Title
Miranda vs. Abaya
Case
G.R. No. 136351
Decision Date
Jul 28, 1999
Joel G. Miranda’s mayoral substitution annulled after father’s candidacy cancellation; Supreme Court ruled succession law applies, voiding his election.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 136351)

Factual Background

Jose "Pempe" Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor on March 24, 1998. On March 27, 1998 private respondent ANTONIO M. ABAYA filed a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel that certificate of candidacy, docketed as SPA No. 98-019, alleging material misrepresentation and ineligibility by reason of having served three consecutive terms. The Comelec First Division issued a resolution on May 5, 1998 granting the petition and stating that Jose "Pempe" Miranda was disqualified. On May 6, 1998 petitioner JOEL G. MIRANDA, the son of Jose "Pempe" Miranda, filed a certificate of candidacy as substitute for his father and presented a certificate of nomination from the party. On May 11, 1998 the election was held; petitioner received 22,002 votes and private respondent received 20,336 votes.

Proceedings Before the Commission on Elections

After the May 11 election, private respondent filed SPA No. 98-288 on May 13, 1998 seeking to declare the substitution null and void because, he alleged, the father’s certificate had been denied due course and cancelled and therefore there was nothing to substitute. The Comelec First Division dismissed SPA No. 98-288 motu proprio on May 16, 1998. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The Comelec En Banc, on December 8, 1998, granted the motion for reconsideration, amended the May 5, 1998 dispositive language to state that Jose "Pempe" Miranda’s certificate of candidacy was denied due course and/or cancelled, annulled petitioner’s election and proclamation, cancelled the certificate of canvass and proclamation, and directed the city board of canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winning candidate among those voted upon.

Petition to the Supreme Court and Interim Relief

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court on December 9, 1998, praying for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain enforcement of the Comelec En Banc resolution. The Court issued a temporary restraining order on December 11, 1998 and required respondents to comment. Private respondent and the Comelec filed comments; petitioner sought extensions to reply but ultimately the Court resolved the controversy without further extension by petitioner.

Issues Presented

The Supreme Court framed the issues as whether the annulment of petitioner’s substitution and proclamation was issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and whether the Comelec order directing proclamation of private respondent was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner contended that his substitution was valid under Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, which permits substitution when a candidate is "disqualified for any cause," and that the Comelec lacked jurisdiction or committed grave abuse in annulling his substitution and proclamation. Private respondent argued that the father’s certificate had been denied due course and cancelled under Sec. 78, that a cancelled or denied certificate is not a candidacy that can be substituted, and that the substitution was therefore void ab initio; he sought annulment of petitioner’s certificate and proclamation. The Comelec defended its en banc action to nullify the substitution and to order proclamation consistent with its reading of its prior resolution.

Ruling of the Supreme Court (Disposition)

The Supreme Court affirmed the Comelec En Banc insofar as it annulled the election and proclamation of petitioner JOEL G. MIRANDA, and it modified the Comelec directive by deleting the portion ordering the city board of canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winning candidate among those voted upon. The Court lifted the restraining order. The Court denied the petition in part and granted it in part to effect the stated modification.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Majority

The Court held that the matter fell squarely within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Comelec and that the Supreme Court’s review was limited to certiorari under Rule 65, Rules of Court, i.e., to complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The Court analyzed Sec. 77 and Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, invoking the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius and ejusdem generis, and concluded that substitution under Sec. 77 presupposed the substituted person’s status as an actual candidate with a valid, seasonably filed certificate of candidacy. The Court relied on precedent including Bautista v. Comelec to the effect that a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy. The Court reasoned that a certificate denied due course and cancelled rendered the person no candidate at all and therefore there was nothing to substitute; permitting the substitute to file an original certificate beyond the filing period would defeat the purpose of the filing rules and produce unequal protection. The Court found that the Comelec en banc’s annulment of petitioner’s substitution and proclamation rested on a valid legal basis and did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. The Court further observed that, to the extent the Comelec en banc may have exceeded its power by motu proprio revisiting SPA No. 98-019, any such excess did not amount to grave abuse that would justify certiorari relief. Finally, the Court held that, because the votes cast for an ineligible candidate are presumed cast in the belief that he was qualified and cannot be extrapolated to the second placer, the doctrine that the second placer may not be proclaimed where the winner is disqualified applied; thus the Court directed that the statutory rule on local succession under Sec. 44, R.A. 7160 should govern rather than mandatory proclamation of private respondent.

Treatment of Remedies and Scope of Review

The Court reaffirmed that under the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence the Court’s power to review Commission decisions is confined to certiorari under Rule 65, which addresses lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The Court reiterated established standards that mere errors of judgment do not constitute grave abuse and that certiorari is not an avenue to review ordinary errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Romero dissented on the ground that the Comelec En Banc acted capriciously

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