Case Summary (G.R. No. 160445)
Procedural History of the Underlying Litigation
The Mercados initiated a Petition for Review on Certiorari from a Court of Appeals decision dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment. The Supreme Court initially denied review for lack of reversible error (January 12, 2004), later granted reconsideration to reinstate the petition (March 24, 2004), and ultimately denied the petition after full consideration (June 7, 2004), concluding that petitioners failed to show reversible error. A motion for reconsideration was denied (September 15, 2004) on the ground that annulment of judgment is not a substitute for appeal and may only succeed where extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction, or denial of due process is shown; petitioners’ allegations of counsel’s negligence did not amount to extrinsic fraud.
Content and Nature of Mercado’s Letter
On October 18, 2004, petitioner Mercado addressed a letter to Chief Justice Davide asserting, among other things, that (1) the ponente denied their petition due to “tremendous pressure” from the Chief Justice; (2) SBC financed travels of the ponente and of Atty. Villanueva and thereby obtained a “go‑signal” to sell the Mercados’ property; (3) the ponente’s alleged influence enabled SBC to sell and demolish improvements on the Mercados’ property despite pending litigation and lis pendens. The letter used pejorative language, accused the Chief Justice and the ponente of depriving the Mercados of property rights without due process, and questioned the integrity of the Supreme Court and the judiciary.
Initiation and Course of Contempt Proceedings
Following the letter, Chief Justice Davide required Atty. Villanueva to comment. The Third Division ordered Mercado to appear and show cause; Mercado and new counsel appeared and swore to the truth of the letter. The Division required written explanations and received: (a) Villanueva’s denial of Mercado’s allegations plus documentary proof of his London trip (passport and a graduation program showing his daughter’s graduation); and (b) Mercado’s explanation and apology asserting he wrote under stress and that his statements reflected what Villanueva had told him.
Testimony and Conflicting Accounts
At subsequent proceedings, Mercado testified that Villanueva told him the ponente was Justice Gutierrez and that Villanueva boasted of being a “very, very close and long time friend” of the ponente. Villanueva denied making the alleged boasts and maintained that any association or coincident attendance at his mother’s wake did not amount to improper influence. The Court designated Justice Renato C. Dacudao as Commissioner to take evidence and report on factual issues surrounding the alleged improprieties and the source of Mercado’s allegations.
Commissioner’s Findings and Recommendation
Commissioner Dacudao found that Mercado’s conduct was improper and tended to bring the administration of justice into disrespect, but he concluded there was no showing of malice or bad faith and recommended a fine of P5,000.00. The commissioner’s factual findings included confidence that petitioner learned the name of the ponente from communications traceable to his counsel and noted corroborative aspects favoring petitioner’s account, while also recognizing admissions by Villanueva that he and the ponente had known each other since 1964 and that the ponente attended the wake.
Supreme Court’s Assessment of Malice and Bad Faith
The Supreme Court disagreed with the commissioner’s characterization that Mercado lacked malice or bad faith. The Court defined bad faith and malice as involving a dishonest purpose, conscious wrongdoing, or an ulterior motive and found Mercado’s letter demonstrated such states of mind. The Court emphasized that the letter’s language—accusing the Chief Justice of exerting improper pressure, alleging bribery and collusion, invoking religious and moral condemnation, and threatening resort to other fora—went beyond fair comment and amounted to a deliberate vilification of judicial officers without factual basis.
Application of Freedom of Speech and Limits Thereon
The Court rejected Mercado’s invocation of constitutional freedom of speech and privacy of communication as a defense to contempt. It reiterated that freedom of expression does not protect abusive, malicious imputations that impair public confidence in the Judiciary. The Court relied on precedent holding that letters to individual justices concerning their judicial functions are matters of judicial concern and may form part of the record; accordingly, they are subject to scrutiny under contempt rules when they tend to obstruct, impede, or degrade the administration of justice (citing In Re Laureta and related authority).
Legal Standard for Indirect Contempt and its Application
Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended) authorizes punishment for indirect contempt after charge and hearing, including “any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.” The Court held that Mercado’s letter constituted indirect contempt because it directly attacked the integrity of the Chief Justice and the ponente, thereby degrading the administration of justice. The procedural safeguards (charge and hearing) were observed.
Professional Responsibility of Counsel and Atty. Villanueva’s Liability
The Court analyzed Atty. Villanueva’s conduct under Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 15.06 prohibits a lawyer from stating or implying the ability to influence public officials or tribunals; Rule 15.07 requires lawyers to impress upon clients compliance with laws and fairness. The Court concluded that Villanueva breached these duties by representing that he was a “very, very good, close and
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 160445)
Procedural History
- On December 12, 2003, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Ma. Agnes R. Mercado filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing: (a) the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 27, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71570 dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment; and (b) the Court of Appeals Resolution dated October 23, 2003 denying their motion for reconsideration.
