Title
Mortel vs. Aspiras
Case
Adm. Case No. 145
Decision Date
Dec 28, 1956
Atty. Aspiras disbarred for seduction, deceit, and illicit relations with Josefina Mortel, undermining legal profession integrity.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 233767)

Procedural History

Petitioner filed a complaint before the Supreme Court on March 17, 1953, accusing respondent of seduction by promise of marriage and of using his son to effect a sham marriage. Petitioner later moved to withdraw/dismiss (April 9, 1953); the Court denied dismissal and required respondent to answer. The matter was referred to the Solicitor General (May 13, 1953). The Solicitor General initially recommended dismissal (November 2, 1953) and the complaint was dismissed (November 5, 1953). Petitioner subsequently moved to re‑open (December 17, 1953); the Court granted re‑opening (January 5, 1954) and ordered re‑investigation. The Solicitor General filed a formal complaint seeking respondent’s disbarment. Respondent filed an answer (May 6, 1953; replied to official charges May 6, 1955), failed to produce additional evidence when allowed, did not appear at oral argument but later filed a memorandum.

Core Factual Findings

The Court found beyond reasonable doubt that: (1) respondent represented himself as single and courted petitioner, promising marriage and ultimately seducing her; (2) petitioner moved to Manila in December 1952 to marry respondent and, following respondent’s instructions, applied for a marriage license on January 3, 1953 naming Cesar Aspiras as spouse; (3) on January 14, 1953 petitioner and Cesar underwent a City Hall marriage ceremony which was a formality and the parties never lived together as husband and wife; (4) respondent continued to cohabit with and have sexual relations with petitioner after the ceremony, up to November 1953; (5) respondent allegedly ordered his son Cesar to live with them to camouflage the illicit relationship; and (6) petitioner gave birth to a child on January 24, 1954.

Evidentiary Basis for Findings

The Court relied on petitioner’s sworn testimony corroborated by documentary evidence: love letters from respondent to petitioner (Exhibit A‑6, September 22, 1952; Exhibit A, November 2, 1952), respondent’s letters to petitioner’s mother (Exhibits A‑19, A‑21, February 9 and March 6, 1953), and marriage application forms (Exhibits 7 and 8). Respondent produced no affirmative evidence to contradict the Solicitor General’s proofs despite opportunity to do so.

Legal Issues Presented

  • Whether the respondent’s conduct (seduction by promise of marriage, arranging a sham marriage between petitioner and his son to conceal the affair, and cohabitation with his son’s wife) constituted sufficient grounds for disciplinary removal from the bar.
  • Whether the petitioner’s complicity (pari delicto) should bar disciplinary proceedings against respondent.
  • Whether the Supreme Court may remove an attorney from the roll on grounds not strictly enumerated in statutory lists of disbarable offenses.

Applicable Law and Precedent (constitutional and procedural basis)

Because the decision in the record falls before 1990, the Court applied the appropriate pre‑1987 constitutional framework and exercised its disciplinary power over members of the bar. The Court proceeded pursuant to the established rule that it may remove attorneys on its own motion (citing Section 1, Rule 128 as referenced in the record) and under antecedent jurisprudence recognizing removal for conduct demonstrating lack of the continuing moral qualifications necessary for practice (cited authorities in the record include In re Pelaez, Balinon v. De Leon, and Re Stolen, as well as American jurisprudential commentary).

Court’s Legal Analysis and Reasoning

The Court treated the case as implicating the integrity of the legal profession and the public interest in maintaining the courts’ dignity. It emphasized that admission to and continuation in the practice of law requires continued moral fitness; loss of that qualification may justify removal even if the statutory grounds for disbarment are not precisely met. The respondent’s misconduct was not limited to private immorality: the conduct involved a calculated scheme to misrepresent marital status, to enlist a minor descendant as an instrument to cover the illicit relationship, and to cohabit with the son’s wife after arranging and witnessing her marriage to his son. These aggravating circumstances—mockery of marriage and corruption of a descendant—were held to amount to such moral delinquency as to render respondent unfit to practice law. The Court rejected the respondent’s pari delicto defense as insufficient to defeat disciplinary action, observing that the proceeding aimed to protect the public and the administration of justice, not to adjudicate civil remedies between private parties. The respondent’s failure to present exculpatory evidence or to appear at oral argument further supported the Court’s acceptance of t

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