Case Summary (G.R. No. 78239)
Procedural History
Sandiganbayan conviction rendered March 25, 1983; Monsanto appealed to the Supreme Court which affirmed the conviction. While her motion for reconsideration was pending, she received an absolute pardon on December 17, 1984 (accepted December 21, 1984). Monsanto sought reinstatement and back pay; the request was routed to the Ministry of Finance and subsequently to the Office of the President. Her petition for review to the Supreme Court was given due course on October 13, 1987.
Sentence and Accessory Penalties
The Sandiganbayan imposed imprisonment from four years, two months and one day of prision correccional (minimum) to ten years and one day of prision mayor (maximum), imposed a fine of P3,500, and ordered joint and several indemnification to the government of P4,892.50 plus litigation costs. Under the Revised Penal Code, prision mayor carries accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from suffrage; prision correccional carries suspension from public office.
Administrative Responses and Ministry of Finance Ruling
The Ministry of Finance initially held (March 1, 1985) that Monsanto could be reinstated without a new appointment but not earlier than the date she was granted the absolute pardon, and directed satisfaction of the indemnity and litigation costs. Monsanto sought reconsideration, claiming the pardon wiped out the crime (such that her employment had not been forfeited) and asserting entitlement to backpay from the date of preventive suspension (August 1, 1982) and exemption from indemnity.
Office of the President Resolution (Factoran)
On April 15, 1986 Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied automatic reinstatement, adopting the view (citing Miranda v. Imperial and People v. Lising) that acquittal, not absolute pardon, is the ground for reinstatement and for entitlement to salaries and benefits during suspension pendente lite. The Office held that a reappointment is required for reassumption of the former position and that the civil indemnity remains payable despite the pardon, citing Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner's Core Argument
Petitioner argued that because the pardon was extended while her appeal was pending and there was no final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office never attached and her employment status remained suspended; she further contended that pardon in that context operated as an acquittal, thereby entitling her to reinstatement without a new appointment and to backpay, and that she should not be required to pay the civil indemnity.
Governing Constitutional and Statutory Law
At the time, the pardoning power was governed by the 1973 Constitution as amended (April 7, 1981 plebiscite) which removed the prior limitation that clemency could only be granted upon final conviction. The Court noted, however, that the 1987 Constitution later restored the limitation. Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a pardon shall not restore the right to hold public office or suffrage unless such rights are expressly restored by the terms of the pardon and that a pardon shall not exempt the culprit from payment of civil indemnity imposed by sentence. Other relevant Revised Penal Code provisions (Articles 40–43) reiterate limitations on the effect of pardon on accessory penalties unless expressly remitted.
Court's Determination on Finality and Acceptance of Pardon
The Court held that by accepting the absolute pardon while her motion for reconsideration was pending, petitioner effectively abandoned her appeal and the unreversed Sandiganbayan conviction assumed finality. Thus, for purposes of legal effect the conviction stood notwithstanding the timing of the pardon.
Doctrinal Analysis of the Nature and Effects of Pardon
The Court reviewed prevailing doctrine (including Ex Parte Garland and Philippine cases such as Cristobal v. Labrador and Pelobello v. Palatino) and recognized two strains of authority: the broad Garland line that a full pardon blots out guilt and removes disabilities, and the modern trend that limits the scope of pardon — emphasizing that pardon implies forgiveness but does not erase the fact of commission, the conviction, or the moral stain. The Court accepted the more realistic approach: a full pardon relieves the pardoned party from punitive legal consequences and disabilities based on conviction, but it does not automatically equate the pardoned person to one who has never committed the offense, nor does it operate retrospectively to compensate past losses.
Application to Reinstatement and Appointment
Applying the doctrine and statutory rule (Article 36), the Court concluded that the absolute pardon removed the statutory disqualification (i.e., the disability) from holding public employment caused by the conviction, thereby restoring eligibility for appointment. However, the Court held that the pardon did not effectuate automatic reinstatement to the specific office forfeited; the appointing power may still refuse appointment on grounds of suitability, moral character, or public trust, and the petitioner must secure a new appointment and undergo the usual selection procedures. The historical facts of the offense remain proper considerations in evaluating fitness to handle public funds.
Civil Liability for Indemnity
The Court affirmed that a pardon does not extinguish civil liability arising from crime. Under Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code and related provisions, the civil indemnity ordered
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 78239)
Procedural History
- Petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto, then Assistant Treasurer of Calbayog City, was tried by the Sandiganbayan and, in a decision rendered March 25, 1983, convicted with three others of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.
