Case Summary (G.R. No. 116702)
Key Dates and Relevant Executive/Statutory Acts
Court of Appeals decision: June 28, 1994.
Supreme Court resolution: December 28, 1995 (requiring application of the 1987 Constitution as the constitutional basis).
Executive Order No. 265 (creation of Municipality of Alicia): September 16, 1949.
Act No. 968 (component territories of Mabini and Candijay): October 31, 1903.
Petitioner’s collateral attack on Alicia’s juridical personality commenced in the trial proceedings on January 19, 1984. Relevant precedent cited: Pelaez v. Auditor General (December 24, 1965) and Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr. (December 6, 1994). Section 442(d) of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) is relied upon in the comparative analysis.
Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
- Whether the Court of Appeals improperly applied the doctrine of equiponderance of evidence and erred in relying on documentary exhibits which petitioner alleges to be void.
- Whether the respondent Municipality of Alicia lacks juridical personality because Executive Order No. 265 (its instrument of creation) was allegedly unconstitutional and thus void ab initio.
- Whether the Court of Appeals’ decision failed to resolve the boundary problem between the municipalities and merely returned the parties to their prior state.
RTC Judgment and Reliefs Sought by Petitioner
The Regional Trial Court declared Barrio Pagahat to be within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Candijay and permanently enjoined the Municipality of Alicia to respect Candijay’s control, possession, and political supervision over Barrio Pagahat. The RTC therefore effectively quieted title and resolved the boundary dispute in Candijay’s favor.
Court of Appeals’ Findings and Rationale
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC, concluding that the trial court erred in declaring Barrio Pagahat to be within Candijay’s territory. The CA found the boundary claimed by Candijay, as supported by certain exhibits (including Exh. X-Commissioner), to be unacceptable because it would in effect absorb multiple barrios beyond Pagahat and substantially exceed Candijay’s territorial jurisdiction as established by law-creating instruments. The CA also found both parties’ survey plans inadequate in identifying boundary monuments, noting absence of locations for several named points used in the Provincial Board’s declared boundary line. After examining Executive Order No. 265 and Act No. 968, the CA concluded that neither instrument clearly established that Barrio Pagahat belonged to Candijay or that Bulawan (from which Pagahat originated) was listed among the barrios constituting Alicia. Given these evidentiary insufficiencies, the CA applied the equiponderance rule and dismissed the complaint, holding that where evidence is in equipoise the plaintiff must fail.
Equiponderance Rule and Standard of Review on Appreciation of Evidence
The Supreme Court affirmed that the Court of Appeals’ determination of equiponderance involved factual appreciation and weighing of evidence, a matter generally not reviewable by the Supreme Court unless the lower court’s appreciation is shown to be whimsical, capricious, or unsupported by the record. The Supreme Court found no such showing of caprice or whimsy. It agreed that neither party made out a preponderant case: the plaintiff must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and where evidence is insufficient to establish the cause of action, dismissal is proper. The CA’s conclusion that evidence was in equipoise and its resulting dismissal were therefore sustained.
Collateral Attack on Alicia’s Juridical Personality and Timeliness
Petitioner’s contention that Executive Order No. 265 was void for being based on an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power (as held in Pelaez) was raised belatedly—decades after Alicia had begun functioning as a municipal entity. The Supreme Court referenced the doctrine applied in Municipality of San Narciso v. Mendez, Sr., observing that prolonged and continuous exercise of municipal functions, public recognition through various governmental acts, and subsequent statutory or constitutional developments (including the Local Government Code’s Section 442[d]) can cure prior defects and secure de jure status. Given that Alicia had existed since 1949, had been subject to administrative recognition (e.g., coverage by municipal circuit courts), and appeared as a municipality in the ordinance apportioning House seats appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Court found Alicia to be in a position analogous to San Andres and concluded Alicia should be considered a regular, de jure municipality. The Supreme Court thus rejected petitioner’s collateral and untimely attack on Alicia’s juridical personality.
