G.R. No. 218534 - Marquez vs. Mayo

Case Summary (G.R. No. 218534)

Factual Background

The administrative case originated in a complaint filed by Annaliza F. Daguio before the Office of the Chief, PNP, docketed as NHQ-AC-363-011413 (DIDM-ADM-13-04), against PO2 Mayo for grave misconduct. The complaint alleged that at about 9:00 a.m. on January 25, 2012, PO2 Mayo and other police personnel—SPO3 Menalyn Turalba, PO3 Jose (SPO3 Turalba’s husband), and PO1 Elizalde Visaya—went to Annaliza’s iron workshop at No. 4 Daisy Street, Purok 6-C, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City to dismantle a bomb wrapped in red cloth using a pipe wrench, but failed. According to the allegations, SPO3 Turalba and Annaliza cautioned PO2 Mayo and the other officers to stop because the bomb could explode, after which the police officers left and returned at about 2:00 p.m.

Thereafter, the police officers requested Cruzaldo Daguio, Annaliza’s husband, to spot the bomb using a welding torch. Cruzaldo refused, warning that the bomb might explode, but the officers persuaded him by claiming the officers were bomb experts. While Cruzaldo was spotting the tip of the bomb, it exploded, killing Cruzaldo and PO1 Visaya on the spot, and wounding nine (9) civilians. PO2 Mayo, PO3 Jose, and Liza Q. Grimaldo were rushed to the hospital; PO3 Jose and Grimaldo were pronounced dead on arrival, and various properties were destroyed.

The record also showed that PO2 Mayo failed to file an answer or counter-affidavit despite being served with summons and notices of pre-hearing conference at his office in the PNP Special Action Force (SAF).

Administrative Disciplinary Proceedings and Issuance of Dismissal

In a Decision dated October 11, 2013, Police Director General Alan La Madrid Purisima, then Chief of the PNP, found PO2 Mayo guilty of grave misconduct and imposed dismissal from the PNP service. The Decision characterized the penalty as the extreme sanction and noted aggravating circumstances, including PO2 Mayo’s alleged taking advantage of his official position as a member of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal of the SAF and that the incident occurred during office hours.

PO2 Mayo filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 2, 2014, asserting denial of due process and lack of opportunity to present evidence, lack of a chance to answer the accusations, and lack of jurisdiction of the Chief of the PNP under the alleged “Principle of Exclusivity,” contending that the first disciplinary authority was the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of the SAF. In a Resolution dated November 26, 2014, the Office of the Chief, PNP denied the motion. It found that PO2 Mayo had been duly notified because he was served with summons and notices but still failed to submit an answer or counter-affidavit. It likewise rejected the Principle of Exclusivity theory on the ground that the IAS was not a disciplinary authority.

PO2 Mayo then filed an appeal before NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM) National Appellate Board on January 27, 2015 seeking reversal of the Decision and the Resolution.

Implementation of Dismissal and RTC Injunction

Pursuant to the October 11, 2013 Decision and the November 26, 2014 Resolution, the PNP issued S.O. No. 9999 dated December 29, 2014, dismissing PO2 Mayo from the service effective October 11, 2013. PO2 Mayo alleged that he learned of the S.O. only on January 30, 2015 when he was not allowed to renew his PNP identification card due to administrative problems arising from the case.

As the S.O. was about to be implemented, PO2 Mayo filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Manila, raffled to Branch 32 and docketed as Civil Case No. 15-132998. He argued that the S.O. was void because the October 11, 2013 Decision was not yet final and executory while his appeal to NAPOLCOM was pending, and because, under NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular (NMC) No. 2007-001, filing of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal would stay execution of the disciplinary action.

The RTC issued an Order dated February 9, 2015 granting a temporary restraining order (TRO) pending resolution. The PNP, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration, but the RTC denied it in an Order dated March 3, 2015. On March 18, 2015, the RTC rendered a Decision granting the injunction and declaring S.O. No. 9999 void.

The RTC anchored its reasoning on Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975, as amended, particularly construing that although disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal are generally final and executory, the provisos imply a different character upon the filing of an appeal to the appellate board. The RTC reasoned that finality and executory character should attach only if no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed within the period. It further held that an appeal to NAPOLCOM stayed execution unless the appellate board failed to act within sixty (60) days, and it also interpreted NMC No. 2007-001 as supporting the staying effect of appeal.

The PNP moved for reconsideration of the RTC Decision, but the RTC denied the motion in an Order dated June 1, 2015, prompting the present Rule 45 petition before the Supreme Court.

