province of South Cotabato, represented by Municipal Mayor Reynaldo S. Tamayo, Jr.
- Respondent: Atty. Herminio B. Faustino.
- Noted problem: a high rate of accidents along a stretch of the national highway from Crossing Barangay Polonuling to Crossing Barangay Cebuano.
- Legislative response: Sangguniang Bayan of Tupi enacted Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014, known as the "Speed Limit Ordinance" on March 3, 2014, to address the accident problem (rollo references).
- Implementation date of the Ordinance: the Ordinance was implemented on May 5, 2014 (source indicates implementation date).
Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014 — Substantive Provisions
- Speed limits prescribed by the Ordinance for the covered stretch of national highway:
- Crossing Polonuling to Crossing Acmonan: maximum speed set at 80 kph.
- Crossing Acmonan to Crossing Cebuano: maximum speed set at 40 kph.
- Penal provisions under the Ordinance:
- First offense: fine of P1,000.00.
- Second offense: fine of P1,500.00.
- Third offense: fine of P2,000.00 or thirty (30) days imprisonment or both.
- Effectivity clause in the Ordinance: SECTION IX. EFFECTIVITY. The Ordinance shall take effect immediately after fifteen (15) days posting in three (3) conspicuous places (the Ordinance itself prescribed a singular posting requirement).
Respondent’s Apprehension, Payment, and Judicial Initiation
- On October 6, 2014, respondent Faustino was flagged down by local traffic enforcers for alleged overspeeding.
- Measured speed: respondent was recorded at seventy kilometers per hour (70 kph) while traversing the highway segment from Crossing Acmonan to Crossing Cebuano, where Ordinance No. 688 prescribed a 40 kph limit.
- The respondent was fined P1,000.00 and paid the fine under protest.
- On October 8, 2014, respondent filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Polomolok, South Cotabato: a petition for declaratory relief, annulment of the Speed Limit Ordinance, and damages, with a prayer for temporary restraining order — docketed as Special Civil Action No. 104-14, captioned Herminio B. Faustino v. Municipality of Tupi.
- Respondent’s substantive allegations in the petition:
- The Ordinance was unconstitutional for failure of publication, violating due process and statutory publication requirements.
- The Ordinance violated the Local Government Code and RA No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code) and the Tax Code (as alleged grounds in pleadings).
- Reliefs sought: declaration of unconstitutionality of the Ordinance; refund of fines paid under the Ordinance; moral damages for shame, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation suffered due to the apprehension under the allegedly unconstitutional Ordinance.
Procedural and Amicus Filings
- The Office of the Solicitor General (via the Provincial Prosecutor of South Cotabato) filed a comment noting:
- The Ordinance imposed penalties stiffer than RA No. 4136, specifically the 30-day imprisonment provision.
- The Ordinance authorized confiscation of driver’s licenses and issuance of Temporary Operator’s Permit (TOP), functions that only deputized Land Transportation Office (LTO) personnel can legally perform.
- Observations that RA No. 4136 enjoins local government units to submit classifications and certifications to the LTO and to make signs for classified streets (statutory framework concerns).
- Petitioner’s position in lower court and on appeal: asserted compliance with RA No. 4136 and other legal bases for ordinance validity, and emphasized the public-safety results (reduction in accidents) during enforcement.
Trial Court Proceedings and Decision (RTC, Branch 39, Polomolok)
- By Decision dated January 20, 2016, the trial court declared Ordinance No. 688 invalid and void ab initio.
- Dispositive order of the trial court included:
- Declared Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014 INVALID and VOID ab initio.
- Permanent injunction restraining the Municipality from enforcing and implementing the Ordinance.
- Directed the Municipality to immediately refund all accrued-collected fines imposed by virtue of the Ordinance.
- Trial court reasoning summarized:
- Prior breach by respondent did not bar him from attacking the Ordinance’s validity because further enforcement would result in inevitable future violations; declaratory relief was still appropriate at that stage according to the trial court.
- Substantial compliance and authority: while the trial court acknowledged the Municipality’s ordinance-making power, it found the Ordinance contravened RA No. 4136 because:
- No prior classification of highways, marking/signage, nor certification to the LTO had been shown.
- The Ordinance imposed uniform speed limits for all vehicle types, conflicting with RA No. 4136 which prescribes different maximum speeds for passenger cars/motorcycles and for motor trucks/buses.
- The trial court did not expressly declare the Ordinance unconstitutional on lack of supporting evidence or argument for such a declaration (it found statutory conflict and procedural noncompliance sufficient to invalidate).
Post-Decision Motions and Trial Court Omnibus Order
- Both petitioner and respondent filed motions for reconsideration.
- Respondent sought a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality and damages.
- Petitioner argued that declaratory relief was improper and challenged the basis for the trial court’s refund order.
- Under an Omnibus Order dated May 15, 2017, the trial court denied the motions for reconsideration and granted respondent’s motion for execution, effectively halting implementation of the Ordinance pending further proceedings.
Petitioner’s Arguments Before the Supreme Court (Principal Contentions)
- Petitioner urged the Supreme Court to exercise judicial review on pure questions of law and maintained that the Ordinance is valid. Principal points advanced:
- The Ordinance was enacted in accordance with RA No. 4136 and the speed limits fall within the maximum allowable speeds under Section 35 of RA No. 4136.
- The 80 kph limit from Crossing Polonuling to Crossing Acmonan corresponds to the statutory category “open country roads, with no ‘blinds corners’ not closely bordered by habitations,” with the area characterized by few residential houses and industrial buildings.
- The 40 kph limit from Crossing Acmonan to Crossing Cebuano corresponds to the statutory category “through streets” or boulevards, given the presence of churches, schools, businesses, residential houses, the Municipal Hall, and Municipal Plaza that closely border the road.
- Substantial compliance with Section 38 of RA No. 4136: the LTO is the approving agency for classification; the LTO here issued Deputation Orders authorizing the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Municipality’s local traffic enforcers to implement the Ordinance — implying LTO acquiescence or involvement.
- Trial court’s refund order lacked basis: respondent filed in his individual capacity, not as a class representative; at most only respondent’s paid amount should be refunded, not fines paid by other motorists.
- The Ordinance was enacted to protect commuters and drivers; statistics showed a drastic reduction in accidents during the period the Ordinance was implemented.
- As to publication, petitioner insisted the Ordinance was to be presumed valid per the trial court’s earlier statements.
Respondent’s Comment on Appeal (Principal Contentions)
- Respondent advanced, in essence:
- Ordinance No. 688 contravenes Section 36 of RA No. 4136, which prohibits local authorities from prescribing maximum speeds other than those provided in the statute; the Ordinance failed to classify the types of roads and vehicles covered.