Title
Moreno vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 168550
Decision Date
Aug 10, 2006
A probationer, Urbano Moreno, successfully challenged his disqualification from running for Punong Barangay, as the Supreme Court ruled that probation suspends sentence execution, restoring his civil rights and exempting him from the Local Government Code's disqualification provision.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 19621)

Factual Background

– On August 27, 1998, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar, convicted Moreno of Arbitrary Detention and imposed imprisonment of four months and one day to two years and four months.
– Moreno was granted probation under P.D. 968 (Probation Law of 1976).
– On December 20, 2000, the trial court terminated his probation and issued an order restoring all civil rights lost or suspended due to his conviction.

Procedural History

– November 15, 2002: Comelec First Division disqualified Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that, under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, he remained ineligible within two years after serving sentence.
– June 1, 2005: Comelec en banc denied Moreno’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed his disqualification.
– July 6, 2005: Moreno elevated the case to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari.

Applicable Law

– 1987 Constitution (as this decision postdates 1990)
– Local Government Code of 1991, Sec. 40(a) (disqualification of convicted persons within two years after serving sentence for offenses punishable by one year or more)
– Probation Law of 1976 (P.D. 968), Sec. 4 (probation suspends execution of sentence) and Sec. 16 (final discharge restores civil rights)
– Revised Penal Code, Art. 43 (classification of penalties)

Petitioner’s Arguments

  1. The grant of probation suspended the execution of the sentence; Moreno never served any portion of the adjudged term.
  2. Final discharge of probation on December 20, 2000 restored all civil rights, including eligibility to run for public office.
  3. The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) applies only to those who have served their sentence; probationers are a distinct class.
  4. Even if disqualification applied, his subsequent election would amount to an implied pardon by the electorate.

Respondents’ Arguments

– The Comelec and Office of the Solicitor General relied on Dela Torre v. Comelec (327 Phil. 1144, 1996), which held that probation does not negate the disqualification under Sec. 40(a).
– They maintained that the two-year ineligibility period runs from the date of final discharge from probation, regardless of actual service of sentence.

Issue for Resolution

How should the phrase “within two (2) years after serving sentence” in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code be interpreted in light of a probationary suspension of sentence?

Interpretation of “Serving Sentence”

– “Service of sentence” in its ordinary sense denotes actual confinement in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court.
– Under Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, probation suspends the execution of the sentence; the probationer does not serve the penalty but complies with conditional supervision.
– In Baclayon v. Mutia (129 SCRA 148, 1984), this Court held that probation is not a sentence but a suspension of sentence and its accessory penalties.

Effect of Probation on Disqualification

– Because Moreno never experienced actual service of his prison term, the two-year disqualification period under Sec. 40(a) could not commence.
– Final discharge under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law restored all rights lost by reason of conviction, terminating any civil disabilities and rendering Moreno eligible.

Legislative Intent and Statutory Construction

– The Local Government Code of 1991 omitted any expres

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