A.C. No. 7732 - Marcoleta vs. Borra

Case Summary (A.C. No. 7732)

Factual Background: The Alagad Nomination Dispute

During the 2007 National and Local Elections, competing factions associated with complainant and Osabel each filed a separate list of nominees for the party-list group Alagad. After Alagad won a seat in the House of Representatives, the protagonists contested who should represent the party.

The dispute proceeded through Comelec resolutions. By Omnibus Resolution dated July 18, 2007, the Comelec’s First Division resolved the controversy in favor of Osabel. Commissioner Borra wrote the ponencia, while Commissioner Brawner concurred. The matter was elevated to the Comelec En Banc, which, through Resolution dated November 6, 2007, reversed the First Division and reinstated complainant’s certificate of nomination.

Comelec En Banc had required a re-hearing due to the failure to obtain the necessary majority voting. Despite the conduct of a re-hearing, the required majority vote still could not be obtained. Ultimately, the First Division’s Omnibus Resolution was affirmed, and the controversy’s final disposition traced back to the First Division’s July 18, 2007 resolution, the issuance of which became the centerpiece of the disbarment complaint.

Initiation of the Disbarment Complaint and Core Allegations

Complainant filed the present complaint for disbarment alleging that respondents violated judicial conduct norms, and also invoked statutory standards under Republic Act No. 6713. The complaint centered on allegations that respondents acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence, particularly in the timing and manner by which the case was resolved within Comelec.

Complainant asserted, among others, that respondents intentionally delayed the resolution of the case allegedly beyond the period claimed to be required by Sec. 8, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, and that the delay was meant to affect political campaign outcomes tied to an assumed timeline before May 14, 2007. Complainant also alleged deception and manipulation in how the issue was supposedly framed and handled by respondents, including claims that the resolution allegedly changed the common issue agreed upon by the parties into one allegedly beyond Comelec’s jurisdiction.

Further, complainant criticized the assailed 20-page Omnibus Resolution for purportedly failing to cite any law to support its conclusion that resignation could not be considered because it was allegedly not in written form. Complainant also alleged that respondents allegedly gave more credence to minutes purportedly submitted by Osabel despite having previously avowed that the minutes were partisan and could not be upheld as a faithful depiction of prevailing facts. Complainant maintained that respondents did not properly rely on the party’s Constitution and By-Laws (CBL), and further attacked the characterization of respondents’ votes and any dissenting remarks as indicative of partiality.

Complainant also pursued a line of attack on respondents’ retirement-related actions and other alleged compliance lapses, including claims of violations under Republic Act No. 3019 in connection with the purportedly “hurried” release of retirement benefits, and claims of culpable constitutional violation connected with Comelec’s adjustment of compensation schemes via Resolution No. 7685.

Supplemental Complaint Against Brawner and Respondents’ Threshold Defenses

Complainant later filed a Supplemental Complaint dated February 12, 2008, this time charging respondent Brawner with tampering with the record of proceedings in a related case by allegedly falsely stating in an Order dated February 5, 2008 that a re-hearing had occurred, that both parties had agreed to simultaneously file memoranda during the re-hearing, and that the parties had filed their respective memoranda.

In response, respondent Brawner’s Answer argued, in substance, that complainant’s remedy should have been an appeal through a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, rather than a disbarment complaint. Respondent Brawner also asserted that, as members of a constitutional body enjoying presumptions of regularity in the performance of official functions, he and respondent Borra were insulated from disbarment complaints as impeachable officers.

Respondent Borra, for his part, argued that the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons of Judicial Ethics could not apply to him because he and his co-respondent were not judges. He further emphasized that Comelec performs quasi-judicial functions and administrative duties and that its internal rules governed over any general code of conduct invoked by complainant. Respondent Borra also claimed the complaint was premature because the validity and legality of the resolutions remained subject to review, and that the complaint was meant to harass and punish the respondents for exercising judgment in the cases filed before them.

Complainant replied that respondents could not shelter themselves behind the idea of impeachability to evade disciplinary accountability. Complainant specifically invoked Sec. 1 (1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, contending that the “impeachable officer” insulation from disbarment should apply only to the majority of Comelec members who should be lawyers, and not to the commissioners being charged. Complainant maintained further statutory and constitutional allegations, including the retirement-benefits-related claim and the compensation-scheme adjustment claim.

