CIF. No. 7527 - Moya vs. Barton

Case Summary (CIF. No. 7527)

Factual Background

After the adverse judgment in civil case No. 7527, the defendant was notified on February 14, 1946. On March 14, 1946, or twenty-eight days after notice, the defendant filed a motion for new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and the order denying it was served upon the defendant on April 1, 1946. On April 2, 1946, the defendant filed a notice of appeal and an appeal bond. At the same time, the defendant filed a motion requesting an extension of five days within which to file the record on appeal, explaining that it was impossible for him to have the same typewritten and filed in one day or on April 3, described as the last day of the period fixed by law.

The trial court granted the motion on the same day it was presented. The defendant-appellant then filed his appeal on time, and the case was pending before the appellate court.

Motion to Dismiss the Appeal and Grounds Asserted

In the appellate court, the plaintiff-appellee filed a motion for dismissal of defendant’s appeal. The motion rested on two grounds: first, that the trial court allegedly had no power to extend the period for filing the record on appeal; and second, that the plaintiff-appellee allegedly was not notified of the defendant’s motion for extension and that the motion was not set for hearing.

Issue for Resolution

The appellate court had to determine whether the trial court could extend the time to file the record on appeal, and whether the extension could be validly granted despite the alleged lack of notice and lack of hearing.

The Court’s Ruling on the First Ground: Power to Extend

On the first ground, the Court refrained from definitively deciding whether the period within which an appellant must file the notice of appeal and appeal bond may be extended. Instead, it directly addressed the specific question concerning the record on appeal.

The Court held that the trial court had power and discretion to extend the period for filing the record on appeal in the interest of justice, provided it appeared that the appellant did not have sufficient time to prepare and file it within the period limited by law. The Court recognized that lack of time may occur because the remaining time is very short, because the record on appeal is voluminous, or because of other justifiable reasons. It also conditioned the power on a timing requirement: the motion for extension had to be filed before the expiration of the period fixed by law.

The Court explained that the rules governing procedure must be construed liberally and reasonably. It reasoned that a motion, pleading, or other paper filed within the extended period that the court legally granted was, in legal effect, still a paper filed within the period fixed by law.

To support this conclusion, the Court cited the **provision of sec. 7 of Rule 41, which empowers a court to order the amendment of a record on appeal when an appellee’s objection is well taken and to grant appellant time within which to submit or file the amended record on appeal. The Court reasoned that if an appellant could secure an extension indirectly by filing an incomplete or defective record on appeal, there was no rational basis why the appellant could not obtain the extension directly or why the court could not grant it directly. The Court invoked the maxim that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly, and conversely that what can be done or granted indirectly can be done or granted directly.

The Court further supported its view by analogy to its earlier rulings in Lim vs. Singian (37 Phil. 817) and Layda vs. Legaspi (39 Phil. 83). In those cases, the Court had held that the trial court had the power to extend the period of ten days within which to present the bill of exceptions, notwithstanding sec. 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which required the bill of exceptions to be filed within ten days from notice of intention to present it.

The Court’s Ruling on the Second Ground: Notice and Hearing

On the second ground, the Court referred to sec. 2 of Rule 27, which provides that every written motion other than one that may be heard ex parte must be filed with the court and served upon the parties affected by it.

The Court considered that an extension of time could be shorter than the time required for the motion to be set for hearing and acted upon by the court. It also reiterated that the court had the discretion to grant the extension for good reason, as discussed in connection with the first ground

Case Syllabus (CIF. No. 7527)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Jose L. Moya appeared as plaintiff and appellant in a civil case before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
John Barton appeared as defendant and appellant in the same civil case.
The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant.
The defendant pursued appellate review, and the matter was pending before the Court at the time the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.
The Supreme Court resolved the plaintiff’s motion in a resolution on a motion to dismiss appeal, rather than on the merits of the underlying judgment.

Key Factual Antecedents

The defendant received notice of the adverse judgment on February 14, 1946.
On March 14, 1946, which was 28 days after notice, the defendant filed a motion for new trial.
The trial court denied the motion for new trial.
The order denying the motion for new trial was served on the defendant on April 1, 1946.
On April 2, 1946, the defendant filed a notice of appeal and an appeal bond.
On April 2, 1946, the defendant also filed a motion requesting an extension of five days within which to file the record on appeal.
The defendant’s motion invoked the ground that it was impossible to have the record on appeal typewritten and filed in one day, and it highlighted April 3, 1946 as the last day of the period fixed by law.
The trial court granted the motion for extension on the same day it was presented.
The record on appeal was treated as timely because the extension was granted.

Issues Raised in Motion to Dismiss

The plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the lower court had no power to extend the period for filing the record on appeal.
The plaintiff also moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff-appellee was not notified of the defendant’s motion for extension and that the motion was not set for hearing.
The Supreme Court confined its evaluation to these procedural objections, without definitively ruling on whether the extension of notice and bond periods was within the trial court’s power.

Governing Procedural Rules

The Court relied on Rule 41, sec. 7 to support the trial court’s authority to deal with matters involving amendment of the record on appeal, including granting time for submission of an amended record upon appellee’s objection.
The Court applied Rule 27, sec. 2, which provides that every written motion other than one that may be heard ex-parte must be filed with the court and served upon the parties affected thereby.
The Court used Lim vs. Singian (37 Phil. 817) as precedent, holding that the court could extend the period for presenting the bill of exceptions despite statuto