Title
Mari vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 127694
Decision Date
May 31, 2000
A co-worker, after borrowing and returning incomplete files, assaulted a female colleague, leading to a conviction for serious slander by deed, later modified to a fine.
serious slander by deed
penalty modification
fine

Case Summary (G.R. No. 127694)

Factual Background

The Court of Appeals found that complainant and petitioner worked as co-employees in the Department of Agriculture in Digos. On December 6, 1991, petitioner borrowed from complainant the records of his service file. Three days later, when petitioner returned the records, complainant discovered that several papers were missing, including official communications from the Civil Service Commission and the Regional Office of the Department of Agriculture, as well as a copy of a complaint filed by the Rural Bank of Digos against petitioner. Complainant, acting on the instruction of her superior officer, Honorio Lumain, sent petitioner a memorandum directing him to explain why his file had been returned with missing documents.

Rather than acknowledging receipt, petitioner confronted complainant and angrily shouted at her using offensive language: “Putang ina, bullshit, bugo.” The Court of Appeals further found that petitioner banged a chair in front of complainant and choked her. A security guard intervened and petitioner was prevailed upon to desist from further injuring complainant. Petitioner’s defense was that he borrowed his service record rather than his 201 file and that he did not choke complainant. He also claimed that complainant provoked him into acting as he did, so his acts were merely a reaction to provocation.

Proceedings in the Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals

On January 7, 1992, complainant filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Digos, Davao del Sur a criminal complaint for slander by deed. On May 20, 1992, she filed an amended criminal complaint adding that the crime was aggravated because the offended party was a woman.

After trial, on September 22, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court convicted petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. It credited one “ordinary aggravating circumstance” and imposed an indeterminate sentence of five (5) months and eleven (11) days to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days, and ordered petitioner to pay P5,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to reimburse the cost of suit, while requiring complainant to pay the docket fee corresponding to the damages she was entitled to receive.

Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court. On December 1, 1995, the Regional Trial Court adopted the findings of fact of the Municipal Trial Court and affirmed the appealed decision in toto. Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review on June 18, 1996. On December 9, 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty, imposing an indeterminate sentence of one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as maximum.

Issues Raised on Appeal

Petitioner assailed the conviction on factual grounds, particularly the Court of Appeals’ finding that he shouted invectives at complainant in the presence of several persons and then choked her. He argued that the prosecution failed to prove the choking and that it appeared to be an after-thought, citing claimed inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. The Court treated the challenge as raising an issue of fact.

The Court’s Treatment of Factual Findings

The Court held that an appeal via certiorari does not warrant review of factual issues. It ruled that the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial evidence, were conclusive and binding. It further stated that such findings would be reviewable only if exceptions applied, such as when the lower courts made diverse factual findings or when the findings were entirely grounded on speculation. The Court found that petitioner failed to establish that his case fell under any exception.

Errors on the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the Aggravating Circumstance

Despite sustaining the conviction, the Court recognized that the lower courts committed reversible error in the proper application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The Municipal Trial Court had found the attendance of an “ordinary aggravating circumstance” but did not specify what it was. The amended complaint alleged that the offense was aggravated because the offended party was a woman. The Court ruled that the victim’s being a woman, by itself, does not automatically constitute an aggravating circumstance. It required proof that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the offended woman, or showed manifest disrespect to her womanhood, or displayed a specific insult or disrespect to her womanhood. The Court found no such finding and no evidence of a specific circumstance showing insult or disregard of sex beyond the mere fact of the victim’s sex. It therefore concluded that the aggravating circumstance was not proved and should not have been credited.

The Court also held that the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals failed to correct this error. The Regional Trial Court did not make its own findings of fact and simply adopted the trial court’s findings. The Court of Appeals also did not notice the error, even though the Solicitor General had pointed out in his comment that the penalty imposed on the accused was excessive, indicating that no aggravating circumstance was properly proved.

Correct Calibration of the Minimum and Maximum Terms

The Court then explained the rules governing sentencing under the Indeterminate Sentence Law for offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. It ruled that courts must fix both a minimum and a maximum term. The maximum term must be that which could be imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code considering attending circumstances. The minimum term must be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law for the offense, and the minimum is fixed without regard to modifying circumstances.

In applying these rules, the Court noted that in this case there was no modifying circumstance. Accordingly, the maximum penalty could only fall within the range of the medium period of the prescribed penalty. It identified the statutory penalty for serious slander by deed under Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code as arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months), or a fine of P200.00 to P1,000.00. The penalty next lower in degree was arresto mayor in the minimum and medium periods, corresponding to one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months.

Applying the foregoing, the Court reasoned that the minimum should be fixed within the arresto mayor minimum and medium range. It stated that while the trial court imposed a five-month minimum, this exceeded the range of the minimum term allowed by law. It held that the Court of Appeals’ minimum term of one (1) month and one (1) day was correct.

On the maximum term, the Court concluded that the trial court’s maximum of two (2) years, elev

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