G.R. No. 70746-47 - Marcos vs. Ruiz

Case Summary (G.R. No. 70746-47)

Criminal Charges and Pre-Trial Developments

On 2 August 1984, Acting 2nd Assistant City Fiscal Lorenzo A. Lopena filed two informations before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch II, charging petitioner with violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The alleged transactions occurred on 5 July 1983 in Tagbilaran City. The informations asserted that, knowing he lacked sufficient funds with the Far East Bank and Trust Company (Cebu North Proclamation Area Branch), petitioner delivered to Fulgencia Oculam as payment for jewelry taken by petitioner’s wife, Anacleta Marcos, two checks each in the amount of P3,000.00. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 3890 and No. 3892.

Petitioner posted a surety bond for temporary liberty. The initial arraignment was set for 12 November 1984, and petitioner appeared but requested a reset because his lawyer had just withdrawn and he needed another counsel. The trial court granted the request and reset arraignment to 29 November 1984. In the interim, petitioner settled his obligation with the offended party. On 3 November 1984, the offended party executed an Affidavit of Desistance before Notary Public Paulino G. Clarin, stating among others that she had no ground to continue the prosecution, that she was willing to have the cases dismissed with the consent of the respondent or accused, and that the affidavit could be used by the City Fiscal for the dismissal of the cases.

On the morning of 12 November 1984, Acting 2nd Assistant City Fiscal Lopena filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 3892 on the ground that the complaining witness had turned hostile and showed manifest lack of interest to prosecute, as evidenced by her affidavit of desistance. The prosecution also asserted that without the complaining witness’s testimony, the case could not be prosecuted successfully. The motion bore the approval of Acting 1st Assistant City Fiscal Miguel Relampagos, and petitioner’s consent was expressly stated. The prosecution requested that the motion be set for resolution upon receipt by the clerk of court.

Arraignment, Trial Setting, and Non-Appearance on April Eighth

When the cases were called on 29 November 1984, petitioner and his counsel did not appear. The court received a telegram from petitioner’s wife, Lita Marcos, advising that petitioner was indisposed. Without any objection from the prosecution, the court cancelled the arraignment and reset it, together with the trial, to 7 and 8 February 1985.

On 7 February 1985, petitioner appeared with counsel Atty. Carlos Marcos. He was arraigned in both cases and entered pleas of not guilty. The court then set the trial for 8 April 1985 at 2:30 P.M. and 9 April 1985 at 8:30 A.M. Notice of the setting was given to the accused, counsel, and the Assistant City Fiscal in open court.

When the cases were called on 8 April 1985 in the afternoon, neither petitioner nor counsel appeared. The prosecution presented evidence ex parte and rested its case. The court issued an order forfeiting petitioner’s bond, directing the bondsman to show cause within thirty days why no judgment should issue against the bond, and declaring that because no evidence had been submitted by petitioner, the cases were deemed submitted for decision.

On 9 April 1985, the trial court received an urgent motion for resetting filed by petitioner’s counsel. The motion, dated 29 March 1985 and sent by registered mail, alleged that counsel had a prior legal commitment in Manila requiring personal attention, that it would be physically impossible for him to arrive on time, and that counsel prayed for resetting of the hearing to 13 and 14 May 1985. The motion addressed only the clerk of court and contained no notice of hearing to the prosecuting fiscal. On 23 April 1985, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 8 April 1985, asserting that petitioner believed the April 8 hearing would not proceed in view of the motion for resetting and the pending motion to dismiss; counsel also argued that the non-appearance should be treated as waiver rather than a basis for cancellation of the bond and urged that the motion to dismiss be resolved first.

Order Denying Reconsideration and Petition for Certiorari

On 29 April 1985, respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration. The court held that petitioner should not assume approval of the postponement; that petitioner was estopped from insisting on a ruling on the motion to dismiss because he had agreed to arraignment, pleaded not guilty, and did not question trial scheduling; and that the prosecution’s presentation of evidence amounted to abandonment of the motion.

A notice of promulgation was later issued on 3 May 1985, setting promulgation of sentence for 17 May 1985. Petitioner then filed the present petition on 14 May 1985, anchored on alleged denial of his right to confront witnesses and to be heard, and also challenged the trial court’s decision to proceed without resolving the motion to dismiss.

Issues Framed for Resolution

The Court framed the issues as whether respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or absence of jurisdiction in: (one) ordering arraignment and receiving the prosecution’s evidence without first resolving the motion to dismiss; (two) forfeiting the bail bond and allowing ex parte reception of prosecution evidence after petitioner’s failure to appear on 8 April 1985, treating it as waiver of petitioner’s right to present evidence; and (three) denying reconsideration of the April 8 order and proceeding with promulgation of judgment.

