Title
Municipality of Binan vs. Garcia
Case
G.R. No. 69260
Decision Date
Dec 22, 1989
Municipality of Binan sought to expropriate land for a public market. Defendant Francisco's motion to dismiss, based on a locational clearance, led to case dismissal. Supreme Court ruled the clearance expired, remanding for proper trial and evidence presentation.
expropriation suit
public market
due process

Case Summary (G.R. No. 69260)

Factual Background

The expropriation suit was commenced by complaint filed by the Municipality in the trial court, naming as defendants the owners of the eleven parcels of land. One of the named defendants, Erlinda Francisco, filed a “Motion to Dismiss” dated August 26, 1983. She invoked grounds that included allegedly vague and conjectural allegations, alleged constitutional infirmities under eminent domain jurisprudence, oppression, alleged bar by prior decision and disposition, and the claim that the complaint stated no cause of action. Her pleading was filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67, which required that within the time specified in the summons, each defendant must present in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief all objections and defenses to the plaintiff’s right to take the property for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. As implemented by the Rules, this “motion to dismiss” functioned as the defendant’s substitute responsive pleading in lieu of an answer.

On October 23, 1983, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor of the Municipality. Later, on February 3, 1984, Francisco filed a “Motion for Separate Trial” under Section 2, Rule 31, asserting that the litigation had been delayed in bringing all defendants under the court’s jurisdiction, that some defendants acted without interest, and that although the causes of action and defenses were basically the same, she had, among other defenses, a constitutional defense of vested right allegedly arising from a pre-existing approved Locational Clearance issued by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC). She contended that until the clearance was revoked, or until the Municipality had submitted and obtained approval of a rezoning of the lots, it was premature to file an expropriation case.

The trial court granted the separate trial. By order dated March 2, 1984, it directed that a separate trial be held for Francisco regarding her special defenses mentioned in her motions, distinct from defenses commonly raised by the other defendants. During the separate trial, the Fiscal called attention to the alleged irregularity of reversing the normal sequence of presentation, contending that the “motion to dismiss” had the nature of an answer and that evidence for Francisco should be treated only for purposes of the motion for reconsideration of the writ of possession. Despite this protest, the trial court required Francisco to begin presenting her evidence at the hearings scheduled for March 5 and March 26, 1984. Francisco presented testimony and exhibits, including a land use map, the Locational Clearance and Development Permit issued by the HSRC in her favor, and related executive and letter of instruction references.

Subsequently, on July 24, 1984, the trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint as against Francisco and amending the writ of possession to exclude Francisco and her property. The court’s factual findings were anchored on the issuance of a Locational Clearance on May 4, 1983 by the HSRC to Ferlins Realty owned by Francisco for conversion of her lot into a commercial complex. Relying on testimony from counsel for the HSRC, the court found that a grantee of a locational clearance acquires a vested right over the subject property in the sense that the property may not be subject to another locational clearance application while the clearance subsists. It then treated the clearance as a legal disposition of private property co-equal with, or in parity with, a disposition through eminent domain and concluded that the clearance was therefore a legal bar to the Municipality’s right to expropriate the property.

Trial Court Proceedings and the Timing of the Municipality’s Motion for Reconsideration

The Municipality filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 17, 1984, reiterating its objections to (a) the trial sequence irregularity and (b) the trial court’s supposed failure to receive the Municipality’s evidence before deciding the merits as to Francisco. It further argued that the HSRC locational clearance did not mean others were prevented from filing locational clearance applications for the same project, and thus could not constitute a bar. It also contended that the clearance became a worthless sheet of paper after one year, invoking an explicit condition in the clearance providing for automatic revocation if not used within one year from issue. It asserted that all requisites for expropriation had been complied with.

