Title
Metro Rail Transit Development Corp. vs. Gammon Philippines, Inc.
Case
G.R. No. 200401
Decision Date
Jan 17, 2018
Dispute over breach of contract in MRT-3 project; Supreme Court upheld CIAC ruling, affirming perfected contract, judicial admission, and Gammon's claims for damages and lost profits.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 200401)

Key Dates (project and procedural milestones)

Invitation to bid and bidding: April–May 1997; Gammon’s bids: May 30, 1997; Letter of Award / First Notice to Proceed issued by Parsons: August 27, 1997; Gammon’s signed return of the First Notice: September 2, 1997; Gammon’s letter of comfort transmitted: September 3, 1997; MRT’s temporary suspension letter: September 8, 1997; Gammon returned contract documents: September 9, 1997; Second Notice to Proceed (redesigned engineering services): February 18, 1998 (signed by Gammon March 11, 1998); Third and Fourth Notices to Proceed and the Fourth’s express cancellation of earlier notices: April–June 1998; Notice of Claim filed before CIAC: July 1, 1999; CIAC award: March 27, 2007; Court of Appeals decision affirming CIAC: October 14, 2011; Supreme Court resolution denying Rule 45 petition and affirming lower courts: January 17, 2018.

Procedural History

Gammon filed a notice of claim with CIAC (July 1, 1999). CIAC constituted an arbitral tribunal and, after proceedings, issued an award (March 27, 2007) granting Gammon reimbursements for engineering/design and site de-watering/cleanup and awarding lost profits. MRT appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed CIAC. MRT then filed a petition for review under Rule 45 to the Supreme Court, advancing factual and legal challenges to contract perfection, the quantum and proof of damages (including lost profits), and the binding effect of MRT’s statement in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim.

Issues Presented to the Court

(1) Whether a perfected contract existed between MRT and Gammon. (2) Whether the doctrine of the law of the case — based on a prior Supreme Court ruling in Gammon v. MRT — barred relitigation of the contract’s existence. (3) Whether MRT is estopped or otherwise bound by the specific monetary allegation in paragraph 77 of its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim (the stated willingness to pay P5,493,639.27). (4) Whether Gammon sufficiently proved its claims for reimbursements and lost profits.

Applicable Law and Standards

  • Contract law: Civil Code provisions on consent and perfection of contracts (Arts. 1305, 1315, 1318, 1319, 1320), including that contracts are perfected by mere consent when offer and acceptance concur. Jurisprudence holds that award of a bidding contract and notice of award may perfect a contract even before execution of a formal written contract.
  • Arbitration and CIAC law: Executive Order No. 1008 (Construction Industry Arbitration Law) and the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) Rules; RA 9285 (ADR Law) incorporates EO No. 1008 for construction disputes. CIAC arbitral awards are final and unappealable except on pure questions of law (Section 19 of the Construction Industry Arbitration Law); Rule 43 of the Rules of Court governs appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals, but factual findings of CIAC are generally final.
  • Judicial admissions: Rule 129, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court — admissions made in the course of proceedings do not require proof and are binding unless shown to be made through palpable mistake.
  • Damages: Articles 2199 and 2200 of the Civil Code govern actual damages and lost profits; actual damages must be proven with reasonable certainty by competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. Arbitration proceedings under CIAC are not strictly bound by technical rules of evidence and may admit invoices, debit notes, and other documentation where appropriate.

Court’s Findings on Contract Perfection

The Court concluded that a binding contract was perfected between MRT and Gammon. Key factual and legal points supporting that conclusion: Parsons issued a Letter of Award / Notice to Proceed on August 27, 1997 that (i) awarded the work to Gammon, (ii) set out the contract sum and scope, and (iii) instructed Gammon to signify concurrence by signing and returning the Notice and contract documents. Gammon returned a countersigned First Notice on September 2, 1997, transmitted the signed letter of comfort on September 3, 1997, and returned the signed contract documents on September 9, 1997. Gammon also mobilized resources and undertook de-watering and engineering activities consistent with having accepted the award. The Court relied on binding precedents (e.g., Valencia; Central Bank decisions cited) establishing that award of a contract to a bidder and notice of award can operate as acceptance that perfects the contract, and that failure to execute formal contracts does not negate obligations arising from an unqualified acceptance of an offer.

Court’s Treatment of the Temporary Suspension and Subsequent Notices

The Court distinguished a temporary suspension from revocation of an offer. MRT’s September 8, 1997 communication — stating that it needed a week or two to analyze foreign exchange and interest rate effects — was characterized as a temporary suspension rather than an unequivocal withdrawal. Parsons’ subsequent facsimiles and communications confirmed that the contract requirements were temporarily suspended except for certain redesign and site de-watering tasks. Later notices (Second, Third, and Fourth Notices to Proceed) modified scope and timing; the Fourth Notice (June 1998) expressly cancelled earlier notices, which the Court treated as the effective cancellation only at that later point. The Court found that the communications and conduct of the parties showed mutual consent and that the contract was at least temporarily suspended rather than terminated at the time Gammon accepted and commenced performance.

Application of the Doctrine of the Law of the Case

The Court held that the doctrine of the law of the case applied. A prior Supreme Court decision in Gammon v. Metro Rail Transit Development Corp. had already addressed CIAC jurisdiction and concluded that the arbitration clause and agreement enabled CIAC to adjudicate the dispute; in reaching that conclusion the prior decision treated the contract and arbitration agreement as existing and concluded redesigns merely modified—rather than extinguished—the contract. Because this legal issue was previously determined on appeal in the same case, it became the law of the case and could not be re-litigated in the present Rule 45 petition. Accordingly, the Supreme Court declined to reopen the question of the contract’s existence.

Judicial Admission; Reimbursements for Engineering and Site Works

The Court found MRT bound by the unqualified judicial admission in paragraph 77 of its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, which stated MRT was “willing to pay” P5,493,639.27 for engineering/design and site de-watering/clean-up. Under Rule 129, Section 4, judicial admissions need no proof and are conclusive unless shown to be the result of palpable mistake. MRT neither qualified the admission in that pleading nor amended it; its later contention that the admission was conditional on proof (e.g., official receipts) was rejected because no such qualification was included in the pleading. CIAC and the Court of Appeals thus correctly treated the admission as binding, and the Supreme Court affirmed reimbursement awards within that amount.

Proof of Actual Damages and Lost Profits; Evidentiary Standards in CIAC Proceedings

For actual damages (reimbursements), the Court re

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