- On January 12, 2004, the Supreme Court denied the petition for failure to show reversible error by the Appellate Court.
- Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging reliance on technical rules by the Court of Appeals and asserting that former counsel's gross negligence constituted extrinsic fraud.
- On March 24, 2004, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution granting the motion for reconsideration and reinstating the petition; the Court required Security Bank Corporation to comment.
- Security Bank filed a comment arguing the issues were mere rehash and that counsel’s alleged negligence did not amount to extrinsic fraud; it noted petitioners’ four-year delay and other procedural options available to them.
- On June 7, 2004, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution denying the petition for failure to show reversible error.
- Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration; the Court denied it in a Resolution dated September 15, 2004, reiterating principles on annulment of judgment and the requisites for relief (appeal, motion for new trial, petition for relief).
- A second motion for reconsideration was denied as prohibited.
- Subsequent to these rulings, on October 18, 2004, petitioner Jose Teofilo T. Mercado wrote a letter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., making serious imputations against the Chief Justice, the ponente, and Security Bank Corporation.
- On November 2, 2004, Chief Justice Davide required Atty. Jose P. Villanueva to comment on Mercado’s letter and show cause why he should not be held in contempt.
- On November 17, 2004, the Court’s Third Division ordered Mercado to personally appear on November 22, 2004 to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.
- The Third Division conducted hearings; the matter was referred to Commissioner (COA Justice) Renato C. Dacudao to receive evidence and prepare an Investigation, Report and Recommendation.
- On May 18, 2005, Justice Dacudao submitted his report finding Mercado guilty of improper conduct but concluding there was no showing of malice or bad faith; he recommended a fine of P5,000.00.
- The Supreme Court, in an En Banc Resolution dated February 16, 2006 (G.R. No. 160445), reviewed the matter and issued the final disposition.
Facts (Background of the Underlying Litigation)
- The Mercados filed an action resulting in an adverse trial court Decision; they pursued remedies culminating in a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed.
- The Mercados assert that their failure to appeal from the trial court’s decision resulted from their former counsel’s negligence, which they alleged amounted to extrinsic fraud preventing presentation of their case.
- The Supreme Court emphasized that an action for annulment of judgment is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal and that annulment may prosper only on grounds of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction, or denial of due process.
- The Court of Appeals and ultimately the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the appellate disposition and held that petitioners failed to avail themselves of the ordinary remedies (appeal, motion for new trial, petition for relief).
Content of Mercado’s October 18, 2004 Letter to Chief Justice Davide
- Mercado wrote to Chief Justice Davide recounting the judicial history (reinstatement on March 24, 2004 and later denial on June 7, 2004) and asserted that his counsel told him the ponente denied the petition due to “tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice to favor Security Bank Corporation (SBC).”
- He stated that his counsel and the ponente were “very close and long time friends” and narrated a subsequent coincidence: counsel and family left for London shortly after, and the ponente left for the U.S.A. to visit her children.
- Mercado alleged that shortly before receipt of the June 7 Resolution, Security Bank sold the Mercados’ property to M. Miranda Development Corporation for P120,000,000.00 and obtained demolition permits despite pending case and lis pendens on title.
- He described an account where the buyer boasted of having a “go-signal from the ponente to sell the property,” and that demolition of improvements on the property was carried out by a construction company.
- Mercado accused the Chief Justice and the ponente of depriving the family of property without due process, asserted there was “no justice in our courts,” and implored the Chief Justice to clarify whether he “intervened and put pressure.”
- He asked the Chief Justice to refrain from influencing Third Division members, to let the institution serve justice and not “individual pecuniary interests,” and warned that if they were wrong he would seek another forum to redress perceived injustices.
- The letter used emotive and accusatory language including descriptions such as “unthinkable, ungodly, and malicious,” and asserted that if the Chief Justice had intervened, they would “rest our case.”
Immediate Procedural Response to Mercado’s Letter and Initial Reactions
- Chief Justice Davide required Atty. Villanueva to comment and show cause regarding the allegations on November 2, 2004.
- The Third Division ordered Mercado’s personal appearance and afforded both Mercado and Atty. Villanueva opportunity to be heard; Mercado appeared November 22, 2004 with new counsel Atty. Pablo G. Macapagal and swore to the truth of his letter.
- Mercado manifested that he merely reiterated statements told to him by Atty. Villanueva; he also made an error referring to Justice Conchita Carpio Morales as Justice Gutierrez in some testimony.
- The Third Division required a written explanation from Atty. Macapagal why Mercado should not be held in contempt; Atty. Villanueva su