Case Summary (G.R. No. 188493)
Procedural History and Prior Ruling
This is the second habeas corpus petition filed by Mejoff. The first petition resulted in a denial by the Supreme Court (July 30, 1949). The earlier opinion—reported and authored by Justice Bengzon (with dissents by Paras, Feria, Perfecto, and the writer of the present opinion)—recognized Mejoff as an undesirable alien subject to deportation under the immigration statutes and held that temporary detention pending deportation was permissible so long as it was for a reasonable time. That prior disposition did not fix a firm deportation deadline but articulated factors relevant to what constitutes “reasonable time” and warned that protracted detention could warrant habeas relief.
Facts of Detention
Mejoff was brought to the Philippines during the Japanese occupation as a secret operative. After liberation, he was arrested by U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps as a suspected Japanese spy and later transferred to Commonwealth authorities. The People’s Court ordered his release at one point, but the Deportation Board and subsequently the immigration authorities concluded he had entered without proper documentation in 1944 and ordered his deportation to Russia. Repeated efforts to find transport or a receiving state failed: two Russian vessels that called at Cebu refused to take him, and diplomatic or transport arrangements remained elusive. Because deportation could not be effectuated, immigration authorities detained him in custody for an extended period.
Legal Issue Presented
Whether continued detention of an alien ordered deported—where deportation cannot, after prolonged attempts, be effectuated because no state or carrier will accept the alien—may lawfully continue indefinitely, and whether habeas corpus relief should be granted where the period of detention has become unduly protracted.
Constitutional and International Law Considerations
The Court recognized that protections against deprivation of liberty without due process extend beyond citizens to resident aliens (excluding enemy aliens). It relied on the constitutional principle—cited from the 1935 Constitution—that international law principles are incorporated into national law, and invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to emphasize general norms against arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile. The Court took these broader legal principles into account in assessing the legality and limits of administrative detention pending deportation.
Majority Reasoning on Temporary Detention and Deportation Authority
The majority reaffirmed that temporary detention is a legitimate administrative measure incident to the exclusion or deportation of undesirable aliens, and that authorities may, for a reasonable period, detain an alien while practical arrangements for deportation are pursued. However, the right to continue detention is not unlimited: when it becomes apparent that a deportation order cannot be effectuated and detention has become unreasonably prolonged, the authority underpinning continued custody may be exhausted (the writ of habeas corpus may lie). The Court emphasized that reasonableness of detention depends on circumstances such as difficulties in obtaining travel documents, availability of transport, diplomatic arrangements, and demonstrated efforts by the government to effect deportation.
Reliance on Comparative and Precedent Authorities
The Court surveyed U.S. federal decisions holding that courts have power to release aliens who have been detained an unreasonably long time after deportation warrants cannot be executed, on the theory that the deportation warrant becomes functus officio when execution is impossible. Cases cited included U.S. v. Nichols and a line of earlier decisions (Boss v. Wallis; Caranica v. Nagle; Saksagansky v. Weedin; Ex parte Matthews; Moraitis v. Delany), and in particular Staniszewski v. Watkins—a federal district court decision in which a stateless former resident ordered excluded and detained was released on recognizance with supervisory conditions because the government had no realistic means to deport him. The Court considered Staniszewski persuasive and adaptable to Philippine conditions because domestic immigration law had been modeled on American practice.
Adoption of a Supervisory Release Approach with Modifications
The Court adopted the reasoning of Staniszewski, with modifications appropriate to local conditions. It held that where deportation cannot reasonably be effected and detention has become unduly prolonged, the proper remedy is to release the deportee under supervisory measures designed to protect public peace and ensure availability for later deportation if arrangements materialize. The Court concluded that indefinite detention in such circumstances violates due process and the protections against arbitrary detention.
Consideration of Security and Subversive Risk
The Court addressed government contentions and public-safety concerns that Mejoff might engage in subversive activities if released, given his alleged association with the Japanese occupation. The majority found such risks remote in light of changed political realities (Japan no longer an enemy) and the absence of any pending criminal charges or imminent, uncontrollable risk. The Court invoked the principle—echoing Justice Jackson’s reasoning in a U.S. context—that preemptive incarceration to prevent speculative or anticipated wrongdoing is a dangerous and generally unacceptable practice. Accordingly, speculative fears of future misconduct did not justify indefinite detention absent concrete charges or clear danger.
Relief Ordered and Conditions Imposed
The writ of habeas corpus was granted with specific conditional terms for release. Mejoff was ordered released from custody subject to:
- Placement under the surveillance of immigration authorities or their agents in a reasonable manner sufficient to ensure he keeps the peace and remains available for deportation when feasible;
- Posting of a bond in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties, authority for which the Court cited as available under section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613;
- Submission of disputes over the reasonableness of surveillance to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for resolution in case of alleged abuse; and
- No costs assessed against the petitioner. These conditions balanced individual liberty against governmental interests in public order and the possibility of future
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 188493)
Procedural Posture and Nature of the Proceeding
- This is a second petition for habeas corpus filed by Boris Mejoff; an earlier petition was denied by this Court in a decision of July 30, 1949 (G.R. No. L-2855 referenced).