Disposition on the Motion to Dismiss: Withdrawal and Procedural Requirements

All parties agreed that the 12 November 1984 motion to dismiss was not resolved by the trial court. Respondent judge argued that petitioner was estopped because petitioner voluntarily appeared at arraignment, entered a plea, and agreed to trial scheduling, and because the prosecution, by presenting evidence, allegedly abandoned the motion. The Court rejected the estoppel rationale, holding that estoppel did not apply because the motion could still be resolved after arraignment, and because a grant would have benefitted petitioner by preventing refiling due to double jeopardy considerations. The Court also held that abandonment was not established as framed by the trial judge, but it clarified that the operative fact was that the prosecution orally withdrew the motion.

The Court relied on the transcript of stenographic notes of 7 February 1985, where Assistant City Fiscal Lopena stated in open court that, after conferring with the complaining witness, the latter manifested willingness to testify, and thus the prosecution was constrained to withdraw its motion to dismiss. The Court found this withdrawal was made in the presence of petitioner and his counsel, and neither raised any legal objection because they knew they lacked a basis to contest it. The Court, however, faulted respondent judge for failing to make an explicit written ruling on the oral withdrawal. It noted that orderly procedure required that actions on motions must not be left to conjecture but must be stated unequivocally in a manner akin to “black and white.”

Validity of Waiver by Non-Appearance and Proper Scope of Absentia Proceedings

The Court next addressed the consequences of petitioner’s failure to appear on 8 and 9 April 1985. It acknowledged that a person accused has the right to be present at every stage, but the absence may be waived. It invoked Art. III, Sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that after arraignment trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided the accused has been duly notified and the failure to appear is unjustifiable. It also cited Sections 2(c) and 1(c) of Rules 114 and 115, respectively, of the Rules of Court, which deem absence on a particular date, without justification despite due notice, a waiver of the right to be present during that trial, permitting trial to proceed in absentia.

On the record, petitioner failed to appear on 8 April 1985 despite due notice. The Court thus held that the trial court could not be faulted for believing the absence was unjustified at that time, particularly because the urgent motion for resetting had not yet been received by the court when the prosecution presented its evidence. Accordingly, a hearing in absentia was proper for purposes of proceeding on that date.

However, the Court held that respondent judge gravely abused discretion when he ordered forfeiture of the bail bond and required the bondsman to show cause why no judgment should issue against the bond. The Court explained that one condition for bail under Sec. 2(b), Rule 114 is that the accused shall appear whenever required by court or by the Rules of Court. Forfeiture is proper only when the presence of the accused is specifically required by the court or the Rules, and despite due notice to the bondsmen to produce him on a given date, the accused fails to appear as required. The Court found no showing that the court specifically required the bonding company to produce petitioner on 8 and 9 April 1985. It further noted that, given the nature of the offenses under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with the charged checks of face value P3,000.00 each and the statutory penalty range, the presence of the accused at those hearings was not indispensable under the Rules.

The Court clarified the Rules on when the accused must be present: at arraignment under Rule 116; at promulgation of judgment, subject to exceptions under Rule 120; and when the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. As those requirements were not shown to be triggered on the April 8-9 dates, the forfeiture portion was set aside.

Due Process, Arraignment Defects, and Counsel’s Procedural Conduct

The Court held that petitioner was not fully justified in claiming denial of due process. It first rejected the claim that he was arraigned over objectio

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 70746-47)

The case arose from a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Bienvenido O. Marcos sought to annul for nullity the Orders dated 8 April 1985 and 29 April 1985 issued by respondent Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, RTC Judge of the 7th Judicial Region, Tagbilaran City.
The 8 April 1985 Order treated petitioner’s failure to appear and his counsel’s conduct as a waiver to present evidence.
The 29 April 1985 Order denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the 8 April 1985 Order.
Petitioner also attacked the trial court’s conduct that culminated in the promulgation of judgment, evidenced by a Notice of Promulgation sent for 17 May 1985.
The constitutional framework applied was the 1987 Constitution, as the decision was promulgated in 1992.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Petitioner filed the certiorari petition on 14 May 1985 while the criminal cases were pending.
The Court required respondents to comment and later treated the comments as the answer, ordering the parties to submit memoranda.
The Office of the Solicitor General argued that the assailed Order was interlocutory and not appealable, and that petitioner was not denied due process.
The Court gave due course to the petition and enjoined the trial judge from promulgating judgment through a Temporary Restraining Order issued on 16 May 1985.
The issues were framed as whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or absence of jurisdiction in three specific respects.

