Case Summary (G.R. No. 56503)
Relation to Javellana — How Javellana Was Interpreted
The Court analyzed and reaffirmed the import of Javellana v. Executive Secretary. The dispositive language of Javellana — that, by virtue of a majority vote dismissing the challenges, “there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect” — is read as dispositive of the present inquiry. The majority underscores that Javellana’s outcome, read together with the vote breakdown and subsequent practice, means the judiciary must treat the 1973 Constitution as operative. The opinion explains the double-negative style typical of judicial review decisions (presumption of validity) and the political/judicial boundary: dismissal for lack of sufficient judicial finding against validity operates effectively to permit the new Constitution to be considered in force.
Judicial Review, Presumption of Validity, and the Political Question Element
The Court emphasized the general principles of judicial review applied in constitutional controversies: courts begin from a presumption of validity for challenged governmental action, and the burden of proof lies upon those claiming invalidity. When the Court dismisses on grounds such as lack of jurisdiction or political question, that dismissal itself is an exercise of judicial review that allows political branches their decision-making space. Javellana included votes reflecting both judicial determination and a recognition that, where judicial certainty is unattainable, political acquiescence can be decisive. The majority thus treats Javellana as establishing that no judicial obstacle remains to regarding the 1973 Constitution as in force.
Popular Acquiescence and Referenda as Seal of Acceptance
The majority opinion relied on the doctrine that a constitution not validly ratified by formal processes can nonetheless attain operative force by visible popular acceptance and practice. The Court cited authorities recognizing that when the people manifest acceptance of a new constitutional order, courts cannot refuse to recognize that political fact. The opinion enumerated the multiple referenda, amendments, and elections held under the 1973 Constitution as strong indicia of popular acquiescence and operational recognition (referenda in 1973, 1975, 1976, 1977 and elections in 1978 and 1980). Those events were treated as confirming the 1973 Constitution’s de facto and de jure operability.
Martial Law, Commander-in-Chief Clause, and Historical Constitutional Sources
The Court examined the martial law clause as it appeared in the 1935 Constitution and traced its pedigree to the Jones Law and other antecedents, noting that the commander-in-chief clause in the 1935 Constitution was broader than the comparable U.S. clause because it expressly authorized the suspension of habeas corpus and the declaration of martial law. The opinion referenced comparative American state constitutions and U.S. jurisprudence analyzing martial law’s scope, citing cases such as Moyer v. Peabody, Sterling v. Constantin, and Duncan v. Kahanamoku, and scholarly views (Willoughby, Burdick, Willis, Schwartz) to show that martial law has been treated as subject to judicial scrutiny and not absolute.
Scope of Presidential Martial Law Powers as Recognized by the Court
The majority discussed the Court’s prior acceptance of a broader view of executive authority during martial law, as expressed in the plurality ponencia of Justice Makasiar in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections. The Court noted that the President, as Commander-in-Chief and as the enforcer/administrator of martial law, may promulgate proclamations, orders, and decrees essential to national security, preservation of the Republic, protection of liberties, and reform to prevent resurgence of rebellion, and to meet impacts such as worldwide economic crises — a formulation representing a broader conception of martial law powers adopted by parts of the Court. The opinion recognized differences of view among the Justices but situated the plurality’s statement as an influential articulation of the Court’s approach during the martial-law period.
The Judiciary’s Continued Function and Exercises of Review During Martial Law
Contrary to the petitioners’ assertion that judicial review and constitutionalism ceased during martial law, the majority recounted a series of decisions in which the Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction and decided constitutional questions while martial law was in effect. The Court pointed to cases that both upheld and scrutinized different aspects of executive action (e.g., Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections upholding the proclamation of martial law; Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission; Sanidad v. Commission on Elections; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections where the Court invalidated part of a provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52). The majority stressed that the judiciary continued to exercise its role and to protect constitutional rights where possible, citing scholarly assessments lauding the Court’s performance during difficult times.
Comparative and Scholarly Support for Judicial Recognition of Political Realities
The majority opinion invoked comparative law authorities and scholarly commentary (e.g., Chief Justice Concepcion’s separate discussion in Javellana, Taylor v. Commonwealth, Laski, McIver, Corwin) to justify recognition of a constitution accepted in fact by the people even if formal procedural defects existed. The Court noted academic praise (e.g., Justice Lionel Keith Murphy’s lecture) recognizing the Philippine judiciary’s efforts to maintain fundamental liberties in difficult circumstances.