- The present decision is authored by Justice Tuason and promulgated September 26, 1951.
- The Court reviews the continued detention of the petitioner and determines the proper remedy, considering prior holdings and the passage of time since the first decision.
- The disposition ultimately ordered the issuance of the writ with conditions for release; the opinion records concurrences and a dissent (notably a separate disidentia by Pablo, M., in Spanish).
Relevant Facts — Origin, Arrest, Administrative Findings, and Detention History
- Boris Mejoff is described as an alien "of Kusaian descent" who was brought to the Philippines from Shanghai as a secret operative by Japanese forces during the Japanese regime/occupation of the Islands.
- Upon liberation, he was arrested by the U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps as a Japanese spy and later handed to the Commonwealth Government for disposition under Commonwealth Act No. 682.
- The People’s Court ordered his release (the text states this occurred after initial custody and proceedings).
- The Deportation Board, upon examination, found that Mejoff had no travel documents and was therefore illegally in the country; it referred the matter to immigration authorities.
- The Board of Commissioners of Immigration, after investigation, on April 5, 1948, declared Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944 without inspection and admission at a designated port of entry, and ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia.
- The petitioner was under custody from his arrest on March 18, 1948.
- In May 1948 he was transferred to the Cebu Provincial Jail with three other Russians to await arrival of Russian vessels; in July and August 1948 two Russian boats called at Cebu but refused to take Mejoff and his companions, alleging lack of authority to accept them.
- In October 1948, after repeated failures to ship him abroad, authorities removed him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa where he remained confined up to the present time of the decision.
- The Commissioner of Immigration believed it was in the best interests of the country to keep him detained while arrangements for his departure were being made.
- Over two years elapsed since the July 30, 1949 decision; by the time of the present ruling, government efforts had not succeeded in finding transport or a receiving country, and “none are in sight,” though the Court notes the deportation authorities were not at fault for the refusals by ships/countries.
Prior Decision (July 30, 1949) — Holdings and Opinions
- The Court’s prior decision (July 30, 1949) held that the petitioner’s detention was "temporary" and that temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens.
- The Court stated that pending arrangements for deportation the Government has the right to hold an undesirable alien under confinement for a reasonable length of time.
- The prior opinion emphasized that “reasonable time” depends on circumstances: difficulties obtaining a passport, availability of transportation, diplomatic arrangements, and efforts displayed to send the deportee away.
- The Court warned that “under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”
- There were dissents in the prior decision: Justice Feria and Justice Perfecto voted for outright discharge; Chief Justice Paras qualified his dissent by agreeing to further detention only provided the prisoner be released if after six months the Government was still unable to deport him; the writer of the present decision (Tuason) joined the latter dissent but thought two months was a reasonable period.
Issues Presented for Decision in the Instant Petition
- Whether an alien such as Mejoff — brought to the Philippines by Japanese occupying forces, alleged to be a spy, found by immigration authorities to have entered without inspection, and ordered deported but unable to be removed for an extended period — may be detained indefinitely while the Government seeks means of deportation.
- Whether the prolonged detention (over two years since the earlier ruling and over 31 months since custody began) without execution of deportation renders the continued confinement unlawful.
- Whether constitutional protections against deprivation of liberty without due process extend to foreign nationals (including stateless persons) in the Philippines, and to what extent those protections constrain the executive’s detention powers in deportation matters.
- What remedy and conditions, if any, are appropriate when deportation cannot be effectuated in a reasonable time through no fault of the deportation authorities.
Legal and Constitutional Principles Stated by the Court
- The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
- Temporary detention is permissible as a necessary step in exclusion or expulsion, but detention for “too long” a period may justify habeas corpus relief; “reasonable time” is fact-dependent (passport difficulties, transport availability, diplomatic arrangements, governmental efforts).
- The petitioner’s entry, the Court observes, “was not unlawful” because he was brought by armed and belligerent forces of a de facto government whose decrees were law during occupation.
- The Philippine Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) adopts generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation — a point the Court uses to situate human-rights concerns.
- The Court references the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (General Assembly resolution of December 10, 1948) and cites provisions emphasizing equality, entitlement to rights regardless of nationality or status, an effective remedy by competent national tribunals (Art. 8), and protection against arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (Art. 9).
- The Court invokes the principle that when deportation warrants become unexecutable and the detention is unreasonably prolonged, the detention may be regarded as without legal authority (citing U.S. decisions as persuasive authority).
Precedents and Comparative Authorities Considered and Adopted
- The Court examines and relies on reasoning from American federal jurisprudence where courts released aliens detained unreasonably long after deportation warrants proved impossible to execute:
- U. S. v. Ni