Title
Mariano vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 101522
Decision Date
May 28, 1993
A co-owner redeemed a foreclosed property, sold it, and triggered a legal dispute over co-ownership and redemption rights under Articles 1088 and 1620 of the Civil Code.
redemption
written notice
legal redemption

Case Summary (G.R. No. 101522)

Factual Background: Mortgage, Foreclosure, Redemption, and Subsequent Sales

The records established that Francisco Gosiengfiao mortgaged the lot to the Rural Bank on several dates, with the last being January 29, 1958. Francisco died intestate on August 15, 1958, survived by heirs, including Antonia (wife) and their children, among whom were the private respondents. Because the loan remained unpaid, the Rural Bank foreclosed the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale held on December 27, 1963, the bank acquired the lot as the highest bidder.

A redemption was made by Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra. On February 7, 1964, she redeemed the property by paying P1,347.89, and the balance of P423.35 was paid on December 28, 1964. Thereafter, on September 10, 1965, Antonia Gosiengfiao, on her own behalf and for minor children Emma and Lina and other children including Carlos and Severino, executed a Deed of Assignment of the Right of Redemption in favor of Amparo G. Ibarra. The deed reflected the arrangement in a notarial register entry dated 1965.

On August 15, 1966, Amparo Gosiengfiao sold the property to Leonardo Mariano. The deed of sale indicated that Antonia and other heirs had signed as signatories. Leonardo later lived on the lot. In 1982, Grace Gosiengfiao allegedly learned of the sale. She then approached the Barangay Captain seeking a confrontation and to assert her claim. On November 27, 1982, the Barangay Captain issued a certificate to file action. On December 8, 1982, Leonardo sold the property to his children, Lazaro F. Mariano and Dionicia M. Aquino, through a deed of sale notarized in 1982.

Trial Court Proceedings: Dismissal Based on Ownership and Loss of Redemption Rights

On December 21, 1982, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession and legal redemption with damages against Leonardo and Avelina Mariano. Respondents alleged that, as co-heirs and co-owners who had not sold their shares, they were entitled to recover their respective shares and to redeem the shares of other co-owners who had allegedly sold to the defendants.

The defendants answered that respondents had no cause of action because the redemption money came solely from Amparo’s personal funds, which allegedly made Amparo the sole owner and thus entitled her to sell the entire property. Defendants further argued that even assuming co-ownership, respondents’ right of redemption was already barred either by the Statute of Limitations under Article 1144 or by laches.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Branch I, dismissed the complaint by decision dated September 16, 1986. The trial court ruled that respondents had no right of ownership or possession over the lot. It reasoned that upon foreclosure and sale, heirs’ rights were reduced to a right of redemption. It then held that when Amparo redeemed the lot using her own money, she became the sole owner; consequently, respondents who failed to redeem the property from the bank or from Amparo lost whatever rights they previously had.

Court of Appeals Ruling: Redemption by a Co-Owner Inures to All Co-Heirs

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. It focused on whether a co-owner who redeems the entire property using her own personal funds becomes the sole owner and thereby terminates the co-ownership. The appellate court recognized that because the property had been mortgaged, co-ownership existed among the heirs during the legal redemption period after foreclosure.

The Court of Appeals held that redemption of the whole property by a co-owner did not vest exclusive ownership in the redeeming co-owner. Instead, it inured to the benefit of all co-heirs and did not put an end to co-ownership. It emphasized that redemption is not a mode of terminating co-ownership. As it found it undisputed that Amparo redeemed within the one-year redemption period, it concluded that even assuming Amparo used her own funds, she did not become the exclusive owner of the mortgaged property co-owned by the heirs. The Court of Appeals contrasted this with a situation where the buyer would purchase the property from the mortgagee bank after the redemption period and after the bank could consolidate title, which would terminate the co-ownership concept.

Issues Raised by Petitioners: Article 1088 Versus Article 1620 and Alleged Untimeliness

Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied Article 1620 instead of Article 1088 of the Civil Code. They relied on the claim that the lot formed part of the intestate estate of Francisco Gosiengfiao and was never the subject of partition or distribution among the heirs; thus, private respondents allegedly had not ceased to be co-heirs. Based on that premise, petitioners contended that the redemption mechanism applicable was that under Article 1088, which prescribes redemption within one month from the time the heirs were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

Petitioners further invoked the doctrine in Conejero, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. that giving a copy of a deed is equivalent to the written notice required by law. They asserted that respondents failed to exercise the right of redemption within the period allowed.

Supreme Court’s Discussion: Written Notice and the Inapplicability of Conejero on the Evidence

The Court did not dispute the principle from Conejero regarding equivalence between furnishing a copy of the deed and the written notice required by law. However, it held that the factual setting differed. It found that the records showed no written notice of the sale being given to the private respondents.

Petitioners alleged that around October 31, 1982, Grace Gosiengfiao was given a copy of the deed and shown it at the Barangay Captain’s office on November 18, 1982. The Court found this allegation unsupported. It relied on Grace’s testimony, in which she stated that she asked about the deed of sale and was shown a deed and the names of the legal heirs, but she asserted that she was never informed in writing, and that she was never given a copy of the deed of sale. She further testified that she asked for an exact copy to show that her signature was not included, and that the defendants insisted the lot was theirs because of the deed of sale.

The Court noted that the testimony was not refuted by Dr. Mariano, who had been present before the Barangay Captain. It treated the requirement of written notice as settled by Castillo v. Samonte, which quoted Hernaez v. Hernaez: the Civil Code’s text demanded a specific written notice, and neither letter nor spirit allowed expanding it to verbal notice or other forms of information. The Court also referenced that Article 1088 required written notice and that the absence of any statutory alternative made written notice indispensable. In line with Garcia v. Calaliman, the Court reiterated that even actual knowledge obtained through other means would not dispense with the written notice requirement, because the law required written notice to remove uncertainty about the sale and to quiet any doubt that the alienation was definitive.

Tender, Consignation, and Timing: Redemption Exercised at the First Opportunity

The Court also addressed petitioners’ argument that respondents could not validly redeem because of failure to consign the full redemption price after tender was rejected. It ruled that consignation was not necessary in this context. It reasoned that the tender of payment was made not to discharge an obligation but to enforce a right, and that prior jurisprudence held consignation unnecessary when the tender is made on time and the remedy to enforce involves an action to compel reconveyance. The Court thus treated the tender and subsequent action as sufficient to preserve the right.

Further, the Court noted that petitioners themselves had adopted allegations from respondents’ complaint that in October 1982 respondents attempted redemption by tendering P12,000.00 to petitioners, which petitioners rejected. It concluded that respondents exercised their right of redemption at the first opportunity by tendering the repurchase price and that the complaint before the Barangay Captain and then before the trial court was necessary to enforce the right.

Applying Castillo v. Samonte, the Court observed that reimbursement within the one-month period from written notice was a condition precedent to the exercise of the right of legal redemption, while the bringing of an action in court served as the remedy to enforce it if the purchaser refused. Since written notice had not been shown to have been given, the Court held that the 30-day period under Article 1088 had not even begun to run. Consequently, respondents’ redemption rights were not lost.

Legal Basis and Reasoning: Effect of Redemption and Limits of Redemption Periods

The Court’s reasoning harmonized the effect of redemption on co-ownership with the statutory safeguards governing legal redemption by h

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