Title
Marcos vs. Cruz
Case
G.R. No. 46584
Decision Date
May 13, 1939
Petitioners charged with murder contested denial of preliminary investigation; Supreme Court ruled summary investigation under General Orders No. 58 sufficed, denying reconsideration.
preliminary investigation
due process of law
criminal law

Case Summary (G.R. No. 46584)

Factual Background

In criminal case No. 7447, the petitioners were charged with murder against one who in life was called Julio Nalundasan. The information was signed by the Provincial Fiscal of Laguna, who had been specially designated to represent the People, and it was submitted directly to respondent judge in Ilocos Norte. Upon receipt, respondent judge examined under oath the witnesses presented by the fiscal, Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin Rubio, and, being convinced that the offense had been committed and that the petitioners were probably responsible, respondent judge issued warrants of arrest.

The investigation then conducted by respondent judge conformed with sections 13 and 14 of General Orders No. 58 (with section 13 as last amended by Act No. 4178). After arrest, the petitioners sought to be admitted to bail. The fiscal opposed, leading to incidents culminating in a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, docketed as G. R. No. 46490. In that earlier ruling, the Supreme Court required that the petition to bail be set for trial at which both the prosecution and the defense would present evidence so that the court could determine whether the offense was bailable and whether the petitioners were entitled to bail.

Following that development, the court fixed bail at P 15,000 for Ferdinand Marcos and P 20,000 for each of the others. The petitioners posted the bonds and were released. Thereafter, the petitioners repeatedly demanded a preliminary investigation—four times—invoking Acts Nos. 194, 1450, and 1627. After hearing the new incident, the trial court denied the demand. It reasoned that the preliminary investigation contemplated by the petitioners had already been granted and conducted, because it was included in the earlier proceedings conducted under sections 13 and 14 of General Orders No. 58, and then set the case for trial on the merits.

At trial, the petitioners were arraigned, pleaded “not guilty,” and asked for separate trials. The court granted the request and proceeded with trial against the co-accused Quirino Lizardo. Before the prosecution adduced its evidence, the petitioners’ counsel informed the court that they did not waive their right to a preliminary investigation and that Lizardo went to trial only because he complied with the court’s order and to avoid contempt. The prosecution then presented its evidence, and after closure of the prosecution’s direct evidence, the petitioners again sought recourse through certiorari and mandamus, which the Supreme Court initially denied in the manner described at the outset.

The Parties’ Contentions on the Right to Preliminary Investigation

In seeking reconsideration, the petitioners advanced the central position that the preliminary investigation granted to them did not conform to that required either by sections 13 and 14 of General Orders No. 58 (as interpreted with their amendment) or by Acts Nos. 194, 1450, and 1627. They maintained that they remained entitled to a preliminary investigation on demand after bail had been posted and as the case proceeded, and they cited People vs. Solon (47 Phil., 443) and Payao vs. Judge Lesaca (35 Off. Gaz., p. 3), as well as Mariano Marcos et al. vs. Judge Roman A. Cruz (G. R. No. 46490, promulgated on January 24, 1939).

The Court noted that intervening counsel supported the petitioners’ interpretation and argued that the earlier “preliminary” proceedings conducted by respondent judge before the warrant of arrest were not the preliminary investigation mandated by the later statutes, and therefore did not extinguish the petitioners’ right to the later, fuller proceeding.

Statutory Framework and Doctrinal Discussion

The Court examined the language of section 13 and section 14 of General Orders No. 58. It emphasized that section 13 required the magistrate to examine under oath the prosecutor or informant and witnesses and to take their depositions in writing, to decide whether to order arrest, and—if the offense was bailable—to accept sufficient security and release the accused, otherwise to commit them. Section 14 addressed the situation where the evidence submitted did not support the conclusion that the crime was committed or that the person charged was responsible; in that event, the magistrate had to release the accused, while preserving the State’s ability to file a new complaint before prosecution would be barred, and allowing fiscal appeal from the order of release with measures to prevent escape.

The Court then addressed Acts Nos. 194, 1450, and 1627, particularly Act No. 194. It explained that the Acts defined and clarified what a “preliminary investigation” meant and prescribed the procedure. In the Court’s analysis, the Acts established a two-part proceeding: first, an examination of a sworn complaint and the magistrate’s determination based on allegations and the magistrate’s personal knowledge that a crime had been committed and that the accused was probably guilty, which then justified the issuance of an order of arrest; and second, after the accused had been brought before the justice of the peace upon the arrest order, the accused was to be informed of the charge, asked to plead, and—if the accused pleaded not guilty and did not waive the preliminary investigation—witnesses were examined under oath in the presence of the accused, with rights to cross-examine, and with provisions for the accused’s own testimony, rebuttal, and the reduction of evidence to writing.

Accordingly, the Court held that the purpose of preliminary investigation was to secure the accused against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect both the accused’s interests and the State’s interest in avoiding useless and expensive trials, citing United States vs. Mendoza (4 Phil., 124), United States vs. Grant & Kennedy (18 Phil., 122), United States vs. Marfori (35 Phil, 666), and People vs. Solon (47 Phil., 443).

The Court further explained its settled doctrinal distinction between the pre-arrest “summary examination” under sections 13 and 14 of General Orders No. 58, on one hand, and the full preliminary investigation procedure in the later statutes, on the other. It held that when a judge of first instance conducted the preliminary investigation under sections 13 and 14 of General Orders No. 58, that investigation “included both the summary examination before the accused is arrested and the preliminary investigation proper” described in Acts Nos. 194, 1450, and 1627, following People vs. Solon.

Resolution of Alleged Misinterpretations of Solon and Other Cases

The petitioners insisted that the doctrinal reading adopted in Marcos et als. vs. Judge Roman Cruz (G. R. No. 46490) abandoned the Solon doctrine, and they invoked People vs. Red (55 Phil., 706) as demonstrating a reversal. The Court rejected these assertions.

It clarified that the cited paragraph in Marcos et al. vs. Judge Roman Cruz (G. R. No. 46490) did not contain an interpretation abandoning Solon. What that earlier ruling meant, the Court stated, was that the preliminary investigation then made by the respondent judge under section 13 of General Orders No. 58 could not be viewed as equivalent to the “trial” contemplated in section 66 of General Orders No. 58, merely because the accused had neither been present nor had the opportunity to cross-examine the government’s witnesses during the summary investigation stage.

As to People vs. Red, the Court stated that the only legal question in that case concerned whether waiver of a preliminary investigation implied a waiver of the summary examination before arrest. The Court held that the reasoning in People vs. Red did not reverse or abandon Solon. It only recognized that the summary examination under section 13 differed from the preliminary investigation procedures under Acts Nos. 194 and 1627.

The Court reiterated that the right to preliminary investigation, as it interpreted and applied it, was not impaired by the understanding that a judge of first instance who proceeded under sections 13 and 14 of General Orders No. 58 effectively conducted the complete preliminary process contemplated by the later statutes, as previously held in People vs. Solon. The Court also observed that the Legislature had not created discrimination when the preliminary investigation was placed in the hands of certain fiscal offices; therefore, it found no logical reason to assume that a judge of first instance’s conduct under sections 13 and 14 would provide less safeguarding than the alternative statutory procedures.

Court’s Disposition on the Motion for Reconsideration

Applying this doctrine to the facts, the Court concluded that the petitioners were not entitled to a further prelimin

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