Key Factual Allegations

Acting 2nd Assistant City Fiscal Lorenzo A. Lopena filed two informations with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol against petitioner for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The alleged offense dates were 5 July 1983 in the City of Tagbilaran.
The informations alleged that petitioner knew he did not have sufficient funds in his bank account with Far East Bank and Trust Company (Cebu North Proclamation Area Branch).
Petitioner allegedly delivered to Fulgencia Oculam two checks, each for P3,000.00, in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry taken by petitioner’s wife, Anacleta Marcos.
The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 3890 and No. 3892, raffled to Branch II.
Petitioner posted a surety bond for temporary liberty.
Arraignment was initially set for 12 November 1984, and it was reset to 29 November 1984 after petitioner sought postponement due to counsel withdrawal.
The complainant, Fulgencia Oculam, executed an Affidavit of Desistance on 3 November 1984, after petitioner settled the obligation.
The affidavit manifested her willingness to desist and stated that she possessed no ground to continue prosecution and would have the cases dismissed through the City Fiscal if utilized.

Motion to Dismiss Events

On 12 November 1984 at 10:00 A.M., Acting City Fiscal Lopena filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 3892 based on the complainant’s desistance.
The motion alleged that without the complaining witness’s testimony, the case could not be prosecuted successfully because there was no other evidence to prove guilt.
The motion bore the approval of Acting 1st Assistant City Fiscal Miguel Relampagos, acting for the absent Acting City Fiscal, and stated consent of petitioner.
When the cases were called on 29 November 1984, neither petitioner nor counsel appeared, and the court received a telegram from petitioner’s wife advising of petitioner’s indisposition.
Without prosecution objection, the court cancelled the arraignment and reset it along with trial to 7 and 8 February 1985.

Arraignment and Trial Setting

On 7 February 1985, petitioner appeared with counsel Atty. Carlos Marcos, and he was arraigned in both cases.
He entered a plea of not guilty in both cases.
The court set trial for 8 April 1985 at 2:30 P.M. and 9 April 1985 at 8:30 A.M., and it notified petitioner, counsel, and the Assistant City Fiscal in open court.
The Court later noted that the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 3892 was legally infirm due to the trial court’s handling of the reading and plea.

The 8 April 1985 Non-appearance

On 8 April 1985, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared when the cases were called in the afternoon.
The prosecution presented its evidence ex-parte, and it rested its case.
The trial court issued an Order on 8 April 1985 forfeiting petitioner’s bond, directing the bondsman Paramount Insurance Corp. to show cause why no judgment should be issued against the bond.
The trial court declared that because no evidence was submitted by petitioner, the cases were deemed submitted for decision.
The trial court received the urgent resetting request on 9 April 1985.

Counsel’s Urgent Resetting Request

Counsel’s urgent motion was dated 29 March 1985 but was sent by registered mail and received by the trial court on 9 April 1985.
The motion alleged counsel had a previous legal commitment in Manila, stated it would be physically impossible to arrive on time, and sought resetting.
The motion prayed for resetting to 13 and 14 May 1985 at the respective scheduled hours.
The motion lacked a notice of hearing to the prosecuting fiscal, and it merely requested the Branch Clerk of Court to submit it for the court’s immediate consideration.
On 23 April 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated 8 April 1985.
In the motion for reconsideration, counsel asserted petitioner believed the hearing would not proceed due to the resetting request and also because a motion to dismiss allegedly remained unresolved.
Counsel additionally claimed that petitioner’s non-appearance could still be considered as a waiver only and thus should not lead to cancellation of the bailbond.
Counsel also asserted the motion to dismiss should first be resolved before the court proceeded and noted that the accused was arraigned despite the motion to dismiss being pending.

Trial Court’s Denial of Reconsideration

On 29 April 1985, the trial court denied reconsideration.
The denial rested on the grounds that petitioner could not assume postponement would be granted, petitioner was estopped from insisting on a ruling on the motion to dismiss after he consented to arraignment and trial scheduling, and the prosecution’s evidence amounted to abandoning the motion.
The trial court proceeded to schedule promulgation, as shown by the Notice of Promulgation sent on 3 May 1985 for 17 May 1985.
Petitioner argued before the Court that he was denied due process because he was not allowed to confront witnesses and be heard.

Issues Presented

The petition raised three jurisdictional error theories framed as grave abuse of discretion:
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse in ordering arraignment and receiving the prosecution’s evidence without first resolving the motion to dismiss.
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse by forfeiting the bail bond and treating petitioner’s failure to appear as a waiver that allowed the prosecution to proceed ex-parte and for the court to declare that petitioner waived the right to present evidence.
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse in denying reconsideration and setting promulgation f