Conclusion and Disposition
Given Javellana’s authoritative effect, the subsequent practices of the people and the political branches, and the Supreme Court’s own repeated application of the 1973 Constitution in later decisions, the petitioners’ contention that the 1973 Constitution is not in force was rejected. The petition for mandamus and prohibition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Dissenting/Separate Opinion of Justice Teehankee — Core Objections
Justice Teehankee filed a separate opinion objecting to dismissal and urged that the petition be given due course. His principal points:
- The doctrine of “fair and proper submission” (as articulated in Tolentino v. Comelec) required adequate time and information for the people to deliberate on the complex, radical govern
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 56503)
Nature of the Action and Relief Sought
- Petition for mandamus and prohibition filed by petitioners praying relief against the Commission on Elections.
- Petition proceeds on the fundamental assumption by petitioners that the 1973 Constitution is not in force and effect and that the present Constitution remains in the stage of proposal as to them.
- In the last two paragraphs of the petition the petitioners expressly seek a plebiscite to permit the people to vote on the ratification of the Constitution; petitioners contend that, if rejected, the 1935 Constitution would again become operative upon the lifting of martial law on January 17, 1981.
- The petition is identified as similar in substance to the prohibition proceedings earlier dismissed filed by former delegates Samuel C. Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales.
Procedural Posture and Immediate Disposition
- The Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, indicates that the petition must be dismissed.
- The decision to dismiss follows the same reasoning applied in the Occena and Gonzales petitions.
- The Court emphasizes it sits as an institution duty-bound to uphold and apply the Constitution that is in force; if petitioners challenge the operative character of the 1973 Constitution, they have come to the wrong forum in the sense that this Court will apply the Constitution that it recognizes as operative.
Central Legal Questions Presented
- Whether the 1973 Constitution is in force and effect.
- Whether the Court should grant mandamus or prohibition to the petitioners based on their contention that the Constitution is not operative.
- Whether a plebiscite should be ordered to re-determine ratification.
- What is the effect of the Javellana v. Executive Secretary decision on the instant petitions and on the question of the operative Constitution.
- The proper legal understanding of the President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief and the nature and judicially cognizable limits of martial law as relevant to constitutional validity and governance.
The Javellana Decision: Holding and Significance
- The Court reviews Javellana v. Executive Secretary, L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, as controlling on the question of whether the 1973 Constitution is in force.
- Dispositive portion of Javellana: by virtue of six (6) majority votes (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Esguerra) the cases were dismissed; with the dissent of four (4) (Chief Justice Concepcion and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee).
- The Javellana dispositive language concluded that, as the majority vote, “there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.”
- The Court highlights that, as expressed in a preceding paragraph authored by Chief Justice Concepcion, the voting in Javellana reflected: (a) four members held the Constitution was in force by virtue of the people’s acceptance; (b) four members cast no vote on whether people had accepted because they could not state with judicial certainty; and (c) two members voted that the new Constitution was not in force, yielding the result that there were not enough votes to declare the new Constitution not in force.
- The Court explains that the phrasing of the Javellana conclusion and the negative form of the ultimate finding reflect the traditional American mode of judicial review — the presumption of validity and burden of proof on the challenger.
Doctrine of Judicial Review and Its Application
- The Court articulates the nature of judicial review as the power to check or legitimize acts of coordinate departments, with decisions on validity being controlling.
- Emphasizes the presumption of validity of legislative or executive acts and that the burden of proving unconstitutionality rests on the assailant.
- Cites the aphorism “To doubt is to sustain” attributed to Justice Malcolm as consistent with the presumption of validity.
- Notes that when the Court treats an issue as political and dismisses, that dismissal is still a manifestation of judicial review — allowing political branches to decide the matter by declining to pass judgment.
Acquiescence, Ratification, and the Role of the People
- Acknowledges Chief Justice Concepcion’s separate view in Javellana that even if ratification were irregular, a constitution accepted by the people could come into effect by acquiescence, citing Taylor v. Commonwealth and other authorities.
- Quotes the broader exposition that once acceptance by the people is evident, the judiciary must accord recognition; lack of regularity in the method of registration is not fatal once acceptance is manifest.
- Lists concrete expressions of popular acquiescence referenced in the opinion:
- A referendum held July 27–28, 1973 (P.D. No. 229, 1973).
- A referendum held February 27–28, 1975 (Proclamation No. 1366 as amended).
- The 1976 amendments adopted by referendum on October 16–17, 1976 (P.D. 991).
- A referendum on December 17, 1977 (P.D. 1229).
- Elections held under the present Constitution: members of the Interim Batasang Pambansa on April 7, 1978, and local government officials on January 30, 1980.
- The Court reasons that this pattern of referenda and elections is indicative of popular acquiescence in the present Constitution and undercuts contrary arguments.