Title
Matthews vs. Taylor
Case
G.R. No. 164584
Decision Date
Jun 22, 2009
A British national contested a lease agreement over a Boracay property owned by his Filipino wife, claiming conjugal rights. The Supreme Court ruled the property was exclusively hers, upholding the lease and reinforcing the constitutional ban on alien land ownership.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 160219)

Factual Background

On June 30, 1988, Benjamin A. Taylor, a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor, a seventeen‑year‑old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while the marriage subsisted, Joselyn bought a 1,294 square‑meter lot in Manoc‑Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan (the Boracay property) for P129,000, evidenced by a Deed of Sale registered with the Registry of Deeds of Aklan. The sale was alleged to have been financed by Benjamin. The parties, using Benjamin's funds, constructed improvements and converted the property into the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. Licenses and permits for the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn's sister, because Joselyn was a minor when the applications were made.

Events Leading to the Dispute

Following marital difficulties and Joselyn's separation with a man named Kim Philippsen, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Benjamin on June 8, 1992, authorizing him to maintain, sell, lease, and otherwise contract with respect to the Boracay property. Despite that instrument, on July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and Philip Matthews as lessee executed an Agreement of Lease for twenty‑five years with an annual rent of P12,000, duly notarized. Matthews took possession and renamed the resort Music Garden Resort. Benjamin asserted that the lease was invalid because he provided the funds for acquisition and improvements and the property was conjugal or community property requiring his consent.

Trial Court Proceedings

Benjamin filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and Philip Matthews. No Answer was filed initially, and the RTC declared Joselyn and Matthews in default and rendered default judgment on March 14, 1994, declaring the Agreement null and void. The Court of Appeals set aside that default judgment in CA‑G.R. SP No. 34054 and ordered the case remanded to the RTC to allow Matthews to file an Answer and for further proceedings. Matthews thereafter pleaded good faith, relied on the public document nature of the lease, and argued estoppel based on Benjamin's signature as a witness on the last page of the instrument.

Trial on the Merits and RTC Judgment

After trial, the RTC on June 30, 1997 declared the Agreement of Lease null and void. The RTC found the Boracay property to be conjugal or community property and concluded that the consent of the spouses was necessary to validate the lease. The trial court relied on findings that Benjamin provided the funds for purchase and improvements. Although the Agreement was in public form, the RTC discounted Benjamin's apparent participation because his signature appeared only on the last page and not on every page of the document. The RTC ordered defendants jointly and severally to pay Benjamin P16,000 as damages representing unrealized income computed monthly from July 1992 until restoration and P20,000 for attorney's fees and incidental expenses.

Court of Appeals Decision

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in its December 19, 2003 Decision. The CA agreed that if Benjamin had consented or participated in the transaction, the Agreement should have stated that he acted "with my consent" rather than having signed merely "in the presence of" the parties. The CA observed that Joselyn had already prepared an SPA in favor of Benjamin and that her personal participation in the contract was unnecessary if she intended him to act. The CA concluded that the lease was entered without Benjamin's consent and was therefore null and void.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

Philip Matthews petitioned for certiorari raising, among others, the following claims: that Benjamin's marital consent was not required for the Agreement; that, if consent were required, Benjamin had effectively given consent by signing as witness; that the property was Joselyn's exclusive property under Cheesman v. IAC; that the courts below erroneously applied Article 96 of the Family Code instead of the conjugal partnership regime; that the presumption of regularity in notarization was disregarded; and that the CA failed to address Matthews' counterclaim which he had proven.

Supreme Court's Holding

The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals' December 19, 2003 Decision and July 14, 2004 Resolution, and entered judgment dismissing the complaint against Philip Matthews. The Court held that Benjamin could not nullify the Agreement of Lease on the grounds he advanced.

Constitutional Principle Governing the Decision

The Court anchored its decision on Section 7, Article XII, 1987 Constitution, which provides that, save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. The Court reaffirmed the settled rule that aliens are absolutely disqualified from acquiring public or private lands in the Philippines, except in constitutionally prescribed instances, and that the constitutional prohibition aims at conserving the national patrimony.

Application of Jurisprudence to the Facts

The Court surveyed controlling precedents, including Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, Muller v. Muller, Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui, Frenzel v. Catito, and Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and applied them to the present facts. The Court concluded that even if Benjamin provided the funds for the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, his status as an alien rendered any clandestine or vicarious attempt to acquire rights in land illegal and ineffective. The Court rejected the creation of an implied trust or a reimbursement remedy in favor of Benjamin, and rejected characterization of the property as conjugal or community property in a manner that would confer on the alien husband decisive rights to transfer or disposition of the land, reasoning that such a result would indirectly circumvent the constitutional prohibition.

Legal Reasoning and Rationale

The Court reasoned that to declare the property conjugal

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