Title
Marcos, Jr. vs. Robredo
Case
P.E.T. Case No. 005
Decision Date
Nov 17, 2020
Election protest by Marcos vs. Robredo; PET denies motions for Justice Leonen's inhibition, citing lack of bias evidence, upholds impartiality, and rejects undue delay claims.
protest
election results
bias

Case Summary (P.E.T. Case No. 005)

Factual Background: The Motions for Inhibition and Re-Raffle

On November 9, 2020, protestant filed a “Strong Manifestation with Extremely Urgent Omnibus Motion” seeking, among others, the inhibition of Justice Leonen and a re-raffle of the election protest. Protestant alleged that, since October 2019, the protest had “remained in limbo,” and he attributed the delay to Justice Leonen’s supposed bias and partiality. Protestant’s theory rested on several assertions: that Justice Leonen’s prior views, including a dissenting opinion in Ocampo v. Enriquez (referred to as the “Marcos burial case”), revealed prejudice against protestant and his family; that Justice Leonen had circulated “Reflections” recommending dismissal of this protest even before he became part of the “panel,” based on a news article; and that the pattern of deferments and referrals to the Office of the Solicitor General and the Commission on Elections displayed ignorance and contributed to delay. Protestant further argued that delaying resolution contravened public policy and cited Republic Act No. 1793, claiming a statutory timeframe for deciding presidential election contests.

The OSG, through Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, filed an omnibus motion in similar terms, also seeking Justice Leonen’s inhibition and a re-raffle. The OSG claimed the proceedings had suspended “in animation” the People’s interest for close to a year and argued that the undue delay reflected bias. It echoed protestant’s references to Justice Leonen’s dissent in the Marcos burial case, added a claim that Justice Leonen’s alleged attitude and remarks showed hatred toward the Marcos family, and cited Chavez v. Marcos to suggest deficient competence and probity. The OSG also invoked Republic Act No. 1793 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 884 as legal bases for immediate resolution, and it relied on Pimentel v. Salanga regarding careful self-examination when circumstances reasonably capable of inciting bias exist.

Protestee’s Response and the Framing of the Sole Issue

Protestee opposed the motions. She noted that, in an earlier August 28, 2018 PET resolution related to protestant’s motion for inhibition of Justice Caguioa, the Tribunal warned protestant against making “unfounded and inappropriate accusations,” stressing that protestant allegedly repeated the same approach. She argued that the accusations against Justice Leonen were of the same import as those previously leveled against Justice Caguioa. She also illustrated the purported illogical nature of protestant’s reasoning by pointing out that, if protestant’s theory were accepted, it would logically extend to other Tribunal members who had voted in related matters or who were appointed during the same political period, among others.

The PET then treated the sole issue as whether Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen should inhibit himself from the election protest.

Governing Standards on Inhibition

The PET declared that the motion for inhibition was not its first encounter with protestant’s attempts to disqualify the member-in-charge. It emphasized that, in the August 28, 2018 resolution, it had already warned that future “unfounded and inappropriate accusation[s]” would be dealt with more severely. It reiterated the governing rule: the Tribunal would not require a judge to inhibit absent clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that the judge would dispense justice according to law and evidence.

The PET applied Rule 8, Section 1 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court on Inhibition and Substitution of Members of the Court. It noted that the rule provides mandatory grounds for inhibition and also allows voluntary inhibition for a just and valid reason other than those enumerated. It underscored that the inhibiting member must state the precise reason for inhibition and that the grounds invoked by a movant must fit the rule’s scheme or amount to a credible, just cause.

The PET concluded that neither protestant nor the OSG cited a clear ground under the rules. It found that there were no prior proceedings in which Justice Leonen had participated; it also found no professional engagement; no pecuniary interest; and no relationship within the relevant degrees of consanguinity or affinity with either party or their counsel that would call for inhibition under the cited rules. The PET also stressed the procedural burden on the movant: one seeking the inhibition of a magistrate must present clear and convincing evidence of bias, and protestant failed to do so.

