Title
Meneses vs. Venturozo
Case
G.R. No. 172196
Decision Date
Oct 19, 2011
Dispute over land ownership led to a reversal by the Court of Appeals of the trial court's ruling in favor of Adelaida Meneses, ultimately reestablishing her ownership after ruling the sale documents void.
ownership
possession
damages

Case Summary (G.R. No. 48226)

Facts as Alleged in the Complaint and Defense

Respondent Rosario G. Venturozo filed a Complaint for “ownership, possession x x x and damages” in the RTC, alleging that she was the absolute owner of the subject untitled land. She claimed that she purchased the property from the spouses Basilio de Guzman and Crescencia Abad on January 31, 1973, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit “B”). She further averred that her vendors had earlier purchased the property from petitioner’s predecessor, represented to be petitioner Adelaida Meneses, under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 (Exhibit “A” in the appellate discussion).

Respondent stated that she had been in possession until May 1983, when petitioner allegedly with armed men seized and retained possession despite demands. She prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction after preliminary hearing, followed by a decision declaring her owner and ordering petitioner to vacate, with payment of attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, damages, and costs.

Petitioner’s defense directly attacked the June 20, 1966 deed. She alleged that respondent’s supposed vendor was her father’s claimed acquisition, but she denied ever signing any deed of absolute sale dated June 20, 1966. She asserted forgery, non-appearance before a notary public, and non-possession of the residence certificate purportedly required for the notarization. Consequently, she claimed her purported sale to Basilio de Guzman was void ab initio, and that respondent’s later deed of January 31, 1973, derived from that invalid chain, was likewise void.

In her counterclaim, petitioner maintained that because the June 20, 1966 deed was falsified and because respondent and her father had never been in actual possession, respondent was obliged to execute a deed of reconveyance in petitioner’s favor.

Issues Framed Before the Trial Court

The central issue in the RTC was whether the sale purportedly made by petitioner Adelaida Meneses to Basilio de Guzman on June 20, 1966 was valid, in light of petitioner’s allegations of forgery and defective notarization. The resolution of that issue determined the validity of the subsequent January 31, 1973 transfer by Basilio de Guzman to respondent.

RTC Decision (Civil Case No. D-9040)

On July 18, 1991, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, declaring both the Deed of Absolute and Definite Sale dated June 20, 1966 (Exhibit “B”) and the Deed of Absolute and Definite Sale dated January 31, 1973 (Exhibit “A”) null and void ab initio. It declared petitioner owner of the property and ordered respondent to execute a deed of reconveyance. It also ordered respondent to pay damages and litigation expenses.

The RTC found that petitioner inherited the land from her father Domingo Meneses, and that she did not sell her property to Basilio de Guzman in 1966. It held that the signature appearing on the June 20, 1966 deed was a forgery. The RTC reasoned that petitioner’s signature on the questioned deed differed markedly from her specimen signatures, including those in the records of Civil Case No. 1096 in the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan. It also found that respondent’s claim that her parents purchased the property in 1966 was negated by petitioner’s continued possession and collection of the products. Because there was no valid transfer in 1966, the subsequent 1973 conveyance derived from that transfer was also invalid.

Court of Appeals Proceedings and Reversal

Respondent appealed. On October 27, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. It declared respondent the owner of the subject land and ordered petitioner to vacate and surrender possession.

The appellate court concluded that petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that her signature on the June 20, 1966 deed was forged. It relied on petitioner’s statements during her examination, which the Court of Appeals treated as binding admissions: during direct examination, petitioner allegedly stated that the signature over “Adelaida Meneses” on the questioned deed was her signature. The Court of Appeals viewed that admission as conclusive absent a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

The Court of Appeals also held that mere variance of signatures could not be treated as conclusive proof of forgery, since forgery could not be presumed. It faulted petitioner for not producing specimen signatures from around the year 1966 for better comparison. It further emphasized the presumptive regularity of notarized documents, stating that a notarized deed carries evidentiary weight and that it must be overcome by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than mere preponderance. The appellate court considered the testimony of the notary public, Atty. Abelardo G. Biala, who allegedly confirmed the genuineness and due execution of the deed and testified that petitioner appeared before him and acknowledged the deed as her free and voluntary act. The Court of Appeals characterized the notary public’s testimony as more credible than petitioner’s version, and held that petitioner did not meet the evidentiary threshold to overcome the evidentiary force of the notarized deed.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on April 5, 2006.