The trial court initially set the hearing for August 28, 1984, after notice to Francisco’s counsel. However, the hearing was later rescheduled to November 20, 1984. Francisco then filed an ex parte motion for execution and/or finality on September 13, 1984, asserting that the order dismissing the complaint had become final and executory on August 12, 1984, due to the Municipality’s failure to file a timely motion for reconsideration and/or appeal within the fifteen (15) day period counted from notice. On October 10, 1984, the trial court declared the Municipality’s motion for reconsideration to have been filed out of time and stated that it could not act except to dismiss it. The trial court emphasized that notice of the July 24, 1984 order was served on July 27, 1984, while the motion for reconsideration was presented on August 17, 1984.

Later, on October 15, 1985, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution and a certificate of finality of the July 24, 1984 order. The Municipality attempted to have the trial court reconsider the October 10, 1984 and October 15, 1984 rulings. It argued, in substance, that (1) multiple appeals were allowed in eminent domain cases, thus making the appeal period thirty (30) days rather than fifteen (15); (2) a separate trial created a situation where multiple appeals became available; (3) the trial court erred by acting ex parte on the execution matter; and (4) the Municipality was deprived of due process when the court received Francisco’s evidence and then immediately resolved the case as to her without holding further hearing for the Municipality’s reception of evidence. The trial court denied the Municipality’s motion by order dated October 18, 1984, prompting the certiorari proceeding.

Issues Raised in the Certiorari Proceeding

The Supreme Court resolved three issues. First, it addressed whether an eminent domain case under Rule 67 was a case “wherein multiple appeals are allowed,” such that the appeal period should be thirty (30) days instead of fifteen (15) days. Second, it examined whether the trial court could treat Francisco’s “motion to dismiss” filed under Section 3, Rule 67 as a Rule 16 motion to dismiss, reverse the sequence of trial, and then dismiss the expropriation suit as to the movant. Third, it considered whether an HSRC locational clearance issued relative to land use barred an expropriation suit involving the land.

The Parties' Contentions

The Municipality maintained that the trial court incorrectly held its motion for reconsideration to be untimely, insisting that in eminent domain actions multiple appeals are allowed and therefore the period for appeal is thirty (30) days. It further maintained that when the trial court granted a separate trial for one defendant and later dismissed the case as to that defendant, multiple appeals became available, again warranting the longer appeal period. It also asserted that the trial court acted erroneously in proceeding ex parte on the execution and finality issues and, more critically, violated due process by reversing the order of evidence, receiving Francisco’s proof, and deciding against the Municipality without granting it the opportunity to present its own evidence.

Francisco, on the other hand, defended the trial court’s approach by relying on the constitutional defense of vested right allegedly conferred by her pre-existing locational clearance, and by supporting the trial court’s characterization of the clearance as a legal bar to expropriation. She further relied on the trial court’s rulings on finality and timeliness, arguing that the Municipality failed to seek reconsideration and/or appeal within the shorter period.

Legal Basis and Reasoning: Appeal Period in Eminent Domain and Multiple Appeals

The Supreme Court began by characterizing eminent domain proceedings as having two stages. The first stage concerned the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise. It ended, if warranted, with an order of condemnation declaring a lawful right to take for the public use or purpose described in the complaint upon payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of filing. An order of dismissal at the first stage would be final, and an order of condemnation would also be final as the Rules explicitly state that no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or its propriety) shall be filed or heard in the trial court.

The second stage focused on determination of just compensation, made by commissioners, and the order fixing compensation based on their reports would be final as well.

The Court then drew a close analogy to partition and accounting under Rule 69, where the Court had already settled that certain orders are final and appealable even if further proceedings are still required, such as the appointment and work of commissioners or the rendering and approval of accounting. It relied on Miranda v. Court of Appeals and subsequent reaffirmations of the doctrine that judgments for recovery of property with accounting and orders for partition are final and appealable, notwithstanding that further proceedings will still follow. Applying that logic to eminent domain, the Court held that there is no reason to treat eminent domain differently because of the parallel structure that allows multiple appeal scenarios.

It thus held that in actions of eminent domain, as in actions for pa

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