Title
Martelino vs. Estrella
Case
G.R. No. L-15927
Decision Date
Apr 29, 1963
A cabaret's permit was revoked for operating near chapels, deemed "churches" under Republic Act No. 1224, as they held regular religious services. The Supreme Court upheld the closure, affirming the law's broad interpretation of places of worship.
cabaret
churches
religious services
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-27277)

Parties and Setting

Martelino operated, or sought to operate, the Tropical Night Spot cabaret within Makati, Rizal. Mayor Estrella had earlier granted a permit consistent with the municipal council’s approval, but later directed closure of the cabaret following directives from the Executive Secretary, relayed through the provincial governor. The case reached the Court after the trial court dissolved the preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition for prohibition, holding that the cabaret violated Republic Act No. 1224 based on the proximity of religious establishments.

Factual Background

On April 1, 1956, the Municipal Council of Makati approved Martelino’s application by Resolution No. 94 to reopen the Tropical Night Spot cabaret. Pursuant to this resolution, the Mayor issued the corresponding permit. On January 22, 1957, the Executive Secretary, through the provincial governor, informed the Mayor that, based on records in the Executive Secretary’s office, there were two buildings within 200 meters from the cabaret that were being used for school purposes, and that this situation made the cabaret’s operation violative of Republic Act No. 1224. The Mayor was enjoined to revoke the permit.

The Mayor sought reconsideration by stating that a municipal council-created committee had investigated and found that the classroom annex previously near the cabaret site had already been transferred to a far away barrio. Subsequently, the provincial governor again wrote to the Mayor, stating that a survey by his office showed that the cabaret was located 191.50 meters from the F. Benitez Elementary School Annex, 37.30 meters from a Catholic chapel, and 178 meters from a chapel of the Iglesia ni Kristo. The Mayor was again enjoined to comply with the directive of the Executive Secretary.

Accordingly, the Mayor sent Martelino a letter ordering him to close the cabaret. Martelino did not comply. Instead, on April 2, 1957, he filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction, praying that the closure order be declared null and void for being issued without or in excess of authority or with grave abuse of discretion, and that the Mayor be restrained from enforcing it. A preliminary writ was issued before trial.

Trial Court Proceedings

The Court of First Instance found that although there was no school within the 200-meter radius from the cabaret, there were two chapels within the prohibited distance. It therefore held that the establishment of Martelino’s cabaret violated Republic Act No. 1224. Based on this conclusion, the trial court dismissed the petition and dissolved the preliminary injunction.

Appellate History and Scope of Review

The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Court, expressing that no factual question was involved. The certification, however, included a clear recital of the facts, indicating that the controversy largely turned on the interpretation of statutory language rather than on contested factual findings.

The Parties' Contentions

On appeal, the sole issue was whether two chapels located within a 200-meter radius of the cabaret could be considered churches within the meaning of Section 1 of Republic Act 938, as amended. Martelino argued for a strict construction. He maintained that the statute referred to “churches” and not “chapels.” He also invoked the statutory construction principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, contending that the omission of the term “chapels” should be taken to exclude chapels from the statutory coverage.

The Mayor, through the enforcement of the administrative directive and the trial court’s ruling, treated the chapels as churches within the meaning of the law’s proximity restriction.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court examined the statutory text and focused on the meaning of the term “churches.” It consulted Webster’s Third International Dictionary, which defined “chapel” as a “small house or subordinate place of worship,” including religious services held in a sanctuary that is Christian in character and subordinate to a principal church, as well as a private place of worship. The Court reasoned that when the law speaks of “churches,” it includes places suited to regular religious worship. It further relied on a definition found in 7 Words and Phrases as a “place where persons regularly assemble for worship,” citing Stubbs vs. Texas Liquor Control Board (Tex. Cir. Appl., 166 S.W. 2d 178, 180).

The Court acknowledged that not all chapels necessarily qualify as churches contemplated by the statute. It explained that some chapels may not hold religious services regularly. Those chapel types, where regular religious services are absent, would not fall under the law’s concept of a church.

On the record, the Court stated that the two chapels were intended for the regular holding of religious services, as found both by the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals. As to the Iglesia ni Kristo chapel, the Court noted that although it was alleged to be located on a borrowed lot, it had its own pastor and regular services were held until a permanent one was built. Regarding the Catholic chapel, the Court described its evolution from a camalig in 1947 to a more permanent structure, and it stated that beginning in 1954 mass was celebrated there every Sunday and on special occasions through the initiative of members of the Catholic Action. The Court viewed these descriptions as showing no serious difference between the chapels and a church, aside from size or subordination to a principal church.

The Court emphasized that the essential characteristic of a church was devotion of the place to religious services held with regularity, not the size of the building or congregation. Thus, the labeling of the buildings as “chapel” did not defeat the statutory prohibition.

The Court further supported its interpretation by reference to Delgado, et al. vs. Koque, et al., G. R.

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