Title
Mayuga vs. Maravilla
Case
G.R. No. L-18826
Decision Date
Dec 17, 1966
A medical practitioner charged with homicide through reckless imprudence for failing to remove a surgical pack, leading to a patient's death. Lower courts upheld prima facie case; Supreme Court affirmed, emphasizing preliminary investigation's purpose and sufficiency of evidence.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-18826)

Facts Giving Rise to Criminal Case No. 4720

The information alleged that Mayuga failed to remove the intestinal pack (rolled gauze) from the surgical opening which he made during the cesarean operation on Avelina Gallomosa, resulting in infection and her death on December 8, 1956. After conducting a preliminary examination, the Justice of the Peace found that the evidence presented established a prima facie case, and he issued an order for the arrest of Mayuga.

Motion to Quash and Subsequent Certiorari Proceedings

Before the preliminary investigation, Mayuga moved to quash on August 30, 1960, contending that the annexes and oral testimonies submitted during the preliminary examination were hearsay and insufficient to establish a prima facie case. When Justice of the Peace Maravilla denied the motion to quash and likewise denied subsequent motions for reconsideration, Mayuga filed, on November 20, 1960, a petition for certiorari before the Court of First Instance of Romblon, alleging grave abuse of discretion and seeking annulment of the Justice of the Peace’s orders and dismissal of the information.

On January 21, 1961, the Court of First Instance dismissed the petition for lack of merit and directed the Justice of the Peace to continue with the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 4720. After the denial of Mayuga’s motion for reconsideration on February 8, 1961, Mayuga appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court on questions of law, specifically: (1) whether the Court of First Instance erred in upholding the Justice of the Peace’s actuations; and (2) whether the outright dismissal of the certiorari petition was itself erroneous.

Mayuga’s Grounds: Alleged Hearsay and Insufficiency at the Prima Facie Stage

Mayuga objected to several items said to be insufficient to support the existence of a prima facie case. First, he assailed Exhibit A as allegedly unsigned, unauthenticated, and unidentified, purportedly a true copy of an autopsy report issued by Dr. Perpetua Penales on March 4, 1957, noting that Dr. Perpetua Penales was not presented for cross-examination. Second, he attacked Exhibit B, a certificate stating that Avelina Gallomosa died on December 8, 1956, signed by the Municipal Treasurer whose signature was not identified. Third, he questioned Exhibit C, a partly accomplished, unsigned and unattested certificate of death of the Bureau of Health later substituted by a photostatic copy marked Exhibit C-1. Fourth, he challenged the testimony of Avelina’s husband Aquilino Gallomosa, Sancho Pargao, a rural health nurse who attended during the autopsy, and Dr. Godofredo Fatalla, the incumbent Municipal Health Officer.

The Nature of Preliminary Examination and Probable Cause

The Supreme Court reiterated that a preliminary examination of the kind conducted by a Justice of the Peace serves only to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty, so that a warrant of arrest may issue. The Court emphasized that preliminary investigation has two stages. In the first stage, a preliminary examination of the complainant and witnesses occurs before arrest. In the second stage, after arrest, the accused is read the complaint or information and informed of the substance of the evidence against him, with opportunity to present evidence in his favor.

Concerning the first stage, the Court explained that probable cause depends on the discretion of the judge or magistrate empowered to issue the warrant of arrest. The magistrate need not be convinced that the accused committed the crime beyond doubt. It suffices that facts presented may convince the magistrate not that the person committed the crime charged, but that there is probable cause to believe that the person did.

The Court further explained that the proceeding is generally ex parte. It noted that, under the rules applicable at the time, the testimony required to be taken in writing primarily related to the complainant, while only an abstract or brief statement of the substance of other witnesses’ testimony was required. The Court also cited controlling jurisprudence to underscore that the occasion for preliminary examination was not for a full and exhaustive presentation of evidence. It was meant only to present evidence capable of engendering well-grounded belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused was probably guilty. Accordingly, it held that a justice of the peace court was not prohibited from reaching the conclusion that probable cause exists from statements of the prosecuting attorney or other persons whose affidavits or statements were entitled to credit in the magistrate’s opinion.

Application to the Evidence Attacked by Mayuga

The Court noted that beyond the documentary evidence alleged to be hearsay, there were testimonies of witnesses and also affidavits of the complaining witness Aquilino Gallomosa and of Dr. Perpetua Penales, attached as annexes A and B to the petition for certiorari. The Court held that these testimonies alone, even excluding the documents Mayuga characterized as hearsay, were sufficient under the then-applicable rules and jurisprudence to uphold the Justice of the Peace’s finding that a prima facie case existed.

The Supreme Court added that, in examining the matters Mayuga objected to as inadmissible and insufficient, the Justice of the Peace had done more than what was required to form his conclusion. The Court characterized that conduct as commendable and found that the Court of First Instance correctly upheld it.

Alleged Error in Dismissing the Certiorari Petition Without Requiring an Answer

Mayuga additionally argued that under Section 6 of Rule 67, as then, later Section 6 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari that was sufficient in form and substance should be answered, and the Court of First Instance should have required the Justice of the Peace to answer before dismissing the petition.

The Supreme Court rejected that position. It reasoned that in this case the petition was deficient in substance. It cited Arvisu v. Vergara, which held that dismissal of a certiorari petition could be proper even before an answer was filed if the court’s attention was called to the fact that, from the petition’s own allegations, it appeared to be without merit. The Court treated the petition’s deficiency as dispositive of the procedural argument.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal appealed from a

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