Title
Medina vs. Yan
Case
G.R. No. L-30978
Decision Date
Sep 30, 1974
Fortunato Medina, detained illegally, filed habeas corpus; CA upheld jurisdiction over appeal. Atty. Mutuc’s contemptuous acts criticized; SC denied petition, affirming CA’s authority.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-30978)

Factual Background

On November 23, 1968 petitioner Medina, a Filipino then in Saigon employed by an American company, was seized by South Vietnam police and PHILCAG personnel at the instance of the Philippine Military Attache and was flown to Manila the same evening. Upon arrival he was arrested by Intelligence Service officers of the Philippine Constabulary and detained at Camp Aguinaldo and subsequently at Camp Olivas and later in custody of local police at Arayat, Pampanga. Counsel filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court on November 29, 1968 to secure petitioner’s release from detention at the municipal jail of Arayat.

Trial Court Proceedings

Pursuant to the writ the case was made returnable to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City branch. On December 3, 1968 Judge Honorato B. Masakayan heard the matter on the merits. On January 2, 1969 the trial court rendered judgment ordering the immediate release of petitioner from custody. The trial court did not fix bail for release pending appeal.

Appeal and Court of Appeals Actuations

The Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal on January 9, 1969. The trial court transmitted the record to the Court of Appeals on January 15, 1969. Counsel for petitioner filed on January 27, 1969 a motion to certify the appeal to the Supreme Court; the Court of Appeals denied certification in a resolution dated February 1, 1969. Petitioner’s counsel moved on February 14, 1969 for release without bond pending appeal; the Court of Appeals on March 13, 1969 denied release without bond and ordered that petitioner be released pending appeal upon filing a surety bond of P5,000.00. A motion for reconsideration was denied on June 10, 1969.

Contempt Proceedings Against Counsel

Press reports appearing in the Manila Times in May 1969 quoted Atty. Amelito R. Mutuc as denouncing the Court of Appeals’ ruling, stating that petitioner’s detention was illegal, and as advising petitioner to escape from custody. The Court of Appeals construed these statements and counsel’s alleged encouragement of escape as contemptuous and violative of counsel’s oath to obey legal orders. By resolution of June 21, 1969 the Court of Appeals required Atty. Mutuc to show cause why he should not be held for contempt and suspended under Rule 138, Section 28, of the Rules of Court from the practice of law.

Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus in the Supreme Court

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus seeking: annulment of the Court of Appeals’ actuations (including the February 1, 1969, March 13, 1969, June 10, 1969, and June 21, 1969 resolutions); prohibition against enforcement of the contempt and suspension resolution; and an order compelling the Court of Appeals to certify the appeal to the Supreme Court and forward the record. Petitioner sought a preliminary injunction to restrain enforcement of the contempt resolution; this Court on September 4, 1969 temporarily restrained the Court of Appeals from proceeding with enforcement of the June 21, 1969 resolution.

Issues Presented

The principal issue was whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal brought by the Solicitor General from the judgment of the Court of First Instance ordering petitioner’s release, where the writ of habeas corpus had been originally filed with the Supreme Court and made returnable to the lower court. Ancillary issues concerned the validity of the Court of Appeals’ procedural orders and the propriety of its requiring counsel to show cause for contempt and suspension.

Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner contended that where a petition for habeas corpus was originally filed with the Supreme Court and the writ made returnable to a Court of First Instance, the case remained before the Supreme Court in virtue of its original jurisdiction; therefore any appeal from a decision of the lower court should lie directly to the Supreme Court and not to the Court of Appeals. The Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals maintained that once the writ was made returnable to the Court of First Instance that court acquired full authority and duty to inquire into facts and law pertinent to detention, and that its decision was appealable to the proper appellate tribunal, the Court of Appeals, particularly where questions of fact as well as law were presented.

Supreme Court Ruling (Disposition)

The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court held that the Court of First Instance, being the court to which the writ was made returnable, acquired the authority and duty to decide the case on the merits; consequently its judgment was appealable to the Court of Appeals when appellants indicated an intention to raise both questions of law and fact. The Court therefore found that the Court of Appeals lawfully exercised appellate jurisdiction in issuing the resolutions of February 1, 1969, March 13, 1969, June 10, 1969, and June 21, 1969. The restraining order dated September 4, 1969 was lifted and the Court of Appeals was authorized to proceed with determination of the appealed case and its incidents. No costs were awarded.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court relied principally upon its prior decisions in Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz (109 Phil. 378 and 105 Phil. 315) and on Sections 12–15 and Sec. 2 of Rule 102, Rules of Court, to state that when the Supreme Court makes a writ of habeas corpus returnable before a Court of First Instance that court does not function merely as a recommendatory body. The Court of First Instance acquired authority and duty to inquire into both facts and law and to determine whether detention was lawful. The Court observed that the findings of the lower court, if not timely appealed, could become final like any ordinary decision. The Court rejected petitioner’s contention that appeals in such cases must be taken directly to the Supreme Court, noting that appellants had filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals and had signified an intention to raise questions of fact and law; under Section 18, Rule 41, Rules of Court, and the practice established in the cited precedents, the Court of Appeals was the proper appellate

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