Title
Microsoft Corp. vs. Masala
Case
G.R. No. 166391
Decision Date
Oct 21, 2015
Microsoft sued Rolando Manansala for selling pirated software. Courts initially dismissed the case, but the Supreme Court ruled that unauthorized sale alone constitutes copyright infringement, reversing prior decisions.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 166391)

Factual and Procedural Antecedents

A private investigator and an NBI agent effectuated a test purchase of six CD-ROMs containing Microsoft software. A search warrant was procured and executed at the respondent’s business premises on November 19, 1997, resulting in seizure of several unauthorized copies of Microsoft programs. Microsoft filed an Affidavit‑Complaint with the DOJ. The public prosecutor recommended dismissal of the Section 29 P.D. 49 charge for lack of proof that the respondent printed, copied or reproduced the programs and instead suggested a possible charge under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. The DOJ denied Microsoft’s motions for reconsideration and petition for review. Microsoft filed certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the DOJ dismissals. The petition to the Supreme Court followed, challenging the DOJ’s dismissal as grave abuse of discretion.

Legal Issue Presented

Whether the mere sale of pirated copies of computer software — without proof that the accused personally performed the act of copying, printing or reproducing — suffices to establish probable cause and criminal liability for copyright infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49, and whether the DOJ and the CA erred in requiring proof that the respondent was the actual copier/printer/producer of the illicit copies.

Statutory Framework: Section 5 of P.D. No. 49 and Protected Works

Section 5 of P.D. No. 49 defines copyright as the exclusive right “to print, reprint, publish, copy, distribute, multiply, sell, and make photographs, photo‑engravings, and pictorial illustrations of the works,” among other exclusive acts. Section 2 enumerates classes of protected works and expressly includes computer programs. Under the decree, the performance of any of the exclusive acts listed in Section 5 without the copyright owner’s consent constitutes actionable infringement.

Standard of Review on Prosecutorial Determination of Probable Cause

The general rule is deference to the public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause as an executive function; however, the doctrine of judicial review permits intervention when that determination is tainted by grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse exists where the prosecutor’s action is whimsical, arbitrary or shows flagrant disregard of facts or law such that the prosecutor acted beyond the limits of reason and justice.

Reasoning on Statutory Interpretation and the Conjunctive "And"

The CA read the conjunctive “and” in Section 5(a) as requiring that all enumerated acts be proven conjunctively (i.e., that sale alone does not constitute infringement unless accompanied by proof of copying/printing/reproduction by the accused). The Supreme Court rejected this literal and rigid construction as producing absurd and unreasonable consequences, noting that some listed works (e.g., musical compositions, cinematographic works, computer programs) cannot practically be subjected to every listed act (such as photographic or pictorial illustration). Applying established rules of statutory construction, the Court held that where literal reading would frustrate legislative purpose or lead to absurd results, conjunctive terms may be interpreted functionally or disjunctively to give effect to the law’s intent to protect the exclusive rights enumerated. The gravamen of infringement is the unauthorized performance of any of the exclusive acts; therefore sale of unauthorized copies is among the acts that may constitute infringement.

Application to Probable Cause and the DOJ’s Error

On the facts, the seizure of illicit Microsoft copies and the test purchase sufficiently established acts covered by Section 5 (notably distribution/sale) to support a well‑founded belief that copyright infringement had been committed and that the respondent was probably guilty. The DOJ and the CA erred by demanding direct proof that the respondent personally manufactured or reproduced the software. The Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutor’s dismissal for lack of evidence amounted to grave abuse of discretion because it disregarded the existence of acts that constitu

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