Issues Raised and Parties’ Positions

The sole issue was whether S.O. No. 9999, imposing dismissal on PO2 Mayo based on the PNP Chief’s Decision and Resolution, was immediately executory pending PO2 Mayo’s appeal before the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board.

The petitioner contended that (a) Section 45 of R.A. No. 6975 did not provide that inaction by the appellate board within sixty (60) days would render a decision final and executory in the case of an appeal before the National Appellate Board; (b) NMC No. 2007-001 allegedly required only a motion for reconsideration to stay execution; and (c) PNP Circular No. 2008-013 allowed execution of S.O. No. 9999 pending appeal.

PO2 Mayo, in opposition, argued that the petition had become moot due to the subsequent issuance of S.O. No. 2158, which cancelled S.O. No. 9999, and that the petitioner was estopped from contesting the dismissal because it was the petitioner who caused the cancellation. On the merits, he reiterated his position that decisions implementing disciplinary actions must await issuance of a certificate of finality since the case was still pending appeal.

Supreme Court’s Disposition and Resolution of Mootness

The Court did not accept PO2 Mayo’s claim of mootness and estoppel. It found that S.O. No. 2158 dated March 23, 2015 cancelled PO2 Mayo’s dismissal primarily because of the injunction issued by the RTC. The Court held that the petitioner was not at fault for complying with an injunction, noting that judgments in actions for injunction are executory even pending appeal, and implementing the enjoined dismissal could have exposed the party implementing it to indirect contempt.

The Court also identified an error in the RTC’s reasoning concerning when a decision becomes final and executory. It clarified that the RTC’s interpretation misapplied Section 45 of R.A. No. 6975: the clause relating to failure to act within sixty days pertains only to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB). It is not applicable where the appeal was filed before the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board (NAB).

Legal Basis and Reasoning on Immediate Executory Effect

The Court rejected the petitioner’s position that the PNP Chief’s Decision and Resolution were immediately executory while an appeal was seasonably pending before the NAB. The Court stated that the governing framework on the finality of disciplinary actions against PNP members was Section 45 of R.A. No. 6975, as amended, and that it contains a general rule that disciplinary actions are final and executory, but qualifies this rule through provisos for appeals in dismissal cases.

The Court further addressed NMC No. 2007-001, reproducing the parallel provision on finality and emphasizing that disciplinary decisions are subject to the specified appeal process. It cited its ruling in NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board v. P/Inp. John A. Mamauag, where it held that Section 45 makes disciplinary actions final and executory, but makes them appealable only when the penalty involves demotion or dismissal, and the provisos govern the appeal effect.

The Court held that the petitioner’s argument that only a motion for reconsideration can stay execution was misplaced. It agreed with the RTC’s approach that NMC No. 2007-001’s statement that filing a motion for reconsideration “shall stay execution” does not foreclose other modes of staying execution. The Court reasoned that the general rule is that only final judgments may be executed, and that executions pending appeal are exceptions that must be strictly construed. It found that these principles apply because NMC No. 2007-001 expressly provides that the Rules of Court are suppletorily applicable. Accordingly, when appeal is seasonably filed to the NAB, the dismissal is neither immediately final nor immediately executory.

Treatment of Prior Summary Dismissal Doctrine

The Court acknowledged Jenny Zacarias v. National Police Commission, which held that summary dismissals by the PNP Chief under Section 42 of R.A. No. 6975, as amended, are immediately executory. The Court, however, explained that Zacarias relied on then-existing NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular provisions—specifically NAPOLCOM M.C. No. 92-006—that expressly provided immediate executory effect for summary dismissal authorities. It noted that those circulars were repealed, and that later circulars, including NMC No. 2007-001 and NMC No. 2016-002, did not expressly continue the immediate executory rule for summary dismissals.

Effect of Supervening Events: Dismissal Confirmed and Executory

Although the Court rejected the RTC’s legal framework on immediate executory effect during pending appeal before the NAB, it recognized that subsequent developments had occurred. It noted the petitioner’s Manifes

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 218534)

Parties and Procedural Posture

The petitioner Police Director General Ricardo C. Marquez, in his capacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
The respondent PO2 Arnold P. Mayo was the disciplinary subject dismissed from the PNP service.
The petition assailed the RTC, Branch 32 of the City of Manila Decision and Order rendered in Civil Case No. 15-132998.
The RTC Decision granted respondent’s petition for injunction and declared Special Order (S.O.) No. 9999 void.
The RTC initially granted a temporary restraining order (TRO), and later denied the PNP’s motion for reconsideration of the TRO-related order.
The petition before the Court raised a pure question of law on whether dismissal ordered by the Chief of the PNP was immediately executory while the appeal was pending before the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board (NAB).
During the Supreme Court proceedings, the Court considered supervening facts relating to the resolution of respondent’s appeal before the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG).

