Mendoza vs. Allas

Factual Background

Petitioner commenced service with the Bureau of Customs in 1972 and held successive positions culminating in his appointment as Customs Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service on March 1, 1988. Following a reclassification in 1989 under Republic Act No. 6758 and National Compensation Circular No. 50, his post was designated Director III, CIIS, which he occupied in fact and discharged its functions. On April 22, 1993, petitioner accepted a temporary designation as Acting District Collector, Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City, while continuing to receive the salary and benefits of Director III. In March 1994, respondent Ray Allas received an appointment as Director III, CIIS, and in September 1994 petitioner received a letter stating that, effective March 4, 1994, his services were terminated in view of Allas’ appointment, the letter adding that termination was without prejudice to petitioner’s claim for government benefits.

Trial Court Proceedings and Judgment

Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Ray Allas on December 2, 1994. The Regional Trial Court, Paranaque, tried the case and on September 11, 1995 found that petitioner was illegally terminated without due process and in violation of his security of tenure. The trial court declared that petitioner was deemed not to have vacated the office, that Allas’ appointment was void ab initio, and it ordered the ouster and exclusion of respondent Allas from the post and the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of Director III with payment of full back wages and other monetary benefits appurtenant thereto.

Appeal and Court of Appeals Proceedings

Respondent Allas appealed the trial court judgment to the Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, President Ramos promoted Allas to Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations on February 8, 1996. Petitioner moved to dismiss Allas’ appeal as moot and academic in view of that promotion. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal; the dismissal became final and entry of judgment was made on March 19, 1996.

Motion for Execution and Subsequent Denial

Petitioner moved for execution of the trial court’s decision on May 9, 1996. On July 24, 1996, the trial court denied execution on the ground that the contested position vacated by Allas was then occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores, who had not been a party to the quo warranto proceeding. Petitioner sought certiorari and mandamus relief from the Court of Appeals to challenge the denial of execution, but the Court of Appeals dismissed that petition on November 27, 1997.

Issue Presented

The primary question presented to the Supreme Court was whether a writ of execution for the trial court’s quo warranto judgment could be issued, and reinstatement ordered, when the contested office was then occupied by a successor who was not a party to the quo warranto proceeding. A corollary issue was whether petitioner could recover back salaries and benefits after he had reached compulsory retirement age.

Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that execution could no longer issue because respondent Olores, a nonparty, occupied the subject position; petitioner asserted that his removal had been illegal, that he never vacated the office, and that Allas’ appointment was null and void and therefore could not legitimately support subsequent appointments. Petitioner further sought recovery of back salaries and benefits from the time of his alleged illegal dismissal until the finality of the trial court decision, and later to the extent possible until retirement.

Law Governing Quo Warranto

The Court reviewed the nature and purpose of quo warranto under Rule 66, Revised Rules of Court, noting that the writ demands that an individual show by what right he exercises a franchise or office. The Court summarized established rules: quo warranto may be instituted by the Government through the Solicitor General or by a private person who claims entitlement to the contested office; a private relator must prove his entitlement; when usurpation is found the court may oust the defendant, determine rights of parties, and grant other relief as justice requires. The Court cited the specific language governing judgment where usurpation is found and emphasized that the relief fashioned rests in part within the discretion of the court.

Doctrine on Succession and Binding Effect of Quo Warranto Judgments

The Court reiterated the settled rule that a judgment in quo warranto does not bind a respondent’s successor in office, even if the successor traces title to the same source. The Court explained that the writ is directed against the person, not against the office as such, and is concerned with whether that person is legally authorized to exercise the functions of the office. Consequently, a judgment ousting one person does not automatically bind a later occupant who was not a party to the action.

Application of Law to the Case

Because petitioner’s quo warranto was prosecuted solely against respondent Ray Allas, the trial court adjudicated rights only as between petitioner and Allas. The subsequent occupation of the