Title
Montesa vs. Manila Cordage Co.
Case
G.R. No. L-4559
Decision Date
Sep 17, 1952
A dispute over a seized car led to conflicting court orders, with judges in different salas of the same court issuing contradictory rulings. The Supreme Court ruled that judges cannot annul each other’s orders, upholding the validity of the original attachment and invalidating the injunction.
judge
division
annul

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-4559)

Factual Background

On March 7, 1950 the Sheriff of Manila, pursuant to an order in civil case No. 9126 in the Court of First Instance, seized a 1950 Buick Sedan, plate No. 1074, belonging to Yu Bon Chiong. On March 8, 1950 two persons, Hao Yu Guan alias A. Lao Roldan and Rufino Ibafiez, each filed a claim of terceria asserting ownership or possessory rights; the first asserted a mortgage over the automobile under Art. 4, Ley 3952, and the second asserted that he was the co-owner and driver of the vehicle. The Sheriff warned Manila Cordage Company to post the requisite bond or he would release the embargoed automobile.

Bond and Subsequent Proceedings

At the request of Manila Cordage Company, the Fidelity & Surety Co. posted a bond pursuant to Art. 14, Regla 59, and on March 17, 1950 the terceristas filed civil case No. 10624 in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Manila Cordage Company, the Fidelity & Surety Co., and the Sheriff. The terceristas sought an ex parte interlocutory writ directing the defendants, particularly the Sheriff, to cease retaining the Buick and to deliver it to them. Hon. Juez Montesa issued the interim order, and the Sheriff delivered the automobile to the terceristas in compliance.

Motion to Dissolve and Denials

Upon learning of the delivery, Manila Cordage Company filed an urgent motion to dissolve the interlocutory order, contending that Hon. Juez Montesa exceeded his jurisdiction because the Buick had already been preventively embargoed in civil case No. 9126 by an order of Hon. Juez Macadaeg. Hon. Juez Pecson denied the urgent motion on April 18, 1950. A motion for reconsideration was later dismissed by Hon. Juez Montesa on May 23, 1950.

Appeal to the Tribunal de Apelacion

Manila Cordage Company sought relief from the Tribunal de Apelacion by certiorari against Hon. Juez Montesa and others, asking that the interlocutory order in cause No. 10624 be revoked. After hearing the parties, the Tribunal de Apelacion, on December 29, 1950, revoked the order of Hon. Juez Montesa insofar as it dissolved the preventive embargo previously ordered by Hon. Juez Macadaeg in civil case No. 9126.

Questions Presented and Contentions

The principal legal question was whether a judge of one sala of a Court of First Instance may, by interlocutory order in a separate cause, annul or annul ipso facto a preventive embargo lawfully ordered by another judge of another sala of the same court. The petitioners argued that the doctrine in Cabigao and another v. Del Rosario and another (44 Jur. Fil., 192) and Hubahib v. Insular Drug Co. (5 Law. J., 281) had been superseded by Mercado and another v. Ocampo (72 Phil., 318), and that a judge sitting in one sala could modify or annul an order issued by another judge of the same court. Manila Cordage Company maintained that Hon. Juez Montesa had no jurisdiction to set aside the preventive embargo in another pending case and that the interlocutory order violated the rules governing delivery of seized movable property.

Analysis of Precedents

The Court reviewed the three controlling authorities. In Cabigao v. Lim and Pineda the Court declared void an interlocutory prohibitory writ issued by a judge of the First Sala which restrained execution of a judgment of the Second Sala, holding that the several salas of a Court of First Instance are co-ordinate and must not interpose interdicts that interfere with the execution of another sala’s orders. The Hubahib decision reiterates the same principle. In Mercado v. Ocampo the Court allowed a judge to modify orders issued by another judge, but the modification occurred because the second judge acted in the same cause upon returning to his duties and thus essentially continued the same judicial function as if a single judge were acting on the same record.

Court’s Reasoning and Application

The Court held that Mercado v. Ocampo did not overrule Cabigao and Hubahib. The distinction is decisive: in Mercado the second judge acted in place of the first upon a single file; in the present matter two judges of different salas acted in two different causes and one judge’s interlocutory order effectively nullified an order in another independent cause. Such interposition is an undue interference by one judge in the business of another judge of equal status. The Court identified the statutory and rule basis for the doctrine in Art. 263, par. 4, Code of Civil Procedure and in the Rules of Court. It further emphasized that Regla 62 governs interlocutory delivery of movable property and that the rule was amended to add the phrase "o embargados ... en virtud de ... embargo preventivo" in Art. 2(c) so as expressly to bar interlocutory delivery where the goods have been seized under a preventive embargo in another proceeding, unless the goods are exempt from attachment.

Defects in the Interlocutory Order

The Court noted two specific defects in the order issued by Hon. Juez Montesa. First, the Buick Sedan had been legally embargoed preventively in civil case No. 9126 and was not an exempt object under

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