Title
Mateo vs. Romulo
Case
G.R. No. 177875
Decision Date
Aug 8, 2016
A public official dismissed for dishonesty after failing to disclose a prior homicide conviction in his records, despite a conditional pardon.
public servant
dismissal from service
prior criminal conviction

Case Summary (G.R. No. 177875)

Factual Background

The NWRB employees filed their complaint affidavit with the PAGC on April 4, 2003. They alleged, among others, that petitioner failed to disclose in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS) the fact that he had been convicted of homicide by final judgment. They further alleged that he approved and issued water permits and certificates of public convenience in a manner claimed to be beyond or in conflict with Board actions; that he reassigned personnel without proper regard for their rank, status, and safety; and that he acted without due process in certain disciplinary actions against subordinates.

The complaint’s pivotal allegation related to the PDS entries. The PAGC noted that in petitioner’s PDS dated March 12, 1997, Item No. 25 asked whether he had been convicted or had violated any law by any court or tribunal, and the answer provided indicated NO. A similar disclosure denial appeared in a PDS dated November 6, 2000, with Item No. 26 also indicating NO. The PAGC then identified the underlying conviction: petitioner had been charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 93594 before the then Court of First Instance of Manila (now the Regional Trial Court), and he was convicted on August 10, 1976, with a penalty of six years and one day to a maximum of fourteen years, eight months and one day, plus indemnity of P12,000.00. He later received a conditional pardon from President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 12, 1979, which led to his discharge from New Bilibid Prison on July 1979.

Administrative Investigation and Proceedings Before the PAGC

Upon determining that there was sufficient basis to commence an administrative investigation, the PAGC required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit or answer. Petitioner complied on May 26, 2003. After formal hearing, the PAGC directed the parties to submit memoranda or position papers on or before June 9, 2003. The records showed that only the respondents filed the required memorandum or position paper; petitioner did not.

The PAGC thereafter issued its resolution dated June 25, 2003, finding petitioner administratively liable and recommending dismissal with forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service.

Findings of the PAGC on Dishonesty and Related Penalty Implications

On the dishonesty charge, the PAGC found that petitioner’s PDS answers were false in light of his prior conviction. It emphasized that the penalty of reclusion temporal carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from holding public office or employment. It held that this accessory penalty remained even after pardon unless the pardon expressly remitted the accessory penalty.

The PAGC reasoned that while petitioner had been granted a conditional pardon, the terms did not expressly restore his right to hold public office or employment. Consequently, the PAGC concluded that petitioner was not eligible for appointment to his posts in the NWRB. It further concluded that petitioner’s failure to disclose the truth in his PDS constituted dishonest conduct that caused undue injury to the government, and it recommended dismissal even though the dishonesty was not committed in the course of duty because it still affected his fitness to continue in office.

PAGC Findings on Usurpation of Authority and Other Charges

On usurpation of authority, the PAGC relied on the Water Code provisions allowing deputation and on NWRB Board resolutions that set the specific limits of authority. It referenced resolutions authorizing the Executive Director to grant temporary permits under specified regulatory authority, to sign decisions made by the Board, and to perform certain acts within defined limits, including authority to approve water permit applications for amounts at or below 0.05 LPS, subject to specified exceptions.

The PAGC found that petitioner issued Office Order No. 26 on September 11, 2002, which stated that the Executive Director would approve water rights permits and certificates of public convenience and necessity due to the Board’s failure to convene, with effectiveness subject to later Board confirmation. The PAGC then found that from September 2002 to January 2003, petitioner signed and approved 324 water permit applications despite those applications exceeding the 0.05 LPS limit set by Board resolution. The PAGC characterized the conduct as grave misconduct.

Regarding the allegation of unauthorized reassignment and suspensions, the PAGC treated certain office orders and memoranda as issued under the pretext of reorganization, despite the absence of an actual reorganization. It held that petitioner reassigned and transferred personnel without Board approval and that he violated Civil Service laws and Republic Act No. 6656. It also found that suspensions imposed on two employees for insubordination lacked legal basis because they were done without Board approval as required by a Board resolution.