Mootness as to Brawner

During the Court’s consideration, respondent Borra retired from the Comelec on February 2, 2008, while respondent Brawner died on May 29, 2008. As to respondent Brawner, the Court held that the disbarment complaint had become moot. It thus dismissed the complaint as to Brawner on that ground.

Impeachment Requirement for Bar Members Among Impeachable Officers

The Court then addressed the argument that the disbarment complaint could proceed without first pursuing impeachment. Guided by its earlier rulings in Jarque v. Ombudsman, In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, and Cuenco v. Fernan, the Court reiterated the rule that an impeachable officer who is also a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without prior impeachment.

The Court considered complainant’s invocation of Sec. 1 (1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution to evade the rule to be specious. The Court stressed that the constitutional requirement that a majority of Comelec members be lawyers pertains to the desired composition of the Commission. The appointment of a full complement of lawyers was not constitutionally precluded. The Court noted that at the time the complaint was filed, respondents and three other commissioners were lawyers. Accordingly, respondent Borra, as an impeachable officer and a member of the Bar, could not be held to answer administratively for alleged errant actions in the Comelec without first being removed from office through impeachment.

Effect on the Complaint’s Disciplinary Reach: Still Evaluating the Central Alleged Misconduct

Respondent Borra’s retirement did not automatically compel dismissal. The Court clarified that even if impeachment was required to remove an impeachable officer from office, the case’s substance still anchored on the alleged issuance of the Omnibus Resolution dated July 18, 2007, which was written when respondent Borra was a Comelec First Division commissioner. The Court treated complainant’s accusations largely as challenges to the correctness of resolution-related conduct within the quasi-judicial framework.

The Court held that the alleged failure of respondent Borra to resolve the controversy within the prescribed time did not render the resolution null and void. The Court reasoned that prescribed periods in that context partake of a directory requirement due to the Comelec’s numerous cases and logistical constraints. Thus, complainant’s framing of the delay and its supposed intent did not transform the matter into a disbarment-justifying administrative transgression.

Assessment of the Alleged Grounds: Judgment vs. Administrative Wrong

The Court also rejected complainant’s approach that the grounds for disbarment were grounded in supposed judicial ethics violations. It considered that complainant’s contentions were, in essence, fastened on asserted errors of judgment or grave abuse of discretion in appreciating facts—matters proper for judicial review rather than administrative discipline through disbarment.

The Court then addressed the reliance on Sec. 58 of Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code—that the chairman and members of the Commission shall be subject to the canons of judicial ethics in the discharge of their functions. The Court explained that this provision related to the quasi-judicial nature of Comelec’s work and directed guidance by the canons of judicial ethics during the exercise of quasi-judicial discretion. However, it held that the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary applied only to courts of law, and that it did not govern quasi-judicial officers such as Comelec commissioners who had their own codes of conduct.

The Court further stated that even if it were to evaluate respondent Borra’s actions under the Code of Professional Responsibility, complainant failed to establish any specific incidents and sufficient evidence to show that respondent Borra engaged in dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct in his capacity as a lawyer. The alleged acts in the complaint pertained to respondent Borra’s official functions as a Comelec commissioner, and the evidentiary threshold for disbarment was not met.

Retirement Benefits and Anti-Graft Allegations

The Court disposed of the retirement-benefits-related allegation by finding nothing irregular. It held that the release of retirement benefits to respondent Borra was consistent with Memorandum Circular No. 10 (series of 1995) of the Office of the Ombudsman, which required a prospective retiree to present a cer

Case Syllabus (A.C. No. 7732)

Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta (complainant) filed a disbarment complaint against Comelec Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra (Borra) and Romeo A. Brawner (Brawner).
The complaint charged Borra and Brawner with violating Canons 1 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons 4, 5, 6 and 17 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Complainant additionally alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
The underlying controversy involved competing party-list factions of Alagad, where the First Division and En Banc of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) issued conflicting resolutions.
The Court ultimately dismissed the complaint against both respondents on different grounds: mootness as to Brawner and lack of merit as to Borra.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Complainant prosecuted the case as a disciplinary proceeding for disbarment rooted on alleged misconduct in respondents’ official acts in Comelec proceedings.
Respondent Brawner died during the pendency of the case, and the Court treated his death as rendering the case moot as to him.
Respondent Borra retired from the Comelec on February 2, 2008, which did not automatically end the administrative aspect of the complaint but affected the Court’s analysis of the asserted grounds.
Complainant filed an initial complaint and then a Supplemental Complaint after further events involving an alleged tampering of records in SPA No. 07-020.
Borra and Brawner answered and commented with threshold objections to the propriety and timing of a disbarment complaint.
The Court resolved the matter by applying controlling jurisprudence on impeachment requirements for impeachable officers who are members of the Bar and by assessing whether the allegations amounted to specific, provable lawyerly misconduct.

