Case Summary (G.R. No. L-5387)
Key Dates
Factual and procedural events occurred prior to the Supreme Court decision. A related Supreme Court decision cited was rendered December 21, 1953. The appealed decision controlling this summary was announced April 29, 1954.
Applicable Law and Constitution
Primary statutory provisions examined: New Civil Code, Article 335(1) and Article 338(3).
Article 335(1) (quoted): “The following cannot adopt: (1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction;”
Article 338(3) (quoted): “The following may be adopted: ... (3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.”
Constitutional context applicable to the decision time: 1935 Philippine Constitution (the decision predates the 1987 Constitution and the user’s instructions require reference to the appropriate pre-1987 constitution).
Procedural Posture
McGee petitioned for adoption of his two minor step-children in the trial court. The Government opposed the petition on the ground that McGee’s existing legitimate child rendered him disqualified from adopting under Article 335(1). The trial court overruled the opposition and granted the petition relying on Article 338(3). The Government appealed to the Supreme Court, which reviewed the conflict between Articles 335 and 338.
Issue Presented
Whether a step-father who already has a legitimate child may validly adopt his step-children, given the apparent tension between the prohibitory rule of Article 335(1) and the permissive authorization in Article 338(3).
Relevant Prior Decision
The Court cited a recently decided, similar case (Norman H. Ball v. Republic of the Philippines, decided December 21, 1953) in which it held that a husband having a legitimate child may not adopt a step-child, construing Article 335 to bar such adoptions notwithstanding Article 338(3).
Statutory Construction and Court’s Reasoning
- The Court confronted the argument that Article 338(3) would be rendered surplusage if Article 335(1) barred adoption by any parent who already has children, because a husband without legitimate children could adopt a step-child even without the special allowance of Article 338(3). The trial court and appellee argued Article 338 should be read as an exception to Article 335.
- The Court rejected that argument by examining the underlying philosophy of adoption: adoption establishes a parent-child relationship where none exists. Where a parent-child relationship already exists by blood or affinity (as between parent and child, including some step or illegitimate relationships), adding another legal parent-child relationship by adoption is unnecessary and may be improper. Thus, an express authorization (Article 338) was necessary to permit adoptions in relationships of affinity or other special circumstances, and Article 338 is not ipso facto surplusage merely because general adoption provisions might otherwise reach the same outcome in some situations.
- The Court observed historical precedent (old Code of Civil Procedure provisions) and common-law analogues that permitted express statutory authorization for adoptions of relatives or step-children, reinforcing the view that Article 338’s special authorization has independent purpose and was not intended to negate Article 335’s prohibitory rule.
Negative vs. Affirmative Language; Mandatory vs. Directory
- The Court emphasized a canon of statutory construction: prohibitory (negative) language is generally mandatory, while affirmative or permissive language (such as “may”) is typically directory. Article 335 uses a negative formulation (“The following cannot adopt”), indicating an exclusion intended to be mandatory. Article 338 uses affirmative permissive language (“The following may be adopted”), which does not, on its face, override mandatory prohibitions.
- Applying this canon, the Court reasoned that the negative categorical bar in Article 335(1) should not be lightly read as subject to an affirmative provision absent clear legislative intent to the contrary.
Policy Considerations Underlying the Statutes
- The Court articulated the principal policy behind Article 335(1): preventing adoption where the adopting parent already has children avoids intra-family conflict and protects the successional and patrimonial rights of existing legitimate children.
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-5387)
Facts of the Case
- Clyde E. McGee, an American citizen, is married to Leonarda S. Crisostomo and by that marriage has one child.
- The minors subject of the adoption petition are Maria and Amada, surnamed Magpayo, who are Leonarda’s children by her first husband, Ernesto Magpayo.
- Ernesto Magpayo was killed by the Japanese during the occupation.
- McGee filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to adopt his two minor step-children, Maria and Amada Magpayo.
- At the hearing, the Government (Republic of the Philippines) opposed the petition.
Procedural History
- The Government opposed the adoption petition on the ground that petitioner McGee has a legitimate child and is therefore disqualified to adopt under article 335, paragraph 1, of the new Civil Code.
- The trial court overruled the Government’s opposition and granted the petition, applying article 338, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
- The Republic of the Philippines appealed the trial court’s decision to the Supreme Court.
- During the pendency of the present appeal, the Supreme Court had recently (December 21, 1953) decided a similar case (Norman H. Ball) involving the same question.
Statutory Provisions Invoked
- Article 335, paragraph 1, new Civil Code (as quoted in the source):
- "ART. 335. The following cannot adopt: (1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction;"
- Article 338, paragraph 3, new Civil Code (as quoted in the source):
- "ART. 338. The following may be adopted: * * * * * * * (3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother."
Legal Issue Presented
- Whether a husband (step-father) who already has a legitimate child may adopt a step-child, in light of article 335, paragraph 1, and article 338, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
Position of the Opponent/Appellant (Republic of the Philippines)
- The Government contended that McGee is disqualified to adopt because he has a legitimate child, falling squarely within the prohibition of article 335, paragraph 1.
- The Government appealed the trial court’s grant of the adoption petition on that ground.
Position of the Petitioner/Appellee and Trial Court Reasoning
- The trial court and appellee argued that article 338, paragraph 3, expressly permits the adoption of a step-child by a step-father or step-mother.
- The strongest argument advanced by the trial court and appellee was that to hold a step-father with a legitimate child may not adopt a step-child would render article 338, paragraph 3, meaningless and a surplusage.
- Appellee argued article 338 should be read in relation to article 335 such that article 338 operates as an exception to the general prohibition in article 335.
Supreme Court’s Preliminary Observations and Reference to Prior Decision
- The Court noted that it had very recently decided a similar case (Norman H. Ball) in which the same question — whether a husband having a legitimate child may adopt a step-child — was involved.
- In that prior decision, the Court applied article 335 and held that a husband with a legitimate child may not adopt a step-child.
- The Court observed that, with the doctrine laid down in the Ball case, it could end the present appeal; nonetheless, the Court elected to further elaborate on the relationship between articles 335 and 338.