Key Factual Allegations

Respondent PO2 Mayo was charged with grave misconduct based on a complaint filed by Annaliza F. Daguio before the Office of the Chief, PNP, docketed as NHQ-AC-363-011413 (DIDM-ADM-13-04).
The complaint alleged that on January 25, 2012, around 9:00 a.m., respondent and several police officers went to Annaliza’s iron workshop to dismantle a bomb wrapped in red cloth using a pipe wrench, but they failed to do so.
The complaint alleged that SPO3 Turalba and Annaliza told respondent to stop because the bomb might explode, and the police officers left and later returned around 2:00 p.m..
The police officers then requested Cruzaldo Daguio, Annaliza’s husband, to spot the bomb with a welding torch, and he initially refused because the bomb might explode.
The police officers allegedly persuaded him by representing that the bomb would not explode because they were bomb experts.
While Cruzaldo was spotting the tip of the bomb, it suddenly exploded, killing Cruzaldo and PO1 Visaya on the spot and wounding nine (9) civilians.
The incident also allegedly caused property destruction.
Respondent and others were rushed to the hospital, and the complaint alleged PO3 Jose and Grimaldo were pronounced dead on arrival.
The complaint alleged respondent failed to file an answer or counter-affidavit despite summons and notices of pre-hearing conference served at his PNP office at the PNP Special Action Force (SAF).

Administrative Disciplinary History

In a Decision dated October 11, 2013, Police Director General Alan La Madrid Purisima, then Chief of the PNP, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct.
The Chief imposed the extreme penalty of dismissal from the PNP service.
The Chief allegedly aggravated the penalty by respondent’s taking advantage of his official position as a member of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal of the SAF, and because the incident occurred during office hours.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 2, 2014, arguing denial of due process, lack of opportunity to present evidence, and lack of opportunity to answer accusations.
Respondent also invoked the “Principle of Exclusivity”, contending that the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) was the first disciplinary authority to acquire jurisdiction.
The Office of the Chief, PNP denied the motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated November 26, 2014, finding no denial of due process because respondent had been duly notified yet failed to file an answer or counter-affidavit.
The Resolution also rejected the “Principle of Exclusivity” argument because the IAS was held not to be a disciplinary authority.
Respondent appealed to the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board on January 27, 2015 seeking reversal.
In implementation, the PNP issued S.O. No. 9999 dated December 29, 2014, dismissing respondent effective October 11, 2013.
Respondent claimed he learned of the S.O. only on January 30, 2015 when denied renewal of his PNP identification card.

Injunction Proceedings in RTC

Respondent filed a Petition for Injunction with prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC of the City of Manila, Branch 32, docketed as Civil Case No. 15-132998.
Respondent argued that S.O. No. 9999 was void because the Decision of October 11, 2013 was not yet final and executory due to his pending appeal before the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board.
Respondent further argued that execution violated NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 2007-001 (NMC No. 2007-001), which allegedly provides that filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal stays execution.
The RTC issued an Order dated February 9, 2015 granting the TRO pending resolution of the main injunction action.
After the PNP, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration, the RTC denied it in its Order dated March 3, 2015.
The RTC later issued its main Decision dated March 18, 2015, declaring S.O. No. 9999 void and granting the injunction.
Respondent’s RTC theory, as adopted in part, emphasized statutory and regulatory rules on finality and the effect of seasonably filed appeals and motions.
The RTC ultimately ruled that an appeal stayed execution unless the appellate board failed to act within sixty (60) days, and that S.O. No. 9999 should be declared void because the Chief’s decision was not yet final and executory.

Issues Presented to Supreme Court

The sole issue before the Court was whether S.O. No. 9999, imposing dismissal from the service pursuant to the Chief of the PNP’s Decision and Resolution, was immediately executory pending respondent’s appeal before the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board.
The controversy required harmonizing Section 45 of R.A. No. 6975 with NAPOLCOM M.C. No. 2007-001, particularly regarding when a dismissal becomes final and executory and the effect of a pending appeal.
The Court also had to address whether to correct the RTC’s pronouncement on the sixty (60) days rule