Key Factual Allegations

Complainant alleged that during the two thousand seven (2007) National and Local Elections, two warring factions within Alagad each filed separate nominee lists for the party-list group.
Complainant and Diogenes S. Osabel contested who had the right to represent Alagad after Alagad won a seat in the House of Representatives.
The Comelec First Division resolved the dispute in favor of Osabel through Omnibus Resolution dated July 18, 2007, with Borra writing the ponencia and Brawner concurring.
Complainant’s faction later obtained a reversal by the Comelec En Banc through a Resolution dated November 6, 2007, which reversed the First Division and reinstated complainant’s certificate of nomination.
Complainant alleged that because the required majority vote was not obtained, the Comelec ordered a re-hearing, yet the necessary majority still could not be obtained.
After subsequent developments, the First Division’s Omnibus Resolution was eventually affirmed, and complainant treated these acts as evidencing manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence.
Complainant asserted that respondents intentionally delayed resolution from the five-day period allegedly mandated under Sec. 8, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure to nearly four months after submission.
Complainant alleged that the delay was intended to allow Osabel to campaign by a date, such that Osabel would not be left alone and without resources to secure victory.
Complainant alleged that the timing and manner of disposal subverted the will of voters who allegedly believed complainant’s faction would represent them.
Complainant claimed that respondents changed the “sole and common issue” stipulated by the parties into one allegedly beyond Comelec’s jurisdiction.
Complainant asserted that the assailed 20-page Omnibus Resolution allegedly cited no law when ruling that complainant’s resignation could not be considered for not being in written form.
Complainant alleged that respondents allegedly gave more credence to Osabel’s minutes while simultaneously professing that the minutes were partisan and could not be upheld as a faithful depiction of facts.
Complainant alleged that respondents allegedly did not rely on the Party’s Constitution and By-Laws (CBL) in the manner they declared.
Complainant characterized Borra’s “dissent” vote as a marginal note invoking “conscience and judiciousness” rather than a proper dissenting opinion.
Complainant argued that Brawner’s dissent allegedly showed leaning toward Osabel and relied on claims allegedly unsupported by facts, including reference to a different case and an alleged “continuing stature” of Osabel as Alagad President.
Complainant filed a supplemental complaint alleging that Brawner tampered the record in SPA No. 07-020 by falsely stating in an order dated February 5, 2008 that there had been a re-hearing, that the parties agreed to file memoranda simultaneously, and that memoranda were filed.

Statutory and Rules Framework

Complainant anchored alleged misconduct on violations of Canons 1 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly duties of integrity, independence, impartiality without delay, diligence to ascertain facts, and prompt disposal within required periods.
Complainant also relied on Canons of Judicial Ethics, asserting standards on essential conduct, industry, promptness, and judicial opinions that show understanding and non-arbitrary conclusions.
Complainant further invoked Republic Act No. 6713 to support allegations of unethical conduct by public officials and employees.
Complainant relied on Sec. 58 of Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881), which states that the chairman and members of the Comelec shall be subject to the canons of judicial ethics in discharging their functions.
Complainant invoked Section 1 (1) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, arguing that a majority of Comelec members must be members of the Philippine Bar and that this should allow disbarment without first requiring impeachment.
Respondents invoked constitutional and procedural limitations on disciplinary accountability for impeachable officers, citing the Court’s requirement that impeachment must precede disbarment of an impeachable officer who is also a member of the Bar.
The Court applied the controlling standards derived from Jarque v. Ombudsman, In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, and Cuenco v. Fernan.
The Court treated the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary as applying exclusively to courts of law, not to Comelec, which performs quasi-judicial functions.
The Court considered the sufficiency of evidence under the alternative framework of the Code of Professional Responsibility