Title
Marcos, Jr. vs. Robredo
Case
P.E.T. Case No. 005
Decision Date
Oct 15, 2019
Ferdinand Marcos Jr. contested Leni Robredo's 2016 VP election win, alleging fraud. PET dismissed his first claim after a recount in pilot provinces increased Robredo's lead; other claims deferred pending further evidence.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 72870)

Initial Reliefs and Precautionary Measures

Upon filing, protestant paid an initial P200,000. The Tribunal issued a Precautionary Protection Order (July 12, 2016) directing COMELEC and its agents to preserve ballot boxes, ballots and election paraphernalia for 92,509 clustered precincts covered by the Protest. Protestant also sought custody, technical examination and forensic testing of automated election equipment and data for the protested precincts.

Protestee’s Answer and Counter-Protest

Protestee filed a Verified Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and a Counter-Protest contesting 7,547 clustered precincts in 13 provinces (including allegations of vote-buying and substitution in protestant’s bailiwicks). Protestee moved to dismiss the Protest for lack of jurisdiction, insufficiency in form and substance (alleging inadequate specificity under Rule 17), and for being a pre-proclamation controversy that should have been raised before the NBOC. She denied the factual predicates for annulment in ARMM provinces and challenged protestant’s evidentiary showing. Both parties paid initial deposits.

Procedural Disputes on Timeliness and Verification

The parties litigated multiple procedural issues including alleged late filing of protestee’s Answer with Counter-Protest, the timeliness and verification of protestant’s Answer to the Counter-Protest, and related motions to strike or expunge. The Tribunal found the Protest sufficient in form and substance, denied several motions to dismiss, admitted protestee’s Answer, and ordered clarifications from PhilPost regarding receipt dates. The Tribunal emphasized the constitutional allocation of exclusive jurisdiction (SC sitting as PET) over contests relating to Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections.

COMELEC Closure/Stripping Activities and Automated Equipment

COMELEC applied to conduct closure/stripping activities for AES paraphernalia in compliance with its contract with Smartmatic and logistical necessities (lease expiration, return of goods by December 1, 2016). Issues raised included which items were covered by the Precautionary Protection Order, whether closure/stripping would affect election results data, and transfer/ownership under the AES Contract (Articles 6.9–6.10). The Tribunal authorized COMELEC to conduct physical stripping of equipment components while protecting election results data, allowed party representatives to observe, and ordered preservation of removable items containing results.

Cash Deposit Requirements and Financial Incidents

Under Rule 33 the Tribunal required a cash deposit (P500 per precinct) for protests necessitating retrieval of ballot boxes. Given the scope (protestant’s 39,221 clustered precincts composed of 132,446 precincts; protestee’s 8,042 clustered precincts composed of 31,278 precincts), the Tribunal computed large additional deposits and required staged payments (protestant: total P66,023,000 in two installments; protestee/counter-protestant: total P15,439,000 in two installments), with subsequent directives and motions regarding deferments and third-party attempts to subsidize deposits denied.

Formation of Hearing Panel, Preliminary Conference and Purposes

The Tribunal appointed a panel of three Commissioners and scheduled a preliminary conference. The preliminary conference goals were to obtain stipulations, simplify issues, limit witnesses, plan retrieval and revision logistics, and set the pilot province testing established by Rule 65. The Tribunal categorized protestant’s causes of action into: (1) annulment of proclamation by challenging authenticity of COCs (First Cause — later dismissed), (2) revision and recount of ballots in 36,465 clustered precincts (Second Cause — primary focus), and (3) annulment of elections in ARMM provinces for terrorism (Third Cause). The parties were ordered to limit witnesses and to adopt the Judicial Affidavit Rule.

Dismissal of First Cause of Action and Adoption of Pilot Province Procedure

The Tribunal dismissed the First Cause (protest challenging the authenticity of COCs as a basis to annul proclamation) as futile because protestant did not seek manual recount of all precincts; annulment of proclamation alone would be meaningless without recounting ballots nationwide. The Tribunal thus confined active proceedings to the Second and Third Causes and designated Camarines Sur, Iloilo, and Negros Oriental as protestant’s pilot provinces under Rule 65 to serve as test cases for whether to proceed with broader revision.

Motion for Retrieval, Decryption and Technical Examination — Pilot-Only Scope

Protestant moved for retrieval of ballot boxes and decryption/printing of ballot images and for technical examination of signatures (EDCVL vs VRR) across multiple provinces. The Tribunal ordered retrieval, decryption and printing and technical examination exclusively for the pilot provinces (Cam. Sur, Iloilo, Neg. Oriental), deferring technical examination for ARMM provinces under Rule 65 until after the initial determination, citing logistical constraints and the purpose of Rule 65 to use pilot provinces as test cases.

