G.R. No. 109036 - Mercado vs. Court of Appeals

Case Summary (G.R. No. 109036)

Factual Background

Petitioner sought to defer his arraignment on the ground that he was allegedly not notified of the preliminary investigation. He asserted that the private complainant deliberately furnished an incorrect address in the issuance of the subpoena to him. According to petitioner, this purported misinformation prevented him from submitting his counter-affidavit, which he claimed could have forestalled the filing of the criminal case against him.

Petitioner stated that during the hearing of July 10, 1991, the trial court granted his motion to defer arraignment and ordered remand of the case for reinvestigation. Petitioner also alleged that although the trial court’s subsequent order directed the prosecution to comment on the motion, petitioner continued to challenge the fairness of the proceedings. He moved to cancel his arraignment scheduled for July 30, 1991, but the motion to defer arraignment was denied on that date. When petitioner refused to plead, respondent judge entered a plea of “not guilty” for him.

Court of Appeals Proceedings

Petitioner then filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals to stop the trial court from proceeding. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition by its January 13, 1993 Decision on three interrelated grounds: first, that prohibition was not the proper remedy; second, that there had been an actual preliminary investigation where the prosecution sufficiently established probable cause despite petitioner’s lack of notice; and third, that the presence of the accused was not indispensable to the validity of the preliminary investigation. The Court of Appeals added that petitioner’s defenses could best be ventilated during the trial. It denied reconsideration by its February 16, 1993 Resolution.

Issues Raised in the Supreme Court

In the instant petition, petitioner raised two questions of law: (one) whether a preliminary investigation conducted ex-parte due to lack of notice is valid when the omission resulted from the complainant’s deliberate misinformation regarding petitioner’s address; and (two) whether prohibition was a proper remedy in the event of a denial of a motion to suspend arraignment.

Respondents’ Position

In their comment, the City Prosecutor denied that the subpoena had been sent to the wrong address. The City Prosecutor maintained that the subpoena was sent to petitioner’s actual residence at the time, but it was returned unserved. The comment pointed out that in the official receipt of petitioner’s cash bond, petitioner had acknowledged his address as “6-E Reyes St., Gloria Heights Subdivision, Antipolo, Rizal,” which was the same address reflected in the subpoena.

The City Prosecutor also argued that the presence of the accused was not required for the preliminary investigation’s validity, so long as the prosecution exerted efforts to notify the accused and the accused was given an opportunity to controvert the complainant’s evidence.

Supreme Court’s Ruling on the Validity of the Preliminary Investigation

The Court denied the petition for lack of merit. It ruled that petitioner was not denied of his right to a preliminary investigation. The Court stressed that it was not controverted that a subpoena was sent to petitioner’s given address, but it was returned unserved. The Court further noted that petitioner did not dispute that the address appearing in the cash bond receipt was his own address.

The Court reiterated that the purpose of a preliminary investigation is for the investigating prosecutor to determine whether a crime has been committed, which requires reviewing the evidence to determine probable cause, after which the investigating prosecutor is duty bound to file the appropriate information if warranted. It held that the complainant had established that petitioner issued a check that was dishonored because the account had been closed. The Court found that the evidence met the requirement for probable cause.

The Court also reminded that a preliminary investigation is not the proper venue for an exhaustive production of evidence. It thus rejected the insinuation that petitioner’s inability to submit a counter-affidavit—assuming arguendo the factual premise he advanced—rendered the preliminary investigation inherently defective.

On the alleged irregularity of an ex-parte proceeding, the Court found no irregularity. It recognized the rule that preliminary investigations may be conducted ex-parte when the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or does not appear after due notice. The Court cited the New Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 112, Section 3(d) and related jurisprudence, including Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 120 SCRA 659 (1983).

The Court further reiterated its ruling in Rodis, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618 (1988) that the New Rules on Criminal Procedure do not require the presence of the accused as an indispensable condition for the validity of the preliminary investigation, provided that efforts to reach the accused were made and the accused was accorded an opportunity to controvert the complainant’s evidence. It explained that the purpose of the rule was to prevent unscrupulous respondents from thwarting prosecution through hiding themselves or employing dilatory tactics.

Supreme Court’s Ruling on the Remedy of Prohibition

As to the second issue, the Court held that an injunction (and, by extension, prohibition sought to stop criminal prosecution) will generally not lie to restrain a criminal action. The Court cited Paderanga v. Drilon, 196 SCRA 86 (1991), Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 (1990), and Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 (1987). It then set out the exceptions recognized in Brocka, enumerating circumstances where injunctive relief may be proper, including when it is n

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 109036)

Bartolome F. Mercado was the accused in Criminal Case No. Q-91-20150 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Check Law) before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City.
Bartolome F. Mercado filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to assail the Court of Appeals Decision dated January 13, 1993 and its Resolution dated February 16, 1993 that denied reconsideration.
The respondents were the Honorable Court of Appeals, Fourth Division, the Honorable Cesar C. Peralejo, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City, and the Honorable City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

Procedural Antecedents

Mercado sought to defer his arraignment in the trial court on the ground that he was not properly notified of the preliminary investigation.
He alleged that the private complainant deliberately provided a wrong address in the subpoena directed to him, which prevented him from submitting a counter-affidavit that he claimed could have prevented the filing of the criminal case.
Mercado asserted that during the hearing of July 10, 1991, the trial court granted his motion to defer arraignment and ordered the case remanded for reinvestigation, but the subsequent order only directed the prosecution to comment on the motion.
Mercado moved to cancel his arraignment scheduled on July 30, 1991.
On July 30, 1991, the trial court denied his motion to defer arraignment and, upon his refusal to enter a plea, respondent judge entered a plea of “not guilty.”
Mercado filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals to prevent the trial court from proceeding with the trial.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, and Mercado sought reconsideration, which was denied.

Key Factual Allegations

Mercado claimed that he did not receive notice of the preliminary investigation because the subpoena was allegedly sent to a wrong address.
He argued that the complainant’s alleged misinformation was deliberate and that it deprived him of the opportunity to submit his counter-affidavit.
The City Prosecutor denied that the subpoena was sent to a wrong address and stated that the subpoena was sent to Mercado’s actual residence at the time but was returned unserved.
The City Prosecutor relied on Mercado’s cash bond official receipt, where Mercado acknowledged his address as “6-E Reyes St., Gloria Heights Subdivision, Antipolo, Rizal,” which matched the address in the subpoena.

Issues Presented

The first issue asked whether a preliminary investigation conducted ex-parte due to lack of notice could be considered valid when the omission allegedly resulted from the complainant’s deliberate misinformation regarding the accused’s address.
The second issue asked whether prohibition was a proper remedy in the case of a denial of a motion to suspend arraignment.

Governing Rules on Preliminary Investigation

The Court treated the purpose of a preliminary investigation as the determination whether a crime had been committed and whether probable cause existed to justify the filing of the corresponding information.
The Court emphasized that review of evidence in preliminary investigation is necessary to establish probable cause and to guide the investigating prosecutor’s duty to file the information if evidence so warrants (Cruz, Jr. v. People, 233 SCRA 439 [1994]).
The Court reiterated that preliminary investigation is not the proper forum for an exhaustive production of evidence.
The Court held that there was no denial of Mercado’s right to preliminary investigation because a subpoena was sent to the address provided, and it was returned unserved.

Ex-Parte Validity and Notice

The Court held that it found no irregularity in the ex-parte condu