Effect of the Decision on
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 116702)
Case Caption, Citation and Nature of Proceeding
- Reported at 321 Phil. 922, Third Division; G.R. No. 116702; decided December 28, 1995.
- Title of record: The Municipality of Candijay, Bohol, acting through its Sanguniang Bayan and Mayor, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and the Municipality of Alicia, Bohol, respondents.
- Procedural vehicle: Petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court from the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on June 28, 1994, which reversed the Regional Trial Court (Branch I) of the City of Tagbilaran, Bohol.
- Underlying case in the trial court: Civil Case No. 2402, for settlement of boundary dispute and quieting of title over Barrio Pagahat.
Trial Court (Regional Trial Court) Judgment
- The RTC declared that "barrio/barangay Pagahat [is] within the territorial jurisdiction of the plaintiff municipality of Candijay, Bohol," and adjudged that the barrio "forms part and parcel of its territory, therefore, belonging to said plaintiff municipality" (RTC decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 86).
- The RTC permanently enjoined the defendant municipality of Alicia "to respect plaintiff's control, possession and political supervision of barangay Pagahat and never to molest, disturb, harass its possession and ownership over the same barrio" (RTC decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 86).
Court of Appeals Decision and Reasoning
- The Court of Appeals, Thirteenth Division (Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, ponente, with JJ. Alfredo M. Marigomen and Ruben T. Reyes), reversed the RTC judgment on June 28, 1994.
- The CA concluded that the trial court erred in declaring Barrio Pagahat within the territorial jurisdiction of Candijay after scrutiny of the conflicting claims and respective evidence of the parties.
- The CA rejected the boundary line claimed by petitioner based on certain exhibits because acceptance of that line "would in effect place 'practically all of Barrio Pagahat x x x, part of Barrio Cagongcagong and portions of Barrio Putlongcam and La Hacienda and all of Barrio Mahayag and Barrio del Monte within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee Candijay,'" which the CA found implausible (Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 35).
- The CA quoted defendant-appellant Alicia’s brief: "'the plaintiff municipality will not only engulf the entire barrio of Pagahat, but also of the barrios of Putlongcam, Mahayag, Del Monte, Cagongcagong, and a part of the Municipality of Mabini. Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her. Her claim opens the floodgate of controversies over boundaries, including with Mabini.'" (Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 35.)
- The CA found that the trial court erred in relying on "Exh. X-Commissioner [exhibit for petitioner]," because doing so "in effect, included portions of Barrios Putlongcam and La Hacienda within the jurisdiction of appellee Candijay when said barrios are undisputedly part of appellant's (Alicia) territory under Executive Order No. 265 creating the latter" (Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 37).
- After examining the respective survey plans of petitioner and respondent, the CA found both plans inadequate in identifying monuments of the boundary line between Candijay and the Municipality of Mabini (not a party), noting neither plan shows where "Looc-Tabasan, Lomislis Island, Tagtang Canlirong"—places mentioned in the Provincial Board of Bohol’s declared boundary line—are actually located (Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 35).
- The CA considered official acts, including Executive Order No. 265 (dated September 16, 1949) creating Alicia from certain barrios of Mabini, and Act No. 968 of the Philippine Commission (dated October 31, 1903) which set forth component territories of Mabini and Candijay, and observed that "Barrio Bulawan from where barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned as one of the barrios constituted as part of defendant-appellant Municipality of Alicia. Neither do they show that Barrio Pagahat forms part of plaintiff-appellant Municipality of Candijay."
- Applying the rule on equiponderance of evidence, the CA concluded there was an equiponderance of evidence and cited the Supreme Court’s exposition: "'When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant. Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of defendant's claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.'" (citing Sapu-an, et al. v. Court of Appeals, Oct. 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 701, 705-706).
- Disposition by the CA: "WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is reversed and set aside. Another judgment is hereby entered dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2402. No costs." (Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 37.)
Petition to the Supreme Court: Grounds and Contentions
- Petitioner (Municipality of Candijay) sought review by this Court, raising principally:
- Alleged improper application by the Court of Appeals of the principle of "equiponderance of evidence," arguing the CA based its ruling on do