Retrieval Missions and Venue Preparations

The Tribunal organized exploratory retrieval missions, coordinated with COMELEC, local governments and security forces, and concluded retrieval of ballot boxes from the three pilot provinces by September 19, 2018. The Supreme Court gymnasium was retrofitted and designated as the revision venue; the Tribunal amended internal rules governing the composition, qualifications and compensation of Revision Committees (RCs/Head Revisors/Party Revisors) and prepared a Revisor’s Guide to govern revision under AES.

Revision Process: Revisor’s Guide, Composition, and Procedures

Revision was undertaken by fifty (50) RCs, each with a Head Revisor and one representative from each party; Revision Supervisors (lawyers) and a panel of Commissioners supervised, handled incidents, and referred complex irregularities for panel review. The Revisor’s Guide required authentication (security features, UV light) of ballots, segregation into categories (for Protestant, for Protestee, other candidates, stray votes), registering of party objections/claims, and preparation of Revision Reports. The revision objective: physical recount and recording of claims/objections for subsequent Tribunal appreciation.

Gag Order, Enforcement and Fines for Sub Judice Violations

The Tribunal repeatedly directed the parties to observe the sub judice rule to prevent public disclosures that could prejudice proceedings. Despite warnings, public statements continued; the Tribunal found violation and imposed fines of P50,000 on both parties (June 26, 2018), with stern warning of harsher sanctions for recurrence.

Threshold Issue for Valid Votes (50% v. 25%) and Use of Election Returns

Rule 43(1) of the 2010 PET Rules prescribed a 50% shading threshold for valid votes; the Revisor’s Guide originally referenced resolution of threshold issues by Revision Supervisors. Protestee argued for a 25% threshold based on COMELEC RMA Visual Guidelines and EN BANC Resolution No. 16-0600; COMELEC later contended machine calibration used approximately 20–25% threshold. The Tribunal initially retained the 50% rule but, after submissions, amended Rule 62 of the Revisor’s Guide (Sept. 18, 2018) to direct Head Revisors to use the Election Return (ER) generated by the VCM as the reference for segregation/classification — i.e., to verify how the VCM read and counted votes — and instructed HRs to resolve issues based on Tribunal guidance and to use ERs where present (or certified copies from COMELEC). The Tribunal reasoned this approach is flexible and accords with how votes were actually read during the election.

Decryption, Printing and Custody of Ballot Images and Associated Materials

COMELEC produced guidelines and proposed logistics for decryption and printing of ballot images; the Tribunal ordered decryption and printing for the pilot provinces beginning October 23, 2017. COMELEC estimated slow throughput (approx. 40 clustered precincts/day, seven months to complete). Protestant paid costs and provided supplies; the Tribunal allowed parties to obtain soft copies/photocopies of decrypted images subject to incidental costs but retained custody of official printed/authenticated copies for revision purposes; COMELEC formally turned custody of printed ballot images, audit logs and election returns for pilot provinces to the Tribunal on December 3, 2018.

Incidents During Revision — Integrity Issues and Incident Reporting

Revision supervisors and the panel reported incidents: wet/damaged ballots, tampered/excess ballots, inconsistent BEI signatures, and cases where SD cards had been rezeroed resulting in missing ballot images for three clustered precincts. Incident Reports were referred to Commissioners who examined ballots against corresponding election documents, performed barcode matching where ballots exceeded registered voters, and issued memoranda recommending continuation of revision using decrypted images when necessary and recording discrepancies for Tribunal appreciation.

Completion of Revision and Commencement of Appreciation

The Tribunal completed revision for pilot provinces (April 2, 2018 to February 4, 2019) covering 5,415 clustered precincts (three of 5,418 cluster precincts excluded due to unavailable ballots/images). The Tribunal then proceeded with appreciation under approved Ballot Appreciation Guidelines (promulgated November 6, 2018), whose cardinal objective is to discover and give effect to the intent of the voter, to rule on parties’ objections/claims, and to determine validity of ballots and votes.

Categories of Objections and Claims Used in Appreciation

The Tribunal defined and applied categories for objections (spurious ballots, substituted ballots, shaded-by-one/two or more, marked ballots, pre-shaded ballots, and requirements of specificity) and claims (ambiguous votes, over-vote

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