Action of the Office of the President

The matter was elevated to the OP. In its resolution dated August 20, 2003, through Deputy Executive Secretary Arthur P. Autea, the OP concurred with the PAGC. The OP stated that the dishonesty charge alone justified dismissal even if allegedly committed for the first time. It further held that petitioner actually committed dishonesty on two separate occasions by falsely denying in his PDSs the fact of conviction in 1997 and 2000.

The OP affirmed petitioner’s dismissal with forfeiture of retirement and all other benefits. It also observed that there was no need for an additional declaration of disqualification from reemployment because perpetual disqualification arising from the conviction still stood.

Petitioner sought reconsideration on the theory that he had obtained an absolute pardon from President Corazon C. Aquino on May 27, 1987. He asserted that he relied in good faith on the absolute pardon, which purportedly erased his conviction, and he also claimed he had been denied administrative due process because the PAGC did not conduct formal hearings. The OP denied reconsideration. It found that the PAGC had conducted formal hearings and that petitioner had been given the opportunity to participate, including submitting his verified answer. It also noted that petitioner failed to submit his memorandum or position paper despite being ordered to do so. Finally, the OP held that petitioner raised the claim of absolute pardon only for the first time in his motion for reconsideration, and that because the pardon was a private act of the President, petitioner had to plead and prove it.

Court of Appeals Proceedings and Ruling

Petitioner appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 80689, insisting that the OP and PAGC committed serious errors of fact and law, exceeded jurisdiction, and violated his constitutional right to confront his accusers, thus violating administrative due process. The CA, in a decision promulgated on October 30, 2006, denied the petition and affirmed the OP.

The CA held that the essence of administrative due process was an opportunity to be heard or to explain one’s side or seek reconsideration of the questioned ruling. It found that petitioner had been given that opportunity, including participation in formal hearings where he filed his verified answer. The CA observed that although petitioner was ordered to submit a memorandum or position paper, he did not. It also held that administrative due process does not require trial-type confrontation as in judicial proceedings. It determined that the penalty imposed was grounded on the OP’s factual findings of dishonesty, usurpation of authority, and conduct prejudicial to the service. It further held that the OP had not acted arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence.

Issues Raised on Review

Petitioner challenged the dismissal on two principal grounds. First, he claimed respondents recommended or ordered his dismissal without affording him the constitutional right to confront accusers and without administrative due process. Second, he argued that the dismissal was imposed without a valid factual, legal, and evidentiary basis, rendering the penalty unjustified.

Court’s Ruling on Administrative Due Process and Confrontation

The Court denied the petition for review on certiorari. On the issue of confrontation and due process, it held that petitioner’s insistence on a formal, trial-type hearing was unsupported by law. It reiterated that administrative due process required only the opportunity to be heard, to explain one’s side, or to seek reconsideration. It found that petitioner had been duly notified of the complaint and of the formal hearings, had filed an answer, and had participated in those hearings. It stressed that trial-type confrontation was not indispensable in administrative cases. It held that the requirements of administrative due process were satisfied when the parties were afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective positions, and that the administrative agency could resolve issues based on affidavits, documentary evidence, and position papers.

Court’s Ruling on the Claim of Absolute Pardon

The Court next addressed petitioner’s theory that he was shielded by an absolute pardon dated May 27, 1987. It noted that petitioner did not raise the absolute pardon in his answer to the complaint. It further observed that petitioner did not submit proof of the alleged pardon before the PAGC, did not file his memorandum or position paper, and did not advert to the supposed absolute pardon even when the case was elevated to the OP.

The Court held that petitioner’s failure to submit evidence could not be ignored. It rejected petitioner’s claim of good faith because the nature of his conviction made it implausible. It noted that the conviction resulted in reclusion temporal, which under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code carried accessory penalties that, absent express remittance, persisted eve

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