Title
Martinez y Festin vs. Morfe
Case
G.R. No. L-34022
Decision Date
Mar 24, 1972
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention challenged arrest warrants, claiming parliamentary immunity. The Supreme Court ruled immunity applies only to civil cases, not criminal prosecutions, ensuring equal treatment under the law.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-34022)

Factual Background of Bautista, Sr.

Bautista, Sr. took office as a Convention delegate on June 1, 1971. Two criminal complaints under the Election Code were filed against him by a defeated aspirant for distributing free goods at public meetings. After a preliminary investigation, the trial court issued warrants of arrest. Bautista invoked his claimed immunity in an August 14, 1971 motion; the court deferred but ultimately denied relief and ordered his arrest. He filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition on September 15, 1971.

Legal Issue: Scope of Parliamentary Immunity

Both petitioners contended that, as Convention delegates entitled to parliamentary immunities, they were immune from arrest except for treason, felony, and breach of the peace. They argued that Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code further expanded this immunity by penalizing officials who arrested legislators for offenses punishable by less than prision mayor. The Solicitor General maintained that the constitutional immunity applies only to civil arrests and that any broader grant in the Penal Code is inoperative.

Constitutional Provision and Textual Scope

Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution exempts legislators from arrest “in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace.” A felony is defined as any act or omission punishable by law, and breach of the peace covers all offenses against public order. The immunity therefore does not extend to criminal prosecutions.

Constitutional Convention Debates and American Precedent

The 1934–1935 Convention adopted language mirroring the Philippine Autonomy Act and the U.S. Constitution. Debate records show that delegates understood “treason, felony, and breach of the peace” to exclude all criminal offenses. U.S. jurisprudence (e.g., Williamson v. United States, 1908) confirms that this phrase leaves only civil processes within its protection.

Inconsistency of Article 145, Revised Penal Code

Article 145 RPC, enacted in 1932, predates the 1935 Constitution. Under the transitional clause of the Constitution, preexisting laws remain operative only if consistent with the Constitution. Article 145’s attempted expansion of immunity to cover certain criminal arrests conflicts with the clear constitutional text and purpose. Supreme Court precedents (People v. Linsangan; De los Santos v. Mallare) hold that statutes inconsistent with the Constitution become inoperative upon inauguration of the Commonwealth.

Policy Considerations and Public Interest

While preserving legislative independence is vital, granting absolute immunity from criminal arrest would create

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