Petitioner’s Theory in the Supreme Court

Petitioner, substituted by her heir, raised a lone issue: whether the Court of Appeals ruling was in keeping with law and jurisprudence. Petitioner argued that the supposed admission during her testimony was taken out of context. She contended that the question “Do you know this signature?” was meant to elicit whether she recognized or was cognizant of a signature or whether it resembled her signature, and not whether she actually signed the deed. She further invoked recognized exceptions to the conclusiveness of judicial admissions, particularly where the admission was made through palpable mistake or where the admission was not actually made.

Petitioner likewise asserted that the RTC’s findings on the genuineness of her signature should have been respected, emphasizing that the trial court evaluated credibility and evidence firsthand.

Supreme Court’s Review Standard and Recognized Exception

The Court acknowledged the general rule that in appeals from the Court of Appeals under Rule 45, the Supreme Court reviews questions of law and findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive. It also recognized exceptions where the Court of Appeals findings of fact are contrary to those of the RTC, as in this case.

Core Legal Reasoning: Notarization Defect and Evidentiary Standard

In addressing the evidentiary dispute, the Court focused first on the legal character of the June 20, 1966 deed as a public document. It reiterated that Art. 1358 of the Civil Code speaks of public documents as a matter of convenience and does not control validity or enforceability in the abstract. However, the evidentiary regime attached to notarized deeds depended upon the regularity of notarization. Notarized documents enjoy presumptions of due execution, but the presumptions remain only so long as the notarization is beyond dispute. If notarization is defective, the document loses its public character and is treated as a private instrument, and the evidentiary standard shifts from clear, strong, and convincing evidence to preponderance of evidence.

Applying the requisites under Act No. 496, particularly Section 127, the Court found a lack of compliance. The deed was acknowledged in a manner that resulted in only one witness. The notary public’s signature was treated as that of one of the two witnesses required by law, leaving no second witness signature to the instrument in the manner contemplated by Section 127. The Court also noted the timing of the residence certificate: the residence certificate was issued on June 21, 1966, yet the deed reflected the certificate’s details written on June 21, 1966 by the notary public after the execution and notarization occurred on June 20, 1966. Considering those defects, the Court ruled that the deed could not be considered a public document but only a private instrument. As a result, the Court dispensed with the normally attached heightened evidentiary standard and tested the deed’s validity under the preponderance of evidence threshold.

Assessment of the Signature and Forgery Finding

With the deed treated as a private document, the Court applied the evidentiary rule for proving private documents. It found that petitioner’s signature on the June 20, 1966 deed was “very much different” from her specimen signatures and from signatures appearing in pleadings in other cases, even considering a seventeen-year gap between specimen signatures and the questioned deed. The Court therefore concluded that petitioner’s signature on the June 20, 1966 deed was a forgery.

Treatment of Petitioner’s Admission as Taken Out of Context

The Court also agreed with petitioner that her alleged admission had been taken out of context. It observed that in her Answer, petitioner consistently asserted that the alleged deed signed for Basilio de Guzman was a forgery, that she never signed it, that she did not appear before the notary public, and that she did not secure the residence certificate referenced in the deed. In her testimony, she likewise stated that she had never sold her land to Basilio de Guzman, had never met the notary public Atty. Abelardo Biala, and had not met Basilio de Guzman on June 20, 1966.

The RTC, which had the opportunity to observe witnesses’ demeanor, had found petitioner and her testimony credible. The Co

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