Title
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs. Ley Construction and Development Corp.
Case
G.R. No. 185590
Decision Date
Dec 3, 2014
Metrobank sued LCDC and Spouses Ley over unpaid LC for cement shipment; courts ruled Metrobank failed to prove liability, dismissing the case.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 185590)

Procedural History

The Bank filed a complaint for recovery of money and damages with a prayer for preliminary attachment against LCDC and the spouses Ley for unpaid obligations arising from a Letter of Credit (LC) and related transactions. The RTC granted defendants’ demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case. The Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC’s dismissal and denied the Bank’s motion for reconsideration. The Bank then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court.

Facts as Recited by Lower Courts

The Bank issued Letter of Credit No. DC 90-303-C on April 26, 1990 for USD 802,500 in favor of Global Enterprises Limited (beneficiary) to finance importation of 15,000 metric tons of Iraqi cement for LCDC. Negotiation by Credit Suisse resulted in a reimbursement claim and debit to the Bank’s account for approximately USD 770,691.30. Credit Suisse forwarded shipping documents to the Bank, which were delivered to defendants; defendants signed a trust receipt. The cement never arrived in the Philippines. The spouses Ley executed a Continuing Surety Agreement guaranteeing LCDC’s obligations. The Bank sought recovery of the peso equivalent of its payment plus interest, penalties, attorney’s fees, and costs.

Evidence Presented at Trial

The Bank presented a single witness, Mr. Fenelito Cabrera (Head of the Foreign Department of the Bank’s Head Office per the Bank’s theory). The Bank offered numerous documentary exhibits, initially marked Exhibits A to N and sub-markings. On reconsideration, several exhibits (identified as D, E, H, I, J, K, L, M and sub-markings) were excluded for lack of proper identification and authentication by a competent witness. The trial court ultimately recognized only certain exhibits (Continuing Surety Agreement; Application and Agreement for Commercial LC; the Letter of Credit; Register copy/memorandum of the LC; Trust Receipt; and Statement of Outstanding Obligations). The Bank’s counsel admitted Cabrera’s incompetence to testify as to some exhibits.

Trial Court’s Rationale for Granting Demurrer to Evidence

The trial court found the Bank’s sole witness, Cabrera, incompetent to identify and authenticate many of the Bank’s documentary exhibits because he was assigned to the Dasmariñas Branch, not the Head Office, during the relevant period (March 1990–June 1991). The court emphasized that the documents not properly identified could not be given evidentiary weight. With the reduced set of admissible exhibits and the lack of competent testimony to establish the requisite elements of the Bank’s cause of action, the court concluded the Bank failed to make a preponderant case and granted the demurrer to evidence, dismissing the complaint.

Court of Appeals Findings and Ruling

The CA reviewed the admissibility and probative value of the remaining exhibits and affirmed the trial court. The CA agreed that Cabrera properly identified only a subset of exhibits (e.g., Register copy, Trust Receipt, some statements of outstanding obligations) and that the Bank’s admission in pre-trial pleadings did not amount to defendants’ admission of authenticity for all documents. Although the CA admitted additional exhibits (including the Register copy and Trust Receipt) for consideration, it held that, even with those documents, the Bank failed to prove LCDC’s liability for improper negotiation of the LC or to otherwise establish a preponderant case for recovery. The CA therefore dismissed the Bank’s appeal.

Issue Presented to the Supreme Court

The Bank’s petition to the Supreme Court essentially raised factual challenges: that the trial and appellate courts erred in finding insufficiency of evidence, that LCDC and the spouses Ley admitted certain documents, and that the Bank’s actionable claim was based primarily on the Trust Receipt (TR) rather than on the Letter of Credit (LC).

Rule 45 Limitation and Standard of Review

The Supreme Court emphasized that a petition under Rule 45 can raise only questions of law; it is not a trier of facts. The Court noted the well-established principle that findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Supreme Court unless one of the recognized exceptions applies (e.g., findings based entirely on speculation, grave abuse of discretion, misapprehension of facts, conflicting findings, etc.). The Court observed that the Bank failed to demonstrate that any exception applied; thus the petition improperly seeks reexamination of factual determinations (a question of fact), which is beyond the scope of Rule 45.

Preponderance of Evidence and Demurrer to Evidence

The Court reiterated the civil standard of proof—preponderance of evidence—and explained that determining whether the Bank proved its cause of action by this standard is inherently a question of fact. A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence; questioning the sufficiency of evidence therefore requires factual assessment (weight, credibility, probative value) reserved for the trial and appellate courts. Given the Bank’s primary contention centered on sufficiency and weight of evidence, the petition raised factual issues unfit for Rule 45 review.

The Bank’s Mischaracterization of Its “Primary Actionable Document”

The Supreme Court rejected the Bank’s attempt to recast its cause of action as grounded primarily on the Trust Receipt. The Court explained that a cause of action is determined by allegations in the complaint, not by the party’s later characterization. Examination of the complaint showed the Letter of Credit was the central operative document: it was alleged in numerous paragraphs, described substantively (amount, beneficiary, purpose), and the Continuing Surety Agreement was pleaded to guarantee obligations “inclusive of the subject Letter of Credit.” The Trust Receipt was mentioned only incidentally in paragraph 2.8 as an acknowledgment of receipt of shipping documents. Thus, the complaint, as pleaded, made the LC—not the TR—the basis of the Bank’s cause of action.

Actionable Documents Rule and Pleading Deficiencies

The Court applied Section 7, Rule 8 (action or defense based on document) and explained that an actionable document must be either quoted verbatim in the pleading or its substance set forth and attached as an exhibit. The complaint sufficiently set forth the substance of the Letter of Credit (Annex C) but did not set forth the substance of the Trust Receipt beyond a descriptive reference and attachment. Therefore, the Trust Receipt was not pleaded as the primary actiona

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