- Sentences imposed by the Sandiganbayan: imprisonment from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional (minimum) to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor (maximum); fine of P3,500; jointly and severally to indemnify the government P4,892.50 (balance defrauded) and to pay costs proportionately.
- Monsanto appealed to the Supreme Court; this Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan conviction. She filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending.
- While the motion for reconsideration was pending, President Marcos extended to Monsanto an absolute pardon dated December 17, 1984; Monsanto accepted the pardon on December 21, 1984.
- Monsanto requested reinstatement to her former post as Assistant City Treasurer; the request was referred to the Ministry of Finance because the Local Government Code transferred appointment power for treasurers to that Ministry.
- Ministry of Finance 4th Indorsement (March 1, 1985): ruled Monsanto may be reinstated to her position without necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was granted the absolute pardon; directed satisfaction of the P4,892.50 indemnity and litigation costs.
- Monsanto sought reconsideration (April 17, 1985), arguing that the pardon wiped out the crime, that her employment had been merely suspended since preventive suspension (Aug. 1, 1982), that she was entitled to back pay for the suspension period, and that she should not be required to pay the indemnity share.
- The Ministry of Finance referred Monsanto’s letter to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., by memorandum dated April 15, 1986, denied automatic reinstatement and held she must secure reappointment before reassuming her former office and remained liable for the civil indemnity.
- Monsanto’s motion for reconsideration of that ruling was denied. She then filed the present petition for review; the Court gave due course on October 13, 1987.
- The Supreme Court rendered its decision (en banc) on February 9, 1989, authored by Chief Justice Fernan, affirming Factoran’s assailed resolution.
Factual Background
- Petitioner’s position: Assistant Treasurer, Calbayog City.
- Criminal charge: Complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.
- Penal consequences imposed: imprisonment (prision correccional to prision mayor range), fine P3,500, indemnity to government P4,892.50, costs proportionate.
- Preventive suspension date referenced by petitioner: August 1, 1982.
- Pardon: absolute pardon extended December 17, 1984; accepted December 21, 1984; pardon described on standard printed form as “an absolute and unconditional pardon [which] restored [petitioner] to full civil and political rights.”
- Ministry of Finance initial administrative position: reinstatement without new appointment permitted not earlier than date of pardon, but indemnity and costs to be satisfied.
- Office of the President (Factoran) administrative position: pardoned public official is not entitled to automatic reinstatement; must secure appointment; civil liability remains; reliance on prior decisions including Miranda v. Imperial and People v. Lising.
Issues Presented
- Whether an absolute (plenary) pardon granted by the Chief Executive entitles a public officer to reinstatement to her former position without a new appointment.
- Whether the timing of the pardon (while appeal/reconsideration was pending and before final judgment by the Supreme Court) alters the legal effect of the pardon with respect to reinstatement, back pay, and the attachment of accessory penalties.
- Whether an absolute pardon extinguishes the civil indemnity and other civil liabilities imposed by the criminal sentence.
- Whether the accessory penalties (disqualification from holding public office, suspension from office) were removed by the pardon and, if so, whether removal operates automatically to reinstate the public officer to a forfeited position.
Holding / Disposition
- The assailed resolution of Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
- The Court held that Monsanto, having accepted the absolute pardon, is deemed to have abandoned her pending appeal and that her unreversed Sandiganbayan conviction assumed the character of finality for purposes of this analysis.
- The Court concluded that a plenary pardon, while removing the disqualification that barred the pardoned person from being eligible for appointment, does not automatically reinstate a public officer to the office forfeited by conviction; the pardoned person must secure reappointment to reassume the post.
- The Court held that the civil liability imposed by the criminal sentence (the indemnity) subsists notwithstanding the pardon and that Monsanto is not exempt from payment of the indemnity and litigation costs.
- The Court ruled that Monsanto is not entitled to back pay for the suspension period.
Legal Principles on Pardon (as stated in the decision)
- Definition and nature:
- Pardon is “an act of grace… which exempts the individual… from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed” and is an official act of the executive; delivery and acceptance are essential to its validity (citing United States v. Wilson).
- Constitutional framework relevant to timing of pardons:
- Under the 1973 Constitution as amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite: Article VII, Section 11 granted the President power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons (except in cases of impeachment) and to remit fines and forfeitures; 1981 amendments deleted prior requirement that clemency be granted only