Title
Municipality of Obando, Bulacan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case
G.R. No. 73558
Decision Date
Sep 29, 1987
Municipality of Obando and Sunga failed to timely appeal a court ruling due to a typhoon; SC dismissed their petition, citing negligence and mandatory appeal deadlines.
municipality of obando
bulacan
intermediate appellate court
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 151821)

Factual Background

The dispute began with a complaint for sum of money filed before the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch CXX, in which judgment was rendered in favor of Ernesto R. Cruz (doing business as “EMD Trading Center”). The trial court ordered the Municipality of Obando to pay P71,147.15, representing the value of unpaid merchandise purchased from Cruz, plus interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint. It further awarded P20,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit.

The appellate facts were established as follows: the petitioners admitted that they received a copy of the decision on June 13, 1985. No motion for reconsideration was filed. They also admitted that the period to file an appeal would expire on June 28, 1985. They claimed that counsel had prepared the notice of appeal on June 27, 1985 and intended to file it by registered mail on June 28, 1985, but argued that a strong typhoon, referred to as “Daling,” caused public offices in Bulacan and much of Metro Manila and Central Luzon to close on June 28, 1985. They further alleged that strong winds, heavy rains, and flood waters prevailed on June 28, 29, and 30, 1985, allegedly preventing the filing of the notice of appeal. The notice of appeal was actually filed by registered mail only on July 3, 1985.

Upon motion by the private respondent, the trial court issued an order dated July 22, 1985 dismissing the appeal for being untimely and granted the motion for execution.

Proceedings Before the Intermediate Appellate Court

After the dismissal of the appeal, the petitioners sought relief from the Intermediate Appellate Court through a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction. On December 23, 1985, the Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petition. It held that an appeal is a purely statutory remedy and that perfection of the appeal within the period provided by law is mandatory and jurisdictional.

The Intermediate Appellate Court anchored its ruling on the Court’s earlier pronouncement in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Maximo N. Japzon (G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 46). It ruled that the fifteen-day period for appeal (or for filing a motion for reconsideration) could not be extended, and that failure to comply had the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.

Issues Raised in the Petition

In the petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners advanced a single principal issue: whether the courts should have approved the notice of appeal filed out of time due to a claimed fortuitous event. They contended that the devastating typhoon constituted an act of God or act of nature that should excuse the delay.

They also cited earlier cases—such as Ernesto v. Court of Appeals (131 SCRA 347) and Director of Lands v. Romamban (131 SCRA 431)—to support what they described as a liberal view previously adopted by the Court in allowing late appeals when the appeals were meritorious.

Finally, they argued that review of the trial court’s decision was warranted because the respondent allegedly admitted in paragraph 15 of his complaint that his transaction did not adhere to the prescribed procedure under PD 1445, known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.

Ruling of the Court

The Court found the petition without merit and dismissed the petition. It affirmed the Intermediate Appellate Court’s decision dismissing the petition for mandamus. The Court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the appeal as untimely and thus incapable of vesting jurisdiction in the appellate court.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court grounded its ruling on the statutory design and the strictness of the appellate periods under the amended procedure. It observed that the Judiciary Reorganization Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was intended to avoid procedural delays that had plagued justice administration under earlier rules. In this reform, the Court emphasized that (with limited exceptions) the record on appeal was dispensed with, and the period to appeal was reduced from thirty days to fifteen days. Because only a notice of appeal was required under the new procedure, the Court treated the filing period as essential to the orderly exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

To clarify the application of the new rule for ordinary appeals, the Court discussed Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court (143 SCRA 643, 648). There, the Court explained that in ordinary appeals by mere notice of appeal, the fifteen-day period may be interrupted or suspended by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration, but only to the extent contemplated by the rules. Even then, if the motion is denied, the moving party has only the remaining time from the notice of denial to file a notice of appeal. Crucially, the Court stated that no extension of the time to file the notice of appeal is allowed and that such extension is unnecessary because the procedure no longer requires the time-consuming submission of the record on appeal.

Applying this rule, the Court held that no compelling reason justified departure from the prescribed timeline in the case before it. It stated that negligence attended the petitioners’ failure to file within time. The Court found it untenable that, absent any motion for reconsideration, the petitioners waited until the last day to file a mere notice of appeal. It characterized filing a notice of appeal as neither difficult nor time-consuming, and it assumed counsel’s familiarity with the case.

Even assuming that the typhoon prevented timely filing on the expiration date, the Court noted that the last day, June 28, 1985, fell on a Friday. Thus, the petitioners could have filed the notice on the next working day, July 1, 1985. Instead, they filed the notice only on July 3, 1985 and attributed the delay to alleged disarray in the Fiscal’s Office caused by the typhoon, claiming the failure was not discovered at once. The Court rejected this explanation. It ruled that the typhoon did not cause the delay in filing the notice of appeal. The Court attributed the delay to dilly-dallying, negligence, and lack of attention by petitioners’ counsel.

The Court therefore held that the failure to pe

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