Case Summary (G.R. No. 229013)
Respondents’ assertion of mootness and factual claim of temporary release
In their return the respondents justified detention by asserting suspension of the privilege of the writ. Later, in a motion to dismiss, respondents stated that the petitioner had been temporarily released on May 11, 1983 on orders of the Minister of National Defense with the President’s approval and argued that the habeas petition was therefore moot and academic because the petitioner was no longer in custody.
Conditions attached to the temporary release
The record shows the temporary release was subject to express restrictions that limited the petitioner’s liberties: (1) requirement to obtain respondents’ approval for any travel outside Metro Manila (curtailing freedom of movement); (2) requirement to obtain prior approval before changing residence (restricting liberty of abode); (3) prohibition against participating in interviews or giving press releases inimical to national security (limiting freedom of speech); and (4) requirement to report regularly to respondents or their representatives (continuing official supervision).
Legal standard on the scope of the writ of habeas corpus
The Court reaffirmed established precedent that the writ inquires into all forms of involuntary restraint, not merely physical confinement. Citing Villavicencio v. Lukban, the Court reiterated that any restraint which precludes freedom of action may be remedied by the writ. Thus a release that continues to impose involuntary restraints on fundamental freedoms does not necessarily render a habeas petition moot or academic.
Precedents addressing conditional releases and psychological or non‑physical restraints
The Court relied on prior decisions to demonstrate that non‑physical restraints are cognizable under the writ. In Caunca v. Salazar the Court recognized that freedom can be effectively lost through external moral compulsion or psychological constraints even absent physical force. In Tibo v. The Provincial Commander the Court found that a conditional release that restricted petitioners’ movements and activities continued to constitute a restraint. In Toyoto, et al. v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al., the Court emphasized that a release which reserves the power to re‑arrest or to continue effective detention despite acquittal is repugnant to the rule of law; a release must be free from involuntary restraints to render a habeas petition moot or academic.
Application of the law to the facts
Applying these principles, the Court concluded that Moncupa’s temporary release was not the sort of unconditional liberation that would render the habeas petition moot. The specified restrictions plainly limited his freedom of movement, abode, speech, and imposed continuin
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 229013)
Citation, Court and Decision
- 225 Phil. 191, EN BANC; G.R. No. 63345; January 30, 1986.
- Decision authored by Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
- Concurrence: Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, De la Fuente, Cuevas, Alampay, and Patajo, JJ.
- Aquino, C.J., did not take part.
- Justice Plana reserved his vote.
Procedural Posture
- Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Efren C. Moncupa.
- Respondents filed a return justifying detention on the ground the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to petitioner.
- Respondents subsequently moved to dismiss, asserting the petition had become moot and academic because petitioner was temporarily released on May 11, 1983.
- The Court was asked to determine whether the petition became moot and academic in view of the temporary release and the conditions attached thereto.
Facts — Arrest, Detention, Investigations and Charges
- Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at the corner of D. Tuazon Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City.
- Moncupa was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City, where he was detained.
- On April 23, 1982, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and eight others on allegation he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member.
- Two separate investigations were conducted:
- By Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa Investigation Group.
- By Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of Quezon City.
- Both investigators ascertained that petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization.
- Both investigators recommended prosecution only for:
- Illegal possession of firearms; and
- Illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33.
- Consequently two separate informations were filed against petitioner:
- One for illegal possession of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
- One for violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of Quezon City.
- Against the other accused, cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as amended; notably the petitioner was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law.
- During pendency of the habeas petition, petitioner’s arraignment and further proceedings had not been pursued; motions for bail by petitioner were denied by the lower court.
Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss and Nature of Temporary Release
- Respondents filed a motion to dismiss (dated August 30, 1983) asserting that on May 11, 1983, petitioner was temporarily released from detention on orders of the Minister of National Defense with the approval of the President.
- Respondents argued that because petitioner was free and no longer under their custody, the habeas petition was moot and academic.
- The Court noted that petitioner’s temporary release was accompanied by specified restrictions.
Restrictions Attached to Temporary Release (as pleaded in the record)
- The Court recorded the restrictions imposed on petitioner’s temporary release as follows:
- His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner must obtain respondents’ approval for any travel outside Metro Manila.
- His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is required in case petitioner wants to change his place of residence.
- His freedom of speech is curtailed by a prohibition that he should not “participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to the interest of national security.”
- He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives.