Title
Mercado vs. Manzano
Case
G.R. No. 135083
Decision Date
May 26, 1999
A 1998 election case where Eduardo Manzano, a dual citizen, was initially disqualified but later declared eligible by COMELEC, upheld by the Supreme Court, clarifying dual citizenship vs. allegiance.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 130634-35)

Short Statement of Relief Sought

Petitioner Mercado filed a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the COMELEC en banc resolution that reversed a Second Division order disqualifying Manzano and to declare Manzano disqualified to hold the office of Vice Mayor of Makati City on the ground of dual citizenship.

Procedural History — Second Division Disqualification Ruling

On May 7, 1998 the COMELEC Second Division granted a disqualification petition by Ernesto Mamaril and ordered cancellation of Manzano’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Manzano held dual citizenship (U.S. and Philippine) and was therefore disqualified under Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code. The Second Division based its decision on Manzano’s birth in San Francisco (jus soli), his Alien Certificate of Registration with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration, and concluded he held dual citizenship.

Motion for Reconsideration, Election, and Proclamation Suspension

Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration on May 8, 1998. The motion remained pending through the May 11, 1998 elections. Pursuant to COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3044 (May 10, 1998), the Makati board of canvassers tabulated votes but suspended the proclamation of the winner while the disqualification proceeding remained unresolved.

Petitioner’s Intervention Attempt and COMELEC En Banc Review

Petitioner Mercado sought to intervene in the disqualification proceedings (motion filed May 19–20, 1998). The motion was not resolved. On August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc (4–1, with one abstention) reversed the Second Division and declared Manzano qualified to run and ordered his proclamation as Vice Mayor; the board of canvassers proclaimed Manzano the same evening.

Issues Raised in the Certiorari Petition

Petitioner’s principal contentions were: (A) Manzano did not effectively renounce U.S. citizenship by acts alleged (voting in Philippine elections and attaining majority) so he remained a dual citizen and therefore disqualified under Sec. 40(d); (B) Manzano was not qualified to hold the vice mayoralty; and (C) at the time of the May 11, 1998 elections the Second Division resolution was allegedly not final; petitioner argued this affected his entitlement to the office even if Manzano were later disqualified.

Threshold Issue — Petitioner’s Standing to Bring the Action

The Court considered whether Mercado had the personality to brin g the certiorari petition given his unsuccessful motion to intervene before COMELEC. Under COMELEC Rule 8 (Sections 1 and 3), intervention may be permitted to any person with legal interest. The Court found Mercado had sufficient interest: at the time he sought intervention there had been no proclamation of the winner, and as a rival candidate he had a legitimate interest in seeking the disqualification of a competing candidate. The Court relied on R.A. No. 6646 Sec. 6, which allows continuation of disqualification actions after an election and permits intervenors to move for suspension of proclamation when evidence is strong. The non-resolution of Mercado’s motion by the COMELEC en banc was treated as tantamount to denial, justifying his filing of the certiorari petition. The petition thus properly raised both procedural (denial of intervention) and substantive issues.

Legal Distinction — Dual Citizenship versus Dual Allegiance

The Court analyzed Sec. 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160 against the background of the 1987 Constitution. It emphasized the distinction between (a) dual citizenship — a status that may arise involuntarily under conflicting nationality rules of different states (e.g., jus sanguinis and jus soli), and (b) dual allegiance — a volitional or positive act of owing loyalty to two states. The Court noted Article IV, Section 5 (A5) of the 1987 Constitution was intended to address dual allegiance as inimical to national interest. The Court concluded that the phrase “dual citizenship” in Sec. 40(d) and in comparable local charters should be understood, in the constitutional context, as referring to dual allegiance rather than mere dual citizenship.

Consequences of the Distinction and Legal Policy

Because mere dual citizenship (an involuntary legal status) is different from dual allegiance (a volitional commitment to another state), the Court held that persons who happen to hold dual citizenship need not be automatically disqualified. For such candidates, the filing of a certificate of candidacy and an election of Philippine citizenship at the time of filing should suffice to terminate their status as dual citizens for purposes of qualification, even if the foreign state’s laws may still consider them nationals. The Court relied on constitutional debates and legislative discussions (senatorial exchanges) that supported the view that running for public office constitutes an election of Philippine citizenship and an effective repudiation of competing allegiance under Philippine law.

Applicable Foreign-Law Considerations and U.S. Law

The Court acknowledged U.S. statutory language (cited by COMELEC) that once provided loss of U.S. nationality for voting in foreign elections, but noted that the cited U.S. provision had been declared unconstitutional (Afroyim v. Rusk). The Court did not adopt a rule depending on foreign nationality law to determine a candidate’s Philippine qualification; instead, it looked to the candidate’s sworn declarations and acts under Philippine law to effect the election of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner's Challenge on Sufficiency and Timing of Renunciation

Petitioner argued that (1) voting in Philippine elections or other acts was insufficient evidence of renunciation of U.S. citizenship, and (2) any renunciation after attaining majority was ineffective because renunciation allegedly had to occur at majority. The Court rejected both contentions: no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made precisely at majority; and the oath and declarations in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy are sufficient, under Philippine law, to constitute election of Philippine citizenship and repudiation of foreign allegiance for purposes of eligibility.

Facts Relating to Manzano’s Election of Philippine Citizenship

The record showed Manzano was born in San Francisco on September 14 (or 4), 1955, to Filipino parents and thus was both a U.S. and Philippine national at birth. Manzano had been registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and had used a U.S. passport for travel, and he participated in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995 and 1998. The COMELEC en banc found that by voting and, critically, by filing a certificate of candidacy (filed in March 1998 — dates in the record appear as March 21 and March 27, 1998) containing sworn statements that he was a natural-born Filipino, a registered voter, not a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country, and that he would support and defend the Constitution and maintain true faith and allegiance, Manzano effectively elected Philippine citizenship and repudiated U.S. nationality for purposes of his eligibility.

Precedents and Ana

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