Allegations of Undue Delay and the Inapplicability of the Cited Decision Timelines

Protestant framed undue delay as a ground supporting inhibition. The PET addressed this by discussing Republic Act No. 1793, Section 3, which protestant cited for a timeframe for deciding election contests. The Tribunal held that the provision protestant relied upon was no longer good law due to constitutional and statutory developments. It explained the historical evolution: Republic Act No. 1793 was passed to fill a void under the 1935 Constitution; it was impliedly repealed under the 1973 constitutional arrangement where the President was no longer directly voted by citizens; and the Vice-President position was constitutionally non-existent in that period. With the restoration of the direct election of the President and Vice-President, the National Assembly passed Batas Pambansa Blg. 884, and later, under the 1986 Constitution, the PET became a constitutional institution.

The PET also relied on Administrative Matter No. 10-4-29-SC and quoted Rule 67 of the PET’s 2010 Rules, which ties the Tribunal’s decisional process to the procedures in Sections 13 and 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, rather than to any statutory deadline for rendition of judgment. The PET stated that there was no rule requiring presidential and vice-presidential election protests to be decided within twenty months or twelve months, as protestant and the OSG suggested.

On the merits of the delay allegation, the PET described the actual procedural steps taken in the case. It noted that in an October 15, 2019 resolution, the parties were informed of the results of revisions and appreciation of ballots in the 5,415 clustered precincts in the pilot provinces, and the parties were directed to submit memoranda on delineated issues within 20 working days. It then recounted that requests to view and photocopy the voluminous records were granted, and memoranda dated December 19, 2019 were submitted and noted in a January 7, 2020 resolution. The PET further stated that subsequent incidents concerning the contracts of Tribunal personnel were resolved with dispatch and that constitutional issues and serious factual allegations required verification from the Commission on Elections, as well as comments by the OSG, for a “fair and full resolution” of the protest. It emphasized that directives to these offices were not driven by opinion pieces, citing a prior August 28, 2018 resolution where it had ruled that an opinion piece in a news website and an unauthenticated social media video were not credible or admissible evidence.

The Collegial Nature of PET Decision-Making and the Limits of Inhibition as a Litigation Strategy

The PET proceeded to frame the balance between a litigant’s right to seek inhibition and the judge’s duty to decide cases without fear of repression. It explained that deliberating with fellow justices and arriving at a majority decision is the Tribunal’s basic function, and it quoted provisions of the Supreme Court Internal Rules on the decision-making process, including the role of the member-in-charge, the process for action on incidents, and the rules governing continuances and reflections.

The PET stressed that it is a collegial body and that when it resolves matters, it acts as one body whether sitting en banc or in division. It clarified that the member-in-charge merely recommends actions and that the final action is the product of consultation, voting, and majority concurrence among members. It also rejected the insinuation that orders or legal steps taken in a proceeding could be treated as proof of a member’s incompetence or bad faith. It held that if protestant and the OSG were to argue that a member-in-charge’s issuance of orders showed gross ignorance, the argument, in effect, imputed gross ignorance to the Tribunal itself.

Rejection of the Proposed Grounds Based on Prior Opinions and Alleged Bias

The PET then addressed the substantive arguments used to infer bias.

First, it rejected the OSG’s and protestant’s interpretation of bias as proof of prejudgment. It defined bias as a preconceived notion favorable or unfavorable to a party, and it clarified that bias does not arise merely because a Tribunal did not rule according to a movant’s preferred outcome. The PET also rejected the notion that impartiality requires a “tabula rasa” state. It held that impartiality is better understood as the ability to acknowledge initial impressions and remain open to change based on evidence, consistent with the independence of mind required of appointed justices.

Second, it rejected protestant’s narrative that Justice Leonen had lobbied for the dismissal of the protest. The PET relied on its own October 15, 2019 resolution, which it said released the results of revision and appreciation of ballots and showed that protestee’s lead had increased after revision. It noted that Justice Leonen did not vote for immediate dismissal; instead, he joined the majority in directing the parties to file memoranda on the results and on protestant’s Third Cause of Action so that due process rights would be protected. The PET treated this participation as inconsistent with protestant’s story of a vengeful, prejudged magistrate.

Third, the PET rejected the argument that Justice Leonen’s dissent in Ocampo v. Enriquez could disqualify him automatically in the present case. It explained that protesta

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