Title
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Reynado
Case
G.R. No. 164538
Decision Date
Aug 9, 2010
Metrobank accused respondents of estafa over unauthorized withdrawals; SC ruled novation doesn’t extinguish criminal liability, mandating prosecution despite debt settlement.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 164538)

Factual Background

Metrobank’s special audit of its Port Area branch disclosed anomalous transactions involving large withdrawals by Universal against uncleared regional checks, allegedly enabling Universal to utilize the bank’s funds before the clearing period expired. Respondents Reynado and Adraneda were the only voting members of the branch credit committee authorized to extend credit up to P200,000 and were alleged to have connived with Universal. Universal allegedly had a meager paid-up capital and maintaining balance yet made withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.00; the uncleared checks were later dishonored for “Account Closed.” Metrobank’s auditor prepared a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondents with estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Separately, Metrobank and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement (acknowledging indebtedness of P50,990,976.27 and providing for bi-monthly payments and a balloon payment).

Procedural History Through the Prosecutor and DOJ

Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad, after preliminary investigation, recommended dismissal (July 10, 1997), reasoning that the Debt Settlement Agreement estopped the bank from treating the liability as criminal and that novation had occurred, preventing incipience of any criminal liability. Metrobank appealed to the DOJ; the DOJ dismissed the appeal (June 22, 1998), further finding that Metrobank treated Universal leniently and that there was no clear showing of misappropriation by respondents, noting also that Metrobank’s Executive and Credit Committees had been notified and had approved transactions. Metrobank’s motion for reconsideration was denied (March 1, 2000). Metrobank then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals; the CA affirmed the DOJ and dismissed the petition (October 21, 2002), applying the principle that novation, when occurring prior to filing of criminal information, may prevent the rise of criminal liability. The CA did not adopt the OSG’s Comment that DOJ erred and that novation affects only civil liability. Metrobank elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition under Rule 45.

Issues Presented

The primary legal question presented was whether the Debt Settlement Agreement between Metrobank and Universal precluded prosecution of respondents for estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code — i.e., whether novation or compromise extinguished or prevented the incipience of criminal liability for respondents who allegedly committed estafa in connivance with Universal. Subsidiary issues included whether the public prosecutor abused discretion in dismissing the complaint and whether non-inclusion of Universal’s officers in the complaint justified dismissal of charges against the bank officers.

Legal Principles on Novation, Compromise, and Criminal Liability

The Court reiterated established doctrine that novation or compromise does not extinguish criminal liability for estafa. Criminal liability for estafa is not among the modes of extinction listed in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code; reimbursement or belated payment affects only civil liability. Cited jurisprudence (Firaza v. People; Recuerdo v. People; People v. Moreno; People v. Ladera; Metropolitan Bank v. Tonda) supports the proposition that compromise or settlement entered into after commission of the crime operates only on civil aspects and does not bar prosecution. The Court also invoked the civil-law principle of the relativity of contracts (Art. 1311 Civil Code): contracts bind only their parties, their assigns or heirs, and do not benefit or prejudice third persons not parties to the contract.

Review of the Prosecutor’s and DOJ’s Findings on Probable Cause

Under Rule 112, Sec. 1, a public prosecutor determines in preliminary investigation whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty. The Supreme Court emphasized the limited scope of a preliminary investigation: it requires sufficient evidence to engender a well-founded belief of probable cause, not proof sufficient to convict. The Court found that Prosecutor Edad initially regarded that “Ordinarily, the offense of estafa has been sufficiently established,” but that she then reversed course and dismissed the complaint exclusively because of the Debt Settlement Agreement — a legal error given the settled doctrine that novation does not extinguish criminal liability. The DOJ compounded the error by resolving matters of defense and evidentiary sufficiency — inquiries properly reserved for trial — and by treating the settlement as negating damage and fraud. The Court concluded that both the prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion by dismissing the complaint despite evidence adequate to establish probable cause.

Analysis of Non-Inclusion of Universal’s Officers

The DOJ had also relied on the fact that Metrobank did not implead Universal’s officers. The Supreme Court rejected this as a ground for dismissing the complaint. Rule 110, Sec. 2 requires criminal actions to be commenced in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons

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