Title
Marzalado, Jr. vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 152997
Decision Date
Nov 10, 2004
Lessee Albano accused Marzalado, Jr. of trespass and theft after her unit was entered and belongings removed. Supreme Court acquitted, citing justified entry to prevent flooding and lack of criminal intent.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 152997)

Procedural History and Relief Sought

The MeTC (Quezon City, Branch 35) convicted petitioner of qualified trespass to dwelling under Art. 280, sentencing him to arresto mayor and a fine. The RTC (Branch 79) and subsequently the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Petitioner sought review by the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari, challenging primarily (a) the factual finding that the trespass occurred on November 2 rather than November 3 and (b) the denial of his claim that the entry was legally justified under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.

Material Facts Found by the Courts Below

Cristina Albano leased a unit owned by Luz Marzalado. An ejectment judgment against Albano was rendered and appealed. Electricity was disconnected in September 1993; Albano moved out during the pendency of the appeal, leaving a maid occasionally. Albano discovered changes (missing lead pipe, changed padlock, and later removal of roofing and interior emptied) and filed complaints. Eyewitness Raniedo testified seeing petitioner take a lead pipe on November 1 and forcibly open Albano’s unit on November 2, remove belongings and carry them to his house. Petitioner contended he entered the unit on November 3 with barangay personnel to stop continuous flooding caused by an open faucet and to prevent damage to his mother’s property.

Evidence Presented at Trial

Prosecution evidence comprised Albano’s complaints and testimony and the eyewitness testimony of Narciso Raniedo, who claimed to have seen petitioner forcibly enter and remove Albano’s belongings on November 2 (observations between about 4:30–5:00 p.m.). The defense offered petitioner’s testimony asserting justified entry on November 3 with barangay assistance to turn off an open faucet that was flooding the unit; a barangay certification supported that the owner forcibly opened the unit because of strong water pressure from the faucet.

Legal Issues Framed

The dispositive issue reduced by the Supreme Court: whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining petitioner’s conviction for qualified trespass to dwelling, considering (1) the variance in the date alleged in the information and evidence, and (2) whether petitioner’s entry was justified under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code as an act to avoid greater harm to property.

Elements of the Offense and Pleading Requirements

Qualified trespass to dwelling under Art. 280 requires: (1) the offender is a private person; (2) that he enters the dwelling of another; and (3) such entrance is against the latter’s will. Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that the precise date and time need not be stated in an information unless time is an essential element; the offense may be alleged to have been committed at a date as near as possible to the actual date. Thus, the information’s variance in date is not fatal if the date is not an essential element and the time alleged is reasonably proximate.

Court’s Analysis on Variance of Date in the Information

The Supreme Court observed a discrepancy between the date in the information (November 2, 1993) and petitioner’s claim that the entry occurred on November 3, 1993. The Court held that the exact date is not an essential element of trespass; a variance between the date alleged and the date proven does not automatically invalidate the information. The Court relied on established principles that the Information need only allege a date as near as possible and that a variance does not, by itself, warrant reversal when other elements are adequately charged and proven.

Court’s Analysis on Burden of Proof and Material Fact in Trespass

The Court reiterated that criminal convictions must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt and that prosecutions succeed or fail on the strength of the evidence presented. In trespass prosecutions the gravamen is violation of possession — the fact of causing injury to the right of possession. The Court examined the testimonial evidence and barangay certification and found that while there was some disagreement on the precise date, both sides were referring to the same entry incident.

Application of Article 11 (Justifying Circumstances) to the Facts

The Court applied the requisites of Article 11 (necessity to avoid an evil or injury): (1) that an evil actually existed (flooding from an open faucet creating damage to the leased unit/owner’s property); (2) that the injury feared (continued flooding and damage to the property) was greater than the injury done (entry into the unit to turn off the faucet); and (3) that there were no other practical and less harmful means to prevent the injury. The barangay certification, petitioner’s credible account of discovering continuous water flow, and Albano’s admission that the unit was largely vacant supported the conclusion that an exigent situation existed and that petitioner’s entry was remedial to prevent further property damage.

Court’s Consideration of Alternative Measures and Intent

The Office of the Solicitor General argued alternatives (such as closing an inlet valve) and that the flooding did not threaten life or property sufficiently to justify entry. The Supreme Court addre

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