Title
Masangkay vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 164443
Decision Date
Jun 18, 2010
Eriberto Masangkay was acquitted of perjury as insufficient evidence proved the falsity of his claims in a petition for MFI's dissolution, highlighting the necessity of corroborative proof beyond contradictions.
perjury
false statements
dissolution of corporation

Case Summary (G.R. No. 164443)

Factual Background

Petitioner, his common-law wife, and others were incorporators and directors of Megatel Factors, Inc. (MFI), incorporated in June 1990. On December 29, 1993 petitioner filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a verified petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI under Section 6 of PD No. 902-A. The petition alleged, among other things, that a secretary’s certificate and a subsequent “Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct” were fictitious, that a December 5, 1992 board meeting did not occur, and that the deed deprived a minor, Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay, of his land without consideration because no MFI shares were actually issued to him.

Proceedings Before the SEC and Criminal Complaints

Respondent in the SEC proceeding, Cesar Masangkay, filed a criminal complaint for perjury against petitioner before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. The assistant provincial prosecutor dismissed the complaint on grounds of primary jurisdiction and prejudicial question; the Department of Justice reinstated the complaint, reasoning that perjury under Article 183, Revised Penal Code is outside the SEC’s prosecutorial remit. A preliminary investigation was ordered and an information was filed alleging that petitioner willfully declared falsehoods in his verified petition filed with the SEC.

Preliminary Investigation and Filing of Information

The amended information charged that petitioner falsely asserted that the December 5, 1992 meeting never took place and that the Deed of Exchange was fictitious because no consideration was given and the minor never became a stockholder. The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 56495 and raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 59. Petitioner filed a motion to quash, asserting primary jurisdiction of the SEC and the existence of a prejudicial question, which the MeTC denied.

Trial Proceedings and Evidence

Petitioner pleaded not guilty, waived pretrial, and the prosecution presented Cesar Masangkay as its sole witness. Cesar testified that a board meeting occurred on December 5, 1992, introduced minutes purportedly of that meeting that bore petitioner’s signature, and identified petitioner’s participation in securing approval of the exchange before the guardianship court. The defense admitted petitioner’s signatures on certain documents but maintained the defense explanation that the minutes were presented to petitioner for signature at his house and that no actual meeting occurred. The defense also presented the corporate secretary, who could not recall sending notice for the December 5, 1992 meeting, and who testified that MFI never issued stock certificates in favor of the minor.

Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

On October 18, 2000 the MeTC found petitioner guilty of perjury under Article 183, Revised Penal Code. The MeTC concluded that the December 5, 1992 meeting took place and that petitioner’s signature on the minutes contradicted his sworn assertion that the meeting did not materialize. The trial court likewise held that petitioner’s participation in the approval and execution of the Deed of Exchange contradicted his claim that the instrument was fictitious. The trial court imposed the indeterminate penalty prescribed for perjury.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213. The RTC affirmed the MeTC judgment in toto and sustained the conviction for perjury as charged.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts’ rulings but modified the penalty for imprecision under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The CA held that petitioner’s signatures on the minutes and on the Deed of Exchange showed active participation in those transactions, thereby proving deliberate falsehood in the petition for involuntary dissolution. The CA rejected the contention that the alleged false statements were immaterial and found no prejudicial question preventing independent resolution of the criminal case.

Issues Presented

Petitioner raised three principal issues: whether there was a deliberate assertion of falsehood; whether the allegedly truthful allegation that no meeting occurred was material to the petition for involuntary dissolution; and whether perjury could proceed while the principal SEC dissolution case remained pending.

Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Supreme Court granted the petition for review and reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution. The Court acquitted petitioner of perjury on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove deliberate falsehood beyond reasonable doubt despite establishing that the statements were material to the petition for involuntary dissolution.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court reviewed the elements of perjury under Article 183, Revised Penal Code: sworn statement required by law; made under oath before a competent officer; deliberate assertion of falsehood; and falsity as to a material matter. The Court found the first two elements present because the petition for involuntary dissolution was verified pursuant to Sections 105 and 121 of the Corporation Code and sworn before a notary public. The Court held that the statements alleged to be false were material because they formed the basis of petitioner’s invocation of Section 105 to compel dissolution or relief.

On the element of deliberate falsehood, the Court emphasized the prosecution’s burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt not merely that two sworn statements were inconsistent, but to establish by evidence other than the contradictory statements which one was false. The Court reiterated precedent that contradictory sworn statements alone do not suffice because they would leave one oath against another without independent corroboration. The Court held that prosecution evidence consisted primarily of the minutes bearing petitioner’s signature and the testimony of Cesar Masangkay, who was an interested party in the underlying corporate dispute. The prosecution presented no testimony from other directors or participants, no meeting notice, and no circumstantial evidence demonstrating that the directors were physically assembled and conferred on December 5, 1992. The corporate secretary’s inability to recall sending notice undermined the proof that a meeting actually occurred. Petitioner’s explanation that he signed minutes presented at his home and that he supported the guardianship application in good faith to benefit his child provided a plaus

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