Title
Mendoza vs. Laxina, Sr.
Case
G.R. No. 146875
Decision Date
Jul 14, 2003
Barangay Captain Laxina reinstated by COMELEC after election protest; appointments and payroll upheld, no grave misconduct found.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 102448)

Key Dates

  • May 27, 1997: Respondent took initial oath and assumed office following proclamation in the 1997 Barangay Elections.
  • January 18–20, 1999: Trial court declared rival Roque Fermo winner and granted execution pending appeal; respondent vacated office on January 20, 1999.
  • September 16, 1999: COMELEC annulled the trial court’s January 20, 1999 order and ordered Fermo to cease performing functions and to relinquish office to respondent pending appeal.
  • October 27–28, 1999: COMELEC issued writ of execution directing Fermo to vacate; Fermo refused. Respondent began performing functions at the SK-Hall on October 28, 1999.
  • November 12, 1999: COMELEC issued alias writ of execution (returned unsatisfied).
  • November 16, 1999: Respondent re-took oath before Mayor Mathay.
  • November 17, 1999: Fermo turned over barangay assets to respondent.
  • October–December 1999 and January 2000: City Council investigatory and disciplinary proceedings, resolutions, and payroll approvals leading to findings of grave misconduct and recommendation of suspension; judicial proceedings followed culminating in the RTC summary judgment (Nov. 13, 2000) and Supreme Court decision (July 14, 2003).

Applicable Law and Procedural Framework

  • 1987 Philippine Constitution (applicable by instruction for this decision).
  • 1991 Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), specifically Section 61 (form and filing of administrative complaints against barangay officials), Section 67 (administrative appeals to the Office of the President for sangguniang panlungsod decisions of highly urbanized cities), and Section 68 (effect of appeal on executory decisions and entitlement to salaries/emoluments).
  • 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 45 (special civil actions), under which the petition for review was brought.
  • Jurisprudence cited and applied by the courts (cases and principles reproduced in the record).

Material Facts

Respondent was proclaimed winner and duly assumed office in 1997 after taking an oath. An election protest by Roque Fermo resulted in a trial court order declaring Fermo winner and ordering execution pending appeal, prompting respondent to vacate. COMELEC later annulled the trial court’s execution order and directed Fermo to desist pending appeal; writs of execution issued by COMELEC were, however, resisted by Fermo and his supporters, impeding physical possession of the barangay hall. Respondent nonetheless exercised barangay functions at an alternate site (SK-Hall), made appointments (Barangay Secretary and Treasurer), and the barangay council approved payrolls and appropriations covering specified periods. Certain barangay councilors refused to sign the payroll and later filed complaints alleging graft and falsification, contending that appointments and payroll effectivity dates were improperly antedated and that respondent and others conspired to deprive petitioners of salaries.

Procedural History

  • Investigatory and disciplinary proceedings before the Quezon City Council’s Special Investigation Committee resulted in a finding that respondent lacked authority to make appointments prior to his re-taking of oath but concluded respondent and others acted in good faith; respondent was found guilty of grave misconduct and recommended two months’ suspension. The Council adopted the committee’s recommendations and implemented suspension by appointing an acting barangay chairman.
  • Respondent sought certiorari relief in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City; RTC rendered summary judgment annulling the Council’s decision and exonerating respondent on the ground of lack of bad faith. Petitioners then filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.

Issues Presented

  1. Whether respondent’s re-taking of the oath of office was a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption of office after the COMELEC annulled the writ ousting him pending appeal.
  2. The proper date of respondent’s valid re-assumption of office for purposes of validating his appointments and payroll actions (October 28, 1999 – date writ was served and respondent began to discharge functions at the SK-Hall, or November 17, 1999 – date of physical turn-over of barangay assets).
  3. Whether petitioners’ administrative remedies were exhausted before seeking judicial relief, including whether filing with the Office of the President under the Local Government Code was required prior to court intervention.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — Analysis and Ruling

  • The Court analyzed Sections 61, 67 and 68 of the Local Government Code. Section 61 makes complaints against elective barangay officials subject to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, whose decision is "final and executory." Section 67 permits appeals to the Office of the President from sangguniang panlungsod decisions of highly urbanized cities; Section 68 provides that an appeal does not prevent a decision from being final and executory and outlines compensation consequences if an appeal results in exoneration.
  • The RTC’s reasoning that Section 67 rendered the Council’s decision unappealable to the Office of the President was incorrect because Section 68 explicitly contemplates appeals and preserves the executory nature of administrative decisions while still allowing appellate review. The Court reiterated the general rule that administrative remedies must be exhausted before judicial intervention, but recognized the well-established exception allowing judicial resolution when the issue is purely one of law.
  • The Supreme Court found the issues presented (appealability and the legal significance of re-taking the oath) to be legal questions appropriate for judicial resolution and therefore permitted the RTC’s exercise of jurisdiction despite the general exhaustion rule. The Court, however, emphasized that the RTC reached correct results albeit for different reasoning.

Oath of Office Requirement — Analysis and Ruling

  • The Court reaffirmed the principle that taking an oath of office is a qualifying requirement and prerequisite to full investiture, but once a public officer has been proclaimed and duly sworn, the pendency of an election protest does not ipso facto bar assumption and exercise of functions unless there is a final and executory annulment or a valid execution of unseating pending appeal.
  • In this case, respondent had been duly proclaimed and took his initial oath on May 27, 1997. COMELEC’s September 16, 1999 resolution annulled the trial court’s execution removing him pending appeal and ordered Fermo to cease performing functions and relinquish office to respondent. The Supreme Court treated COMELEC’s annulment as restoring the status quo ante (the last peaceful uncontested situation), effectively treating respondent’s original proclamation and oath as continuing to vest him with office.
  • Consequently, respondent’s re-taking of the oath on November 16, 1999 was deemed a mere formality and not a condition sine qua non for the validity of his re-assumption of office. The earlier oath conferred plenary rights that were not extinguished by the temporary, non-executed removal that COMELEC later set aside.

Date of Valid Re-assumption and Validity of Acts — Analysis and Ruling

  • The Court addressed whether respondent’s re-assumption took effect when he began discharging functions at the SK-Hall on October 28, 1999 (after service of COMELEC’s writ and despite Fermo’s physical refusal to yield the barangay hall), or only upon the physical turnover of barangay assets on November 17, 1999.
  • The Court held that respondent effectively re-assumed office beginning October 28, 1999. It refused to allow petitioners to profit from Fermo’s deliberate refusal to comply with lawful writs of execution; sanctioning a later effective date would reward and incentivize noncompliance with court and quasi-judicial processes. The proper administration of justice requires obedience to such processes; the COMELEC’s orders reinstating respondent restored his authority notwithstanding obstacles to physical occupation.
  • Because respondent lawfully re-assumed functions on October 28, 1999 and exercised authority (albeit from an alternative venue), his appointments of Godofredo L. Ramos and Rodel G. Liquido and the grant of emoluments for the period claimed were lawful acts arising from that re-assumption and therefore valid. The committee’s factual finding that respondents acted in good faith supported the conclusion that no grave misconduct was committed in making those appointments or granting compensation.

Payroll, Signature Removal, and Allegation of Conspiracy — Analysis and Ruling

  • Petitioners alleged that respondent connived with other barangay officials to cross out petitioners’ names on the payroll, thereby preventing them from receiving salaries for the covered period. The payroll actually bore petitioners’ names and corresponding salaries, but petitioners intentionally refused to sign and acknowledge receipt as a form of protest.
  • The Court invoked the legal maxim quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit (he who suffers injury by his own fault is not considered to have suffered damage) to reject petitioners’ contention. Because petitioners themselves declined to accept the payroll amounts as a deliberate protest, they cannot claim injury from their own conduct. The investigative committee correctly dismissed the conspiracy/connivance charge against respondent on these facts.

Remedies and